




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1842

THE CONGRESS

OF

VERONA:

COMPRISING A PORTION OF

MEMOIRS OF HIS OWN TIMES.

BY

M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following work must not be confounded with the Memoirs that are intended to appear only after my death. I now put forth that which I may utter while living; the rest will be revealed from the tomb.

My literary life is pretty well known; but I have hitherto never alluded to my political career. I speak of it here for the first and last time; referring to my administration for the rest.

While narrating as a *public* man, the most striking event of the Restoration, I have been compelled to introduce rather prominently, those public men with whom I came into contact. Let not this, however, create alarm. It is myself only that I have not spared. If I have suffered to remain in certain documents, the unmerited encomiums which were bestowed upon me, I have also carefully, and without abatement, recorded the censure I received. I have used towards myself, while writing history, the impartiality of the historian.

Should this work succeed, it will effect a revolution in the opinions held with regard to a memorable epoch in our annals. The task is irksome, and I ought perhaps not to reckon upon success. I have to contend

with national vanity, which is ever reluctant to admit that it has been mistaken. It would needs have us suppose that the Congress of Verona was unfavourable to the war; that the expedition against Spain was an undertaking required by the interests of France; that the *ordonnance* from Andujar, however well sounding, was, when philosophically viewed, a political error; in a word, we are required to believe the very contrary of what we once believed. But the proofs are before us, and it is useless to deny the testimony of authentic documents. I do not defend myself from the charge of being the principal author of the war in Spain. If, by chance, I have been in the right when opposed to the majority, I may be condemned, but the same condemnation will apply to the events.

It is perhaps hardly worth while to explain, that when speaking of myself, I have, as the occasion required, employed both the pronouns *We* and *I*: using the former as the representative of an opinion, and the latter when figuring myself on the scene, or when uttering an individual sentiment. The singular pronoun becomes offensive from its arrogance; the plural *We* is rather a controversial as well as a royal style. With this explanation I will leave the two pronouns to correct each other.

MEMOIRS,

&c.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

BEING ambassador at the court of St. James's in the year 1822, we were in readiness to proceed to the congress of Verona in quality of one of the representatives of France. But before entering on a detailed account of that congress, the affairs which were discussed at it, and the events which followed it, it will be necessary to take a retrospective glance. M. de Martignac, directing his attention to the war in Spain, of which we are about to speak, saw the necessity of re-establishing the pre-existing order of things. He was impartial and moderate. He admired the expedition of 1823, of which such erroneous views were taken :

yet he himself did not discern the full extent of its consequences. The volume which he published is well worthy of perusal. It is a work full of interest and sound sense, written in correct and elegant language ; but tinged with a tone of melancholy. The author is now on the point of death. His recital interests and affects the feelings, like the last accents of a voice which we are destined never more to hear.

CHAPTER I.

SPAIN.

Treaty between Bonaparte and Charles IV.—Godoy—The Spanish Princes at Bayonne—Murat in Madrid—His portrait—Insurrection—Murat and Joseph change crowns.

FROM the latter half of the 15th century to the commencement of the 17th, Spain was the first nation in Europe. She endowed the universe with a new world ; her adventurers were heroes ; her captains became the first generals in the world. She introduced her manners and even her national costume at the different European courts. She reigned in the Low Countries by marriage ; in Italy and in Portugal by conquest ; in Germany by election ; in France by our civil wars ; and she menaced the existence of England, by the marriage of Philip II. with the daughter of Henry

VIII. Spain beheld our kings in her prisons, and her soldiers in Paris. To her language and her genius we were indebted for Corneille. At length this mighty nation declined. Her famous infantry was annihilated at Rocroi by the hand of the great Condé. But the downfall of Spain was not complete until Anne of Austria gave birth to Louis XIV., who, from his native land was transported to France, before the sun had set on the dominions of Charles Quint.

In comparing the wrecks of these two great monarchies with their previous glory, the following lines of Bossuet recur painfully to the memory :
“ Peaceful Isle, witness of the union of two great empires, of which thou art the mutual limit ! Ever memorable Isle ! August day, on which two sister nations, long hostile, and then reconciled, advanced to their confines, led by their sovereigns, but not to the warlike conflict. Sacred fêtes, happy marriage, nuptial veil, benediction, sacrifice, must I now mingle your ceremonies and your pageants with funereal pomps ? Is the pinnacle of glory conjoined with its downfall ? ”

Spain, under the family of Louis-le-grand, buried herself within the Peninsula until the breaking out of the French revolution. The Spanish ambassador attempted to save Louis XVI., but did not succeed. Heaven received the martyr.

The designs of Providence are not to be changed in the hour of the transformation of nations.

Charles IV. ascended the throne of Spain in 1778. Then appeared Godoy ; the man whom we have seen cultivating melons after having revolutionized a kingdom. Godoy was first the favourite of Queen Maria-Louisa, and afterwards of King Charles. The sovereign did not feel what he was, and the favourite was insensible to what he had done. Thus they were naturally placed on a level. There are two ways of despising sovereign power : through greatness or littleness of mind. The sun shone alike on Diocletian at Salona, and on Charles IV. at Compeigne.

Spain first declared war against the French republic, and afterwards concluded peace at Bale. From that time Godoy entered into the interests of France. The Spaniards hated him ; but they manifested their attachment for the Prince of the Asturias, who was no better than Godoy.

In 1807 we were walking on the banks of the Tagus, in the gardens of Aranjuez. Ferdinand passed on horseback, accompanied by Don Carlos. He little thought that the Pilgrim from the Holy Land who was then looking at him, would one day assist in restoring him to his throne.

Bonaparte, after successes in the north, turned to the south. For invading Portugal, which was

protected by England, he entered into an understanding with Godoy. A treaty signed at Fontainebleau on the 29th of October, 1806, determined the march of the French troops through Spain. This treaty declared the deposition of the House of Braganza, assigned a part of southern Portugal to the King of Etruria, another part to Charles IV., and the kingdom of the Algarves to Godoy. Junot entered Portugal on the 19th of November, 1807; the family of Braganza embarked for Brazil on the 27th. Napoleon's eagle soared above those towers which had witnessed the coronation of the corpse of Ines, the fitting out of the fleet of Gama, and which had resounded with the lays of Camoens.

“La no largo oceano navegavam.”

The occupation of Portugal masked the invasion of Spain. On the 24th of December in the same year, the second French army entered Irun. Public hatred augmented against the Prince of the Peace. The majority of the nation wished to place the Prince of the Asturias on the throne of his ancestors. The Prince was arrested, and made some base declarations. Murat, general in chief of the French forces, advanced on Madrid.

The population of Madrid rose with shouts of

“ God save the Prince of the Asturias !” “ Death to Godoy !” Charles IV. abdicated. The Prince of the Peace was taken prisoner, and Ferdinand VII., the new king, saved his life. Napoleon feigned indignation at the violence exercised towards the old king, and at length offered his mediation between the father and son. Charles was summoned to Bayonne, and Godoy quitted Spain under the protection of Murat. Ferdinand, in his turn, repaired to the meeting at Bayonne, in spite of his own distrustful disposition, and the opposition of his subjects.

This scene, befitting Italy in the middle ages, seemed like an inspiration of Macchiavelli, that rare genius, who, like all men of powerful talent and base feeling, was distinguished for noble sayings and petty deeds.

The drama might have produced a great effect, had it been worth while to take the trouble of acting it. But what was the object ; and who the parties concerned ? A half-invaded kingdom, Charles and Ferdinand. The plot was, that Charles should take the crown from his son, in order to abdicate anew in favour of the sovereign whom it might please the conqueror to name. This was acting a play for the mere pleasure of acting. Where was the use of mounting a stage and assuming a false character, when Napoleon was all-powerful, and

there were no spectators to be deceived. Nothing is less congenial with power than intrigue. Napoleon was not in danger. He might have acted with undisguised injustice. It would have cost him no more to seize upon Spain openly, than to take the trouble to steal it.

Charles IV., the queen, and the favourite, proceeded to Marseilles, with the promise of a pension, and accompanied by a band of ragged musicians. The Infants repaired to Valençay. Ferdinand again degraded himself, and vainly solicited the hand of a relative of Napoleon. The Spaniards, deprived of their sovereign family, were now free. Bonaparte, having committed the fault of removing a king, found he had to contend with a people.

Two parties at that time divided the Peninsula ; the one, composed of almost all the rural population, was excited by the priests, and was implicitly obedient to their laws, religious and political : the other included the *Liberales*, a class called more enlightened, and for that reason less imbued with prejudice, and less fortified by virtue. The contact of foreigners in the maritime towns had infected the latter party with our views, and with the principles of our revolution.

Between these two parties, an isolated opinion was here and there discernible. A few sla-

vish admirers were chained to the car of Napoleon : we have seen them in exile under the name of *Afrancesados*. Thus the Spaniards formerly applied the appellation *Anjovinos** to the Neapolitans attached to France.

The massacres perpetrated in Madrid on the 2nd of May were the signal for general insurrection. Murat had the misfortune to witness these troubles : that general was like king Agamante ; and he flew to the charge in a delirium of spirit and courage, as if borne on the hippogriff.

But even Murat's dauntless valour was unavailing. Enemies rose up in every direction : even the woods and forests seemed to be in arms. Reprisals had no effect ; for Spain is a country in which reprisals are natural. The battles of Baylen, the defence of Gironna, and of Ciudad Rodrigo, announced the resurrection of a people who had previously been regarded merely as hosts of beggars. From the remote shores of the Baltic

* M. Chateaubriand writes by mistake *Angevines*, (i. e. inhabitants of Anjou), which is not Spanish but French. Charles de France, Duke of Anjou, son of Louis VIII., was king of Naples and Sicily at the period of the memorable Sicilian Vespers, 1282. His competitor for power in Italy was Don Pedro, king of Aragon, who then obtained possession of the Island of Sicily. The followers of Pedro called the partisans of Charles on the continent *Anjovinos*.—(Translator.)

La Romana led his regiments to Spain, as in former times the Franks escaped from the Black Sea, and triumphantly landed at the outlets of the Rhine. The conquerors of the best soldiers in Europe now shed the blood of monks with that impious fury which the French had imbibed from the buffooneries of Voltaire, and the atheistical madness of the reign of terror. It was, however, these cloistered monks who eventually checked the successes of our veteran troops. The French little expected to see these holy men bestriding like fiery dragons the burning pillars of the edifices of Saragossa, loading their carabines amidst the flames to the sound of mandolines, and the mingled strains of the Bolero and the Requiem. The ruins of Sagonta beheld and applauded.

Napoleon recalled the Grand-Duke of Berg : between his brother Joseph, and his brother-in-law Joachim, he was pleased to effect a slight transmutation. He took the crown of Naples from the head of the former and placed it on the head of the latter ; and in return Murat ceded the crown of Spain in favour of Joseph. Bonaparte without ceremony placed the crowns on the heads of the two new kings ; and they marched off as unconcerned as two conscripts who had changed caps by order of their corporal.

CHAP. II.

Character of the Spaniards.

IN considering Spain at the present day, people fall into a serious error who persist in judging the Spaniards according to the ideas formed of other civilized nations. Napoleon shared this common mistake. He imagined he could conquer Iberia as he had conquered Germania, by violence and seduction : he was deceived.

The Spaniards are Christian Arabs : there is a degree of wildness and improvidence in their character. The mixed blood of the Cantabrian, the Carthaginian, the Roman, the Vandal, and the Moor, which flows in their veins, does not flow like other blood. They are at once active, indolent, and haughty. "Every indolent nation," says the author of the *Esprit des Lois*, in speaking of the Spaniards, "is haughty ; for those who do not work consider themselves as the sovereigns of those who are laborious."

The Spaniards, entertaining as they do the highest opinion of themselves, do not form the same notions of justice and injustice as we do. A transpyreanean shepherd, tending his flock, enjoys the most absolute individuality.

In Spain, independence destroys liberty. What are political rights to a man who attaches no value to them, and whose ideas of the blessings of life are all included in his proverb—" *Oveja de casta, pasto de gracia, hijo de casa*"*—to a man who, like the Bedouin, armed with his pistol, and followed by his flock, requires for his daily fare only an acorn, a fig, and olive? He thinks himself fortunate if he occasionally meet with a traveller whom he can rob and send to heaven, and is perfectly happy in being beloved by a poor shepherdess and an aged father: " *Padre viejo, y manga rota, no es deshonor*."† The sprucely-dressed *Majo* of the Guadalquivir, with his dagger in his shepherd's crook, and his hair confined in a net, never distinguishes the thing from the person, and reduces all difference of opinion to the alternative—*Kill or die*.

This character is so profoundly stamped in the Iberian mould, that the modernised portion of the

* *Sheep of pure breed, free pasture, and to be one of a family.*

† *An aged father and a tattered sleeve are no disgrace.*

Spanish population, whilst they have adopted new ideas, retain, in spite of those ideas, their primitive national feelings. Could it ever have been believed that Spaniards would slaughter monks? Nevertheless, this crime was committed without mercy and without remorse by the Liberales. It must be remembered too that the authority of the priesthood was of old date in the Peninsula: this authority was not founded merely on the religious faith of the people; it had likewise a political source. Even as early as the year 852 the martyrs of Cordova sacrificed themselves for national liberty no less than for the triumph of the Christian religion.

The monks fought under the banners of the Cid, and entered Grenada with Ferdinand. Yet, in spite of all this, monks have been massacred by the Spaniards. How is this to be accounted for? Because a hatred, which had not its birth in Spain, and which was alike ungrateful and ungrounded, was, by a certain party, directed against them. In Spain, whether for love or for hatred, assassination is a crime which is resorted to as it were naturally. The Spaniards seem to regard every thing attainable by death. The adventurers who, sword in hand, advanced into the waves until they were half submerged, for the purpose of taking possession of the Pacific Ocean,

had undertaken to restore America to her deserts. The Spaniard coveted the domination of the universe, but of the unpeopled universe. He was content to reign over the desolate world, like his God seated peacefully in the solitude of eternity.

With this uncontrollable despotism of character, there is allied, by a singular contrast, a disposition at once dull and comic, mild and ostentatious. In their civil wars, when an advantage is gained, it might naturally be expected that the party gaining it would follow it up. But no such thing. The victors halt on the scene of triumph, publish rodomontades, sing songs of victory, play the guitar, and bask in the sun. The defeated party quietly retires, and act in the same manner when its turn of triumph comes. Thus there is nothing but a succession of battles without results. If a town be not taken to-day, it will be taken to-morrow, or the day after to-morrow, or ten years hence, or never ; it matters not. The hidalgos tell us that they were engaged for the space of six hundred years in expelling the Moors.

They entertain too high an admiration of their own perseverance. The patience transmitted from generation to generation at length becomes merely a family shield, which protects nothing, and which serves merely as an ancient decoration to hereditary misfortunes. Decrepid Spain still fancies herself

invulnerable, like the old recluse of the convent of St. Martin, near Carthagenæ. Gregory of Tours informs us that the soldiers of Leuvielde found the monastery of St. Martin abandoned by all its inmates except the abbot, who, though *bowed* by age and misfortune, was *upright* in virtue and sanctity. A soldier, who had raised his sword, and was about to cut off the holy man's head, instantly fell to the ground and expired.

Spanish politicians partake of the faults of Spanish warriors. In circumstances the most critical, they direct attention to insignificant measures, deliver harangues, in which they talk of doing great things, but their speeches are never followed by acts. Is this because they are stupid or spiritless? No. It is because they are Spaniards. They are not impressed with events as other people are: they see things in a different light. They leave time to bring about results, which they never attempt to hasten by any efforts of their own. A Spaniard transmits his life to his son without fear and without regret. The son, in his turn, pursues the same course as the father. Some centuries afterwards, the affairs which the dead have bequeathed will be terminated to the satisfaction of the living. In any other country these affairs would have been settled in a week.

If, in the troubles which at present agitate

Spain, the mass of the people appear to act according to principles less peculiar, that only proves that the general spirit of the age has made its encroachments on the national character : as yet, those encroachments have produced no injurious effects. The mass of the people view with indifference those events which make a great noise at a distance. When insurrection or faction show themselves, the people close their doors and let them pass on. The bulk of the population is indifferent to either of the conflicting parties. Don Carlos cannot take a town ; Christina cannot keep possession of the country districts. The Spaniards have at all times shown themselves ready to fight the battles of rival kings. But, the war once ended, every one returns contentedly to his allegiance, or rather to his business employments. In Spain, these employments are less variable than in other countries, on account of the insulated localities occupied by the rural populations, and the sort of vagabond trade which is carried on by the traffic of caravans, through desolate plains and amidst uninhabited mountains.

CHAP. III.

Old Political Laws of Spain.

FROM the foregoing picture, it might naturally be presumed that the Spaniards never knew political liberty. That would be a mistake. Their political liberty has fallen into disuse, because a superior element has predominated.

From Recared to Roderick, sixteen national councils formed the body of the administrative institutions : the laws of these councils received the sanction of the civic judges, and the consent of the people. The monarch who, in the pure dynasty of the Goths, was elective, swore to fulfil his duties. Trial by *peer*, or by jury, was a part of the fundamental law. The acts of the Council of Toledo were the basis of the statutes.

The Visigoth consigned to the Roman colonists in Spain the privilege of living under their own civil and municipal laws ; accordingly, they re-

tained the forms of the social organization of Rome. Intestine wars, which deprived the vanquished of the benefit of the law of nations, such as it then existed, were less frequent in Spain than in other countries, and slavery became less general. The nobles had not the privileges which were attainable by the sword in France and in Italy ; the feudal system was little or not at all known. The people became pastoral and agricultural, but they never descended into vassalage. The Moorish police laws were in harmony with the laws of the Roman police. The companions of Muza introduced into the country the wild independence of the Arabs, which still continues firmly rooted in Christian Spain.

The checks successively given to the power of the kings of Spain were immense. The states-general of Aragon are well known. Philip II. deprived them of their greatest privileges ; but he dared not touch the law which prohibited the levying of taxes without the consent of the states. Navarre, Biscay, Catalonia, and the kingdom of Valencia enjoyed important privileges. Castile defended herself in another way : she had her imperious council, and had possessed herself of authority. The Aragonese, protected as they were by their charters, could not attain any offices or dignities unless they held property under the

crown of Castile. The Marquess de Denia was obliged to take the Castilian title of Duke of Lerma; the Marquess de Castel-Rodrigo was compelled to transfer his credit and favour to his friend the Count de Olivarez.

The Cortes of Leon was the first assembly of the kind in which the deputies of the third estate were received. These deputies were admitted in 1188, a date which proves that the Spaniards took the lead among emancipated nations.

By degrees the citizens consigned to the sovereign the task of paying their deputies, and choosing the towns whence they should be deputed. This privilege was conferred on two cities only. The tyrant Charles V., who naturally leagued with the other tyrant, the people, increased the represented towns to the number of twenty: at the meeting of the council of Toledo in 1538, he excluded from the Cortes the clergy and the nobility.

The kings of Spain, emancipated from the yoke of the Cortes, were compelled to submit to other restraints: the councils or their decrees controlled the monarchy. Seats in these councils were considered so desirable that they were sought and solicited by the viceroys of Naples and Sicily, the governors of Flanders and Milan; even the favou-

rite Olivarez deemed it expedient to pay court to the councils.

Thus it is obvious that Spain was not a stranger to the representative government. If personal independence was enjoyed to a greater extent than general liberty, (even though the latter served to fortify the former) ; if the Arab genius prevailed, how are we to account for the efforts that have been made to introduce into Spain the loquacious liberty of a deliberative assembly ? On the other hand is it not extraordinary, since the re-establishment of Cortes was the pretended object, that instead of adopting the national form, recourse should have been had to a foreign model, a model now rejected even by France ? Such however is the fact.

If there exists any circumstance helping to explain this anomaly, it must be the long peace which succeeded the treaty of Bale, and which placed the Peninsula on a footing of close relation with the French republic, whilst other European nations were excluded from Paris. Several of the subjects of Charles IV. were at that time numbered among our most ardent jacobins. The Spaniards have a taste for sanguinary spectacles ; and moreover, the glory of our foreign victories was congenial with their pompous and ostentatious turn of character.

CHAP. IV.

The constitutional regency convokes the general Cortes at Cadiz—The Cortes of Cadiz—The constitution—Its defects—All parties dissatisfied.

AFTER the insurrection in Madrid, and the installation of Joseph, juntas were formed in the provinces, all animated by one common interest, but acting upon various plans. The necessity of a central government was speedily felt. Thirty-four deputies established themselves as a regency at Aranjuez. Spain, though often invaded, has always been fatal to her conquerors: in Spain, Cæsar had to fight for his life, and Napoleon, the *avant-courier* of the world, was compelled to gallop from the Peninsula like a humble estafette. After various contests the deputies retired in 1808 to Seville, that city which gave birth to the philanthropic Las Casas. The regency convoked a general Cortes, but they had not time to assemble. From the summit of the mountains of

the Sierra-Morena, the French troops, perceiving the valley of the Guadalquivir, spontaneously presented arms: nothing can more vividly convey an idea of the beauty of Andalusia. In like manner our batallions in Egypt paused and greeted with shouts of admiration the mute monuments of forgotten Thebes. The palace of the Moorish kings, now converted into cloisters, was penetrated; the churches were stripped of the master-pieces of Velasquez and Murillo; even a portion of the bones of Rodrigo were carried away: men who felt themselves so strong in glory feared not to defy the manes of the Cid and the shade of Condé. The regency fled from Seville and took refuge in the Isle of Leon. On the 24th Sept. 1810, the general Cortes, convoked without any condition of eligibility, assembled, and shortly after established itself in Cadiz.

Cadiz, *el emporio del orbe*, the mart of the universe, where all things are bought and sold, was well suited, by its detached situation, to the meditation of great designs. There Tarsis reigned, and there dreams became prophetic. In that spot Cæsar dreamed that he should abuse his mother, that is, according to the interpretation of Suetonius, that he should violate his country. Liberty now seated herself in that city, once reputed to be miraculous, and whence the orb of day, magnified

to *three times its usual size*, plunged into the Atlantic, imparting to the ocean augmented splendour and immensity. But the legends of old times, and the magnificence of nature, merely inspire romantic feelings, which do not accord with the present age. The recollection of the galleons and of South American treasure, mercantile feelings, combined with political passions, animated the factions imprisoned in the Isle of Leon; and the spot which had been termed Elysium was now metamorphosed to Tartarus. The Cortes, confined as it was between the two most powerful barriers in the world, Bonaparte and the sea, did not present the dignified aspect of an assembly on whose decisions the fate of a nation depends.

The sittings of the Cortes were a parody on the French revolutionary assemblies. The great national party was not predominant; for the Cortes swarmed with Liberales. All sorts of measures were proposed: proscription, destruction, and murder. Renegade priests offered themselves as executioners; performing the two-fold vocation of heaven and earth. Never was a noble cause so ignobly conducted. The moderate voice of Arguelles appealed in vain; his eloquence was not listened to, though it was called divine. "In

Cadiz," says father Jerome, "they speak with grace, dignity, and energy, but without accent."

The Act of the Constitution of Cadiz was promulgated on the 19th of March, 1812. It proclaimed the principle of the sovereignty of the people. The king was declared inviolable; the Catholic religion the only religion of the state; and the constitution could not be altered except with the concurrence of three successive legislators, and by virtue of a decree not subject to the royal sanction: the remaining articles were deplorable. There was to be only one chamber; soldiers were to have the right of interpreting their oaths as they might think fit; the king was deprived of an absolute veto; the public functionaries were to be appointed by the Cortes, &c.

The act was grounded on false bases. Absolute sovereignty belongs neither to subjects nor to monarchs; both will alike abuse it: it belongs only to God, or to the genius delegated from God. The Spaniards should have studied the principles of Gonzalo at Cordova, in preference to the doctrines of Marcana in his cell at Toledo.

All nations, impressed with the instability of human things, have sought a security beyond this world, with the view of giving permanence to their institutions. All republicans, as well as

royalists, have appealed to the altar in support of their institutions : all have applied to their principles the epithet *sacred*. But what has it availed them to declare the crown or liberty inviolable, when that crown and that liberty are daily violated ? This fragility has induced all legislators, modern as well as ancient, to have recourse to *the Divine right*, and it helps to excuse, if it does not justify, the imprudence of entrusting the power of God to the weak head and erring heart of man.

The constitution of Cadiz did not satisfy every one, though all submitted to it from necessity : in like manner the army of the Duke of Wellington formed a centre round which the Guerillas rallied. The Spaniards, much as they hate foreigners, have never appeared in so admirable a point of view as when they have mingled with the people of foreign countries. They did not impose their yoke on Europe until they in some sort identified themselves with the inhabitants of the Franche-Comté, a portion of Burgundy, and the Netherlands.

At first the people consented to the general Cortes, for the sake of protection against France. Monks fought in the name of men who despised them, who pillaged and murdered them : monks have almost always ranged themselves on the side of liberty, even when proscribed ; they are in fact *the people* of old times, only cloaked and cowed.

The royalists shed their blood by order of the jacobins. In the end, all that was supposed to have been done for national independence was found to have been done for that which is styled political liberty. When Spain was delivered, the result of her marvellous efforts was found to be merely a mutilated constitution. All gazed with astonishment, and exclaimed, as they contemplated the tottering edifice, "Is this our work?"

CHAP. V.

Bonaparte restored Ferdinand to liberty—The decree of Valencia—The constitutional Cortes put to flight—Ferdinand breaks his word—Executions—Mutiny in the army of the Isle of Leon—Riego—Insurrection in Madrid—Ferdinand's decree, re-establishing the constitution of Cadiz.

THE hour had arrived. Bonaparte, with a hand which Heaven had shorn of its power, unbarred Ferdinand's prison and restored him to liberty. Ferdinand entered Spain, greeted by benedictions and fêtes. A decree, emanating from the Cortes of Cadiz, enjoined him to accept and to take his oath to the constitution of 1812. The newly liberated king had his itinerary traced out for him: his resting places were fixed upon, and the speeches which he was to deliver were prepared. Ferdinand took no heed of this insolence: only twenty-four hours earlier he had been compelled to obey commands: every minute has its degree of power or weakness. The monarch advanced to

Valencia. The new army and the whole population invited him to reign as his ancestors had reigned. A minority of the Cortes, composed of sixty-nine members, petitioned him to annul the Act of the Constitution. This was termed the *Protest of the Persians*.

On the 4th of March, 1814, Ferdinand VII. published the decree of Valencia. This decree, after calling attention to historical facts, and pointing out the impossibilities of the constitution, contained the following declaration :

“ I abhor despotism ; it is incompatible with the intelligence and the civilization of the nations of Europe. In Spain kings were never despots : neither the laws nor the constitution authorize despotism.

“ However, to prevent abuses, I will treat with the deputies of Spain and the Indies ; and, in the Cortes lawfully assembled, composed of the above mentioned deputies, measures shall be taken to adjust solidly and legally all acts requisite to ensure the welfare of my dominions.

“ Attention will be directed to the means most advisable for re-assembling the Cortes. Personal liberty and safety will be guaranteed by laws which, whilst they secure public order and tranquillity, will leave to all my subjects the enjoyment of rational liberty. All shall have the pri-

vilege of communicating through the medium of the press their ideas and thoughts, so long as they confine themselves within the bounds which sound reason prescribes."

The constituent Cortes resisted, and appealed to force. But force, which is at once the parent and child of success, laughed at them. They fled, and Ferdinand entered Madrid an absolute king, a *Rey neto*.

But this *Rey neto* immediately broke his word. He condemned the preservers of his throne to prison and exile. The army remained unpaid. The colonies had just effected their total emancipation. A *camarilla* repaired and regilded the old sceptre ; it was deemed a sufficient protection for a throne no longer sheltered by the domes of Burgos, Toledo, and Cordova. Conspiracies were hatched. Porlier and Lacy took up arms, the former in Galicia, and the latter in Catalonia. Both had, in the war of independence, shed their blood for the king ; but, by his sentence, they perished on the scaffold. We pass by the gibbets of Madrid and Valencia, where many liberal plebeians suffered.

In the Isle of Leon was assembled the army destined to re-conquer the colonies. The officers recounted to the troops their old perils, and the

uselessness of their sacrifices. Complaint is the voice of conspiracy. O'Donnell, Count de Abisbal, who was to command the projected expedition, was at the head of the conspirators. He betrayed them, or unintentionally revealed their secret.

The abortive project was renewed. Lopez-Banos, Arco-Aguerro, San Miguel, Quiroga, and Riego, swore to restore the constitution of Cadiz. On the 1st January, 1820, Riego took up arms. He captured General Calderon, the successor of Abisbal. He then joined Quiroga, who had the command of another batallion, and both failed in an engagement before Cadiz.

Disturbances broke out in Madrid, and General Freyre marched, at the head of 15,000 troops, to put down 10,000 insurgents. Communications were interchanged. Riego, with San Miguel, sallied from the Isle of Leon, followed by a column of 15,000 men. He traversed Andalusia, entering Algésiras, Malaga, Ronda, and Cordova. They were every where well received, and every where speedily forgotten. Deserted by his troops, Riego concealed himself in those mountains, celebrated by the penitence of the knight immortalized by the satirical genius of Cervantes—a greater, though a more insane hero, than Riego. The unfortunate general did not find the new society which he

sought amidst the storms of revolutions. Christopher Columbus, after having discovered a world, sleeps peacefully in the royal chapel of Seville.

The insurrectionary spirit in the Isle of Leon, far from diminishing, continued to increase. Corunna was agitated by Agar ; Saragossa by Garay, and Navarre by Mina.

Abisbal retired to Madrid. He was sent to restore order among the mutinous troops, and, in the vicinity of Ocana, he joined his brother, who proclaimed the constitution. Immediately the regiments assembled tumultuously at the *Puerta del Sol*. The king degraded himself. On the 6th a decree, countersigned by the Marquess de Mataflorida, announced that though the constitution of Cadiz had been set aside, yet that the Cortes were about to meet. The royal schedule was torn ; the stone of the constitution, which had been overthrown in 1814, was again raised up. On the 7th appeared the following definitive decree of Ferdinand.

“ The will of the people is declared. I have resolved to affix my oath to the constitution promulgated by the general and extraordinary Cortes in the year 1812.”

Thus was tyranny crowned by cowardice, and bad faith by perjury.

Prisons, whose gates were once more thrown

open, sent ministers to the royal palace. Arguelles was made minister of the interior, Garcias Herreros minister of justice, and Canga Arguelles was appointed to the department of finance. Perez de Castro and Antonio Porcel were also recalled. All these men were more or less connected with the Cortes of Cadiz. Like our old revolutionists, they had gained experience by time; they attempted to check the spread of mischievous opinions, but found they could not. This is the mistake into which such men invariably fall.

These ministers were assisted by the Supreme Junta, until such time as the Cortes could be assembled, in the same manner as the Commune of Paris aided the Convention. Clubs were opened. The army of the Isle of Leon, by whose exertions the victory had been gained, not content with honours and endowments, aspired to take part in state affairs.

Opinions were divided in Europe. England congratulated Ferdinand on his acceptance of the constitution; Russia declared that his conduct had doomed the destruction of royalty; Prussia and Austria expressed their sentiments in an ambiguous tone. France, through the medium of the Duke de Laval, recommended the Spanish government to come to an arrangement with the other powers of Europe. M. de la Tour-du-Pin,

the French envoy at Madrid, mediated between the king and some of the leading Spaniards, and obtained some modifications in the constituent Act. Great Britain, who merely regarded her interests, and to whom the welfare of the Spanish nation was an object of indifference, was apprehensive that France would obtain considerable influence in the cabinet of Madrid, and accordingly she opposed our salutary counsel.

France performed her duty. She did not congratulate the King of Spain, and she did not repel official communications. She betrayed alarms, but she hastened to counteract them by hope. Our laudable efforts to alleviate the misfortunes of our neighbours proved unavailing. The orators who poured forth their eloquence against us, established themselves permanently at the coffee-house of Lorenzini.

CHAP. VI.

First session of the Cortes—Two revolutionary principles—Riego—The Tragala.

THE opening of the first session of the Cortes was fixed for the 9th of July, 1820. The king was then to renew his oath. A little insurrection broke out in the palace during the night. The king made a speech; the Archbishop of Seville replied in a strain of ceremonious moderation, similar to that which, in our revolution, was the forerunner of excesses.

The majority of the chamber was composed of the old revolutionists of Cadiz. Their leaders were Calatrava and Toreno. M. de Toreno had not been educated in the grotto of Gavagonda with Favilla and Hermezinda: he was the compatriot of Jovellanos and Campomanes. He was reputed to be a writer of great talent, and he was a clear and concise orator: he had been a traveller. "Spaniards who have seen the world,"

says Messire Duval, "profit by what they see, and are for the most part very good and intelligent people." With Toreno came Martinez de la Rosa, a happy genius of that Vega which may be likened to the valley of Lacedemonia.

The minority consisted of men newly enrolled in the abstractions of conventional theories; men the more violent in proportion as they were young and inexperienced.

The *Afrancesados* and the *Perses* were conciliated by amnesties more or less satisfactory. From these amnesties, however, the Marquess de Mataflorida was excepted, and he took refuge in France. The financial arrears were separated from the current expenditure, to the liquidation of which the revenues of the state were applied. A national bankruptcy having been declared, and a loan contracted, some new taxes of Joseph's creation were levied. The ecclesiastical tithe was converted into a civil tax; but that which had been voluntarily paid to God was refused to man. Laws made to meet existing circumstances overthrew every vestige of the old monarchy. To crown the work of mischief, a law was passed, establishing as a duty the disobedience of the soldier whenever he might receive orders contrary to the constitution.

Formerly revolutions were repressed, because in general they were the offspring of passions, and not of ideas. Passions perish like the body, ideas survive like the intellect: passions may be curbed, but ideas cannot be checked. The revolutionary idea promulgated by us in 1789, after making its way through Europe and America, came back to us from Spain. That country now exhibited a servile copy of our revolutionary course: clubs, motions, assassination and destruction. An essential difference however was observable in the two countries. In France all was done by the people; in Spain all was effected by the army; a circumstance which is calculated to prevent the permanent establishment of political liberty. The Peninsula is a sort of Roman empire: its revolutions are reduced to prætorian troubles and legionary elections. If these anomalies were removed we should see Spain in her real character.

The army of the Isle of Leon still existed; the government decreed its dissolution, and it broke up with some symptoms of resistance. Riego, as governor-general of Galicia, came to Madrid: after attending a banquet, he repaired to the theatre, where he was received with acclamations. The audience rose and commenced singing the *Tragala*. He was dismissed from the army, and

the Lorenzini club was closed: these jacobins halted between the Greve and the Place de la Revolution; the ministers were alarmed at their success, and paused.

A measure relating to the municipalities disturbed the remainder of the session. Ferdinand sanctioned the anti-religious law, and repented: this is the only trait of resemblance between him and Louis XVI. He retired to the Escorial: on the 9th of November, 1820, he came from his palace to close in person the first session of the Cortes, and then again retired with his turbulent coterie.

- All revolutionary clubs got under
down by the army and Spain
to people in France Bay

CHAP. VII.

The Escorial—Victor Saez—Revolutionary procession before the windows of Ferdinand at Madrid—The *Comuneros*—The Constitution of Cadiz at Naples.

THE Escorial is a gloomy monument, a vast barrack for cenobites, built by Philip in the form of a martyr's gridiron, and in commemoration of one of our disasters: it rises on a concrete soil composed of moss and scoria, and is surrounded by black hillocks: it contains royal tombs, filled and to be filled, a library without readers, and master-pieces of Raphael mouldering in an empty sacristy. Its 1140 windows, three-fourths broken, look to the mute spaces of heaven and earth. Two hundred monks and the court used formerly to impart to it the aspect of solitude and society. Adjoining this fearful edifice, which looks like the Inquisition driven into the desert, is a park overgrown with furze, and a deserted village. This Versailles of the Steppes used to be unin-

habited, save during the intermitting visits of the kings. We have seen the thrush of the heath perched on its roof.

Ferdinand withdrew to this Hieronymite retreat, whence he intended to make a sortie on society: but though intrenched amidst its holy architecture, he wanted the grandeur, the severity, the silent experience, the invincible faith of those gloomy arches, those sacred pillars—hermits of stone, bearing religion on their heads. He, the dead king resuscitated, could not sit in his coffin, and extend his arms of dust to meet the future; his powerless *camarilla* afforded him no aid: time had reached the foot of old institutions. Like Honorius, he was surrounded by feeble eunuchs, whilst Alaricus was encamping under the walls of Ravenna. Instead of taking one of those severe and decided measures which indicate strength of character, Ferdinand, who was a man of old feelings and modern manners, ordered General Carravajal to supersede Don Gaspard Vigodet as commandant of the province of Madrid. When Marius was arrested at the gates of Rome, he did not think of dismissals. The insipid remedy, deemed heroic at the Escorial, served only to make bad worse. The permanent deputies manifested their displeasure; the clubs were re-opened; deposition was spoken of; and

the king was ordered to return to Madrid. Ferdinand obeyed ; he dismissed the grand master of his household, Count Miranda ; and sent away his director, Don Victor Saez. The latter was an able man, but he had whispered at the grating of the tribunal of penitence, forgetting that the forum is now the confessional of nations. Don Victor committed another error ; he had laboured for the regeneration of religious faith by the same means which gave it birth : he mistook his ground, he confounded that over which religion had passed, with that to which religion had not yet come. The former is an adulterous solitude, barren, unproductive and impenetrable : the plant withers on its surface ; the seed rots in its bosom. The latter is a virginal and fervid solitude, where the flower blooms and the seed produces the bread of heaven. The desert before faith is not the desert after faith.

On his return to Madrid, Ferdinand, accompanied by his brothers, his sisters-in-law, and the invalid queen, were forced to show themselves at the windows of the palace. The mob had assembled, and a procession was advancing. We saw Louis XVI. enter Paris surrounded by furies, and escorted by the guillotined heads of his guards : here the same scene was acted with Castilian decorations. A man, a woman, and a

priest, raised on the shoulders of the populace, held up to the king the Act of the Constitution. After exhibiting it for some time to his gaze they withdrew it, kissed it, and then held it up again. Next a child was raised up : he likewise held in his hand the Act of the Constitution. This child was the son of General Lacy, as yet a feeble avenger, but a living and implacable enemy.

Whilst the procession passed along, the king stood at the palace window : behind him were grouped his terrified servants, his despairing family, and almost lifeless queen. Ferdinand fancied himself one of the invincible despots of the middle ages ; he was no such thing. The Marquess de las Amarillas, the war minister, resigned his post, and was succeeded by Valdes. Bishops fled, grandees were sent into exile : among the banished was the Duke del Infantado, who was nothing but an honest inutility.

Along with the free-masons, whom Arguelles and Valdes had joined, arose the *Comuneros*, an association which revived recollections of the reign of Charles V. They styled themselves *Knights Comuneros*, and declared themselves the champions of equality and liberty. They took an oath, pledging themselves to try, condemn, and execute any individual, not excepting the king and his successors, who should deviate from

certain principles : this was a fearful oath in a country in which the commission of murder is a sort of common right. These secret societies were protected by the laws, and supported by the public clubs.

The king and the council were daily subjected to some new insult. A people who have fought for their independence often disclaim the yoke of liberty, and accept chains in its stead. The ministers resorted to a vigorous measure : they closed the coffee-house of the Cross of Malta, in the hope of raising themselves in public estimation. In France such an object would not have been deemed worth a thought ; among us contempt is not fatal. We cannot kill men like serpents by spitting on them.*

The king was insulted whilst passing through the streets in his carriage : his guards dispersed the mob. In revolutions, the party defending itself is regarded as the aggressor. The monarch, according to custom, forsook his faithful troops : one day, however, losing patience, he entered the council of state, accused his ministers, enumerated the offences of which they had been guilty, and demanded that the offenders should be arrested. This was a poor imitation of Charles I. of Eng-

* *Serpens, hominis contacta saliva, disperit.*—LUCRETIVS.

land. Ferdinand's family became alarmed, and the measure was not followed up.

The propagandists in the interior of Spain rejoiced to behold their work extending abroad. The constitution of Cadiz had been established in Naples ; but it was merely a caprice, and Naples turned again to her sun and her flowers.

CHAP. VIII.

Second session of the Cortes—Insurrections in Piedmont and Portugal—Disturbances in Grenoble and Lyons—French refugees in Spain—Reign of terror—Venuenza condemned and executed by the people—Morillo arrives from America—Close of the second session of the Cortes.

THE second session of the Cortes opened on the 1st of March, 1821. The king commenced his speech by professing revolutionary sentiments, and then apprised the deputies that he dismissed his ministers. The first part of his speech was calculated to make amends for the latter portions.

Felin and Berdaxi formed the nucleus of a new ministry, which, however, the chambers immediately compelled to resign.

Piedmont and Portugal, following the example of Naples, proclaimed the constitution of Cadiz. Grenoble and Lyons rose; and the Cortes applauded. Toreno attacked us in violent terms; Alpuente recommended intervention in the affairs

of Italy ; Moreno-Guerra was for declaring war against Europe, and dismissing from Madrid the ministers of the allied powers. The defeated parties of every nation took refuge in Spain, where they received encouragement and assistance. Ferdinand expressed his regret for the defeat of the Neapolitans.

The revolutionary party in Spain urged on a reign of terror : they pillaged, imprisoned, banished, and transported without mercy. In Barcelona, Valencia, Corunna, and Carthagená, legal authority was overruled by an illegal and nameless authority. An attempt was now made to cure one evil by means of another. On the 27th of April the Cortes passed two laws : the one, designedly confounding religion with the constitution, decreed the punishment of death to any one who should attempt to subvert either. The other law, the idea of which was borrowed from Danton, deprived the accused citizens of all guarantee : they were tried by a court-martial selected from the corps by which they had been arrested. The sentence was passed in six days, and carried into execution in forty-eight hours after : there was no appeal, no exercise of the right of pardon.

Don Mathias Venuenza, one of the king's chaplains, was accused under the new laws, and was sentenced to ten years at the galleys. The

populace, who held sovereign sway by the force of arms, thought the sentence too indulgent. Accordingly, on the 4th of May, they assembled at the Puerta del Sol and revised the sentence. They condemned the priest to death; and executed him, after dragging him from prison and striking him on the head with a hammer. The mob then repaired to the residence of the judge, who had been guilty of condemning the ecclesiastic to so lenient a punishment as ten years' exile; five of the sovereign people, sword in hand, preceding the executioners. The judge effected his escape. The revolutionists paraded the city, and the clubs resounded with songs in favour of popular justice. The king sought refuge in the midst of his guards, and entreated them to save him. Martinez de la Rosa alone raised a generous voice in the Cortes: courage and eloquence were leagued with the Muses. The press celebrated that memorable day. The murderers founded the order of the *Hammer*; and each wore on his bosom the insignia of that order, as the French republicans at one time wore little guillotines suspended from their button-holes. In revolutionary times the crimes that are committed excite astonishment: but why should they? When a new society is formed, an old society is at the same time destroyed. Crimes then intervene, and act as a solvent, to accelerate the de-

composition of the portion which is destined to perish. Thus we see that when crimes are too odious, and too numerous, scarcely any vestige of the new society remains, because the good is destroyed by the contagion of the bad.

Morillo had just arrived from America, where he had won the glory of being conquered by Bolivar. He was appointed commandant of Madrid. Five members of the Cortes were inclining towards republicanism. They abrogated the law which gave to the monarch the right of closing the clubs. Ferdinand refused his sanction to this measure ; but not being supported by the vote of a second chamber, his opposition was calculated to endanger his life. The degraded and expiring monarchy still struggled for its rights. The close of the parliamentary year was spent in discussions on pretended seignorial rights, and the retention of the colonies was a point obstinately adhered to. The ordinary Cortes in the second session having reached its close, the king was obliged to convoke extraordinary Cortes.

In the interim the permanent deputation was established.

CHAP. IX.

Laws of the *Communeros*—The Fontana de Oro—Prisoners in convents—Riego joins Cugnet—Insurrection in Madrid.

SECRET societies were daily augmenting. Christians at first assembled only in secret, and yet they have gained the dominion of the world. Their two great mysteries were God and morality ; with these two mysteries, gradually revealed, they founded the new human community.

The *Communeros* held their supreme assembly in Madrid, where they had a directing junta. Every province had its provisional *Merindad* ; and each *Merindad* had its tower. Voluntary subscriptions sufficed for urgent wants. The *Communeros*, or the sons of Padilla, soon augmented to the number of 70,000.

Death was the object of this society, as life was the object of Christianity. The *Communeros* took their origin from the Carbonari. They had rami-

fications in France, as we shall presently have occasion to show, in alluding to other sister-associations. Carbonarism was the more fatal, because, having had its birth in camps, it perverted the sword, and armed evil design.

The oath taken by new members on being admitted into the society of the *Communeros*, was as follows :—

“ I swear before God, and before this assembly of Knights *Communeros*, to maintain the rights and liberties of all nations ; to submit unconditionally to the decrees of the confederation, and to put to death any knight who shall fail to fulfil his oath. Should I myself fail, I am ready to avow myself a traitor, to suffer an ignominious death, to be burned, and to have my ashes scattered by the winds.”

The Spanish revolution included one element which was wanting in the French revolution. The latter had only *clubs* ; the former had clubs and *secret associations* ; that is to say, the legislative power and the executive power of mischief.

This explains how an organized anarchy could be conjured up at will on the surface of Spain . this phantom would strike a blow, and then hide itself in the bosom of its mother, Darkness. When all seemed to be tranquil, then a shock like that of an earthquake suddenly disorganized society.

If a calm, fatal to the conspirators, reigned in Madrid, it was speedily broken. At a meeting at the *Fontana de Oro*, it was decreed that a house-painter should be hanged. Morillo dispersed the assassins. Then they wreaked their disappointed fury on some of the royal body guards, who were imprisoned in the convents. It is only in Spain that we meet with the contrast of ancient manners with modern ideas.

In other countries, when a man is condemned, he is thrown into prison. But in Spain, infidel innovators confine their victims in monasteries, banish them to the recesses of a chain of mountains, or cast them on the desolate sea beach. There, amidst the ringing of bells, which serve not as the sequel for pious devotion ; beneath mouldering vaults, amidst cells without hermits, monks without successors, sepulchres without voices ; in empty refectories and forsaken cloisters, at the sanctuary to which Bruno bequeathed his silence, Francis his sandals, Dominick his torch, Charles his crown, Ignacius his sword, Rancé his cerecloth ; at the altar of an expiring faith, where man learns to despise time and life, if he indulge in dreams of passion, there is something in the solitude congenial with the vanity of those dreams.

Morillo, still at the risk of his life, saved the proscribed guards. He himself was denounced at

the *Puerto del Sol*. He demanded his trial, and the outcry ceased.

Riego, who held a command in Aragon, connected himself with a French officer, named Cugnet de Montarlot, who had been prosecuted in France. He had been a lieutenant-general in the service of Napoleon, and was the author of the famous proclamations of the emperor to his troops. Cugnet had been plotting and intriguing in our garrisons, on the frontier of the Pyrennees, and had collected some deserters around him. Riego and Cugnet were nursing dreams of a double republic, and, in the meanwhile, both were arrested. An insurrection broke out in Madrid for the thousandth time. An attempt was made to force the king to return from San Ildefonso, as he had been compelled to return from the Escorial. The populace shouted *Vivo Riego ! Vivo el pueblo ! Vivo the poignard and the hammer !* A picture was prepared. It represented Riego holding in his hand the Act of the Constitution, and overthrowing despotism. San Martin prohibited the inauguration of the picture. In Spain, public fêtes are indispensable to those who wish to excite disorder. Amusements are requisite to render faith corporeal, and to degrade it to the voluptuous and sacrilegious transubstantiation of the *muy gitana*.

In spite of San Martin's prohibition, they re-

solved to execute their project. The guards wavered ; the regiment of Sagonta showed itself ready to join the factious ; Morillo and San Martin were at the head of the citizens. That day was called the *Goldsmith's day* ; because it was in the Goldsmith's quarter that the *sedition was quelled*.

CHAP. X.

Extraordinary session of the Cortes—The yellow fever—The *Decemisados*—Society of the Friends of the Constitution.

THE extraordinary session of the Cortes commenced on the 28th September, 1821. The subjects submitted to its deliberation by the crown were, the territorial division of the kingdom ; the pacification of the colonies ; the improvement of the finances, and the preparation of the civil and criminal codes.

The yellow fever broke out. France sent doctors and nuns of la Charité to Barcelona. A *cordon sanitaire* was established : this necessary measure furnished a pretext for an absurd accusation. What need had France to resort to deception ? She was defending her population against a scourge, by exposing her troops to the two-fold contagion of the American plague and the Spanish revolution.

The assembling of the *cordon sanitaire* excited the disapproval of the Spanish government, which manifested its displeasure in a manner insulting to France. We were regarded as a nation to whom insult might be offered with impunity. The violent revolutionary party indulged in language the most indecorous. Alpuente published a libel, in which he pretended to reveal a plot against liberty abroad and in Spain. Ferdinand VII. and Don Carlos, though not named, were clearly indicated. The blood of 15,000 of the inhabitants of Madrid was demanded. Alpuente was like a plaster cast from the bust of Marat.

The liberation of Riego was called for on all sides. A plot failed on the 29th of Oct. 1821, at Saragossa; but it succeeded at Cadiz. The governors who were sent to the latter city were refused admittance: Juareguy, the commandant who was retained, declared his determination not to obey the orders of Ferdinand. Seville and Murcia followed the example of Cadiz. The insurrection was less triumphant at Cordova, Grenada, and Valencia. At Corunna, Mina was forced to withdraw.

The press, which favours all bad causes, seemed to be every where courting the destruction of its own liberty. It inflamed the fury of the anarchists of Madrid, and adopted for them the title

of *Decemisados*, a title borrowed from the annals of revolutionary France. The press, in short, insulted sovereigns, and promised safety and fraternity to the agitators of Europe.

On the 25th of November, 1821, the king addressed a message to the Cortes, soliciting advice, and complaining of the manner in which he had been treated. Martinez de la Rosa was the president of the Cortes, and he appointed Calatrava to make the report. Calatrava condemned the revolt of Cadiz and Seville; but he likewise censured the inertness of the ministry: the latter fell at the moment when Cadiz and Seville were restored to order. In opposition to the secret societies there was established a public society, called *the Association of the Friends of the Constitution*, which resembled the *Monarchical Association* formerly existing in Paris: the objects of this association were to watch and check the licentiousness of the press, the outrages of petitions, and the violence of demagogue meetings. Three plans of law on these subjects were under legislative discussion, when the king unexpectedly took a step which indicated either treachery or madness:—he proposed to admit unpopular men to a share in the government. Calatrava, the hireling of ambition, immediately voted for the rejection of the plans of law: this measure was

opposed by Martinez de la Rosa. The populace assembled at the houses of the persons who opposed the rejection of the laws, and threatened to massacre them. Morillo dispersed the crowd, and the first legislative attempts of the Cortes were at an end. Unhappy Spain! Yet that ill-fated land had been trodden by Hannibal—had witnessed the continence of Scipio, and given birth to Trajan!

Tibi sæcula debent Trajanam.

CLAUDIAN.

CHAP. XI.

Martinez de la Rosa appointed minister for foreign affairs—Royalist *Serviles*—The Trappist—His portrait—St. Ferdinand at Aranjuez—Don Carlos menaced—Landabura—Troubles—The royal guards engage with the troops of the line and the militia—The guards defeated—Spanish plagiarism on the French republic and empire—Martinez de la Rosa refuses to continue in the ministry—Triumphs of the royalists in Navarre—Emigrations—The author leaves London to proceed to the Congress of Verona.

THE second Cortes, whose proceedings have just been described, was, in comparison with the first, what our Legislative Assembly was to the Constituent Assembly. Among the new members were Anti-Roman priests, and speechifying lawyers and clubbists: then there was Riego, a young military orator, and the Duke del Parque, an old prating courtier. Life has two childhoods, but not two springs. Riego was installed in the president's chair. With a view of balancing the

spirit of the Cortes, the king appointed Martinez de la Rosa minister for foreign affairs.

Three poets, M. Martinez de la Rosa, Mr. Canning, and the author of these volumes, filled, in their respective countries, the post of minister for foreign affairs almost simultaneously. "There are few men," says Montaigne, "devoted to poetry who would not be more proud to have been the father of the *Æneid*, than of the greatest hero Rome produced. I apply myself to state affairs and worldly matters more readily when I am alone: I can mingle cheerfully in large assemblies, provided it be at intervals, and when it suits my humour."

What thinks Martinez de la Rosa, who, like ourselves, is still of this world;—and our illustrious friend Canning, who is now undeceived in eternity?

The session opened at Madrid on the 1st of March, 1822. We were then occupying the post of ambassador to London; sometimes listening to the debates of the British parliament, and sometimes engaged in writing the first part of our Memoirs.

The Cortes entered upon the consideration of some financial questions; but there was no possibility of effecting any good. The press, the secret associations, and the clubs had decomposed

every thing : agitation pervaded Barcelona, Valencia, and Pampeluna. On the one hand were raised cries of *Vivo Dios !* on the other, shouts of *Vivo Riego !* People murdered each other in the name of that which cannot die, and of that which is perishable. In Madrid an engagement took place between the royal grenadiers and some other troops ; parties of young men were seen parading the streets, imploring the blessing of an absolute monarch. In Spain, God and the king are one and the same—*las ambas majestades*. In the bosom of the Cortes deputies were heard boldly to declare that the refusal to hear the complaints of the people authorized the justice of the poniard. Riego, the president, was powerless : he was ever ready to sing the *Irgala*. A couplet may for the moment win a crown of laurel ; but if the couplet be not good, it is soon forgotten, and the poor poet finds his throne changed to a mountebank's booth.

The *Serviles*, who thought their name as glorious a decoration as the regal purple, profited by an interval of repose and of reaction against the secret societies, to regain their lost power. Royalist riots now superseded revolutionary insurrections. The *Decemisados*, the matadors of the *Serviles*, were beaten in their turn ; and they renewed the human sacrifices of their ancestors the

Carthaginians. Monarchical parties rose up. Govostidi, Misas, and other heroes of the old religious stamp, appeared in Biscay, Catalonia, and Castile. These insurrections spread, and in them figured Quesada, Juanito, Santo-Ladron, Truxillo, Schafandino, and Hierro. At length the Baron d'Eroles appeared in Catalonia ; with him was Antonio Maranon Antonio, surnamed the Trappist, who was originally a soldier, but his evil passions drove him to the penitence of the cloister : he bore with the same enthusiasm the cross and the sword : his military uniform consisted of a Franciscan's robe, over which was suspended a crucifix ; at his girdle he carried a sabre, pistols, and a chaplet ; he rode on horseback with a whip in his hand. Peace and war, religion and licentiousness, life and death, were all combined in this one man, whose tongue alternately gave utterance to blessings and curses. Crusades and civil massacres, canticles and songs of glory, the *Stabat Mater* and the *Tragala*, genuflexions and the *jota Aragonese*, the triumph of the martyr and of the soldier ; souls wafted to heaven amidst the incense of the *Veni Creator*, rebels shot amidst flourishes of drums and trumpets : such was the state of distracted Spain.

Ferdinand on the banks of the Tagus, *rio que cria oro y piedras preciosos*, had taken his oath

to the constitution, only to betray it ; his sincere friends implored him to act in accordance with the Cortes, and to modify institutions, which his blind friends pressed him to overthrow. The success of the royalists secretly gratified the monarch ; the hope of uncontrolled sovereignty flattered him. The less we are capable of exercising power, the more we long to possess it.

The 30th of May was the king's festival-day ; it was celebrated by the peasants of La Mancha, assembled at Aranjuez. The ancient glory of the Betis seemed to be revived. "This country," says the Archbishop of Cambray, "seems to retain the charms of the golden age: the women spin the beautiful wool, and then it is woven into cloth of astonishing whiteness. In this mild climate no clothing is requisite save that which decency demands. A piece of fine and light cloth, without being cut in any shape, is fastened round the body, and its long folds are disposed according to the fancy of the wearer."

But the dreams of Fenelon were about to be dispelled by sad reality. In vain did the soldiers repeat at Aranjuez the loyal shouts of the peasantry, as the body guards at Versailles sang, "*Richard ! O mon roi !*" If France had not speedily interfered, Ferdinand would have gone where Richard led Louis XVI. The militia ad-

vanced to attack the populace ; a citizen held up a sword and threatened Don Carlos, that last of a line of kings, now struggling for a heavy crown. At Valencia, a detachment of artillery attempted to deliver General Ellio, who was shut up in the citadel. The insurgents of Catalonia, now regularly organized, had taken the title of the *Army of the Faith*. The Seu of Urgel was carried by assault.

The king came from his country palace and closed the session of the Cortes, on the 30th of June, 1822. A skirmish took place in the streets between the regular troops and the militia ; Landabura, an officer of the guards and a constitutionalist, was killed, and Morillo was appointed colonel of the guards.

For the space of six days, disturbances continued to increase : on one side were the royal troops, and on the other the militia and troops of the line, encamped face to face, with true canicular ardour, swords drawn and matches lighted. However, a disposition was manifested in the palace, to come to an arrangement, and the establishment of two chambers was spoken of. The diplomatic corps surrounded the king, and Count de la Garde urged conciliatory measures. Misfortune then influenced reason. Suddenly a regiment of carabineers revolted in Andalusia ; some batal-

lions of the provincial militia joined that regiment, and all advanced together on Madrid, proclaiming the *Rey neto*. This intelligence turned the heads of the royal family; Ferdinand fell into his natural perversity, and broke off the negotiations which would have saved him.

The 7th of July arrived. Two batallions of the guards remained at the palace; and four others were encamped out of Madrid: these latter troops entered the city during the night. According to a previously arranged plan, they separated into three columns; one marched on the park of artillery, the second to the *Puerta del Sol*, and the third to the Place of the Constitution. Fortune no longer favoured the monarchy. The first of the above mentioned three divisions manifested a disposition to desert, and it was finally dispersed by a few shots fired from the *sacred batallion* of the officers. The second and third divisions were successively routed by the constitutionalists. The two batallions on duty at the palace were without orders, and at six o'clock in the morning they were overcome and superseded by the militia. *Te Deum* was sung on the Square of the Constitution. In Spain God is praised for every thing, even for mischief; in France the Deity is never thanked for any thing. Mouvel called

thunderbolts down upon his head, as if God would heed the buzzing of an insect.

The guards having suffered themselves to be conquered, were broken : a portion of them, who attempted to resist this punishment, were shot. These executions were then deemed events of imperishable memory : it was believed that the spots which had witnessed them would for ever endure, and transmit the recollection of them to posterity. Where are Aletua and Urso, in which the sons of Pompey were defeated, *in quibus Pompei filii debellati sunt* ? No one knows : Strabo does not even record the name of Pompey. Heroes of the mob and of the streets enjoy your evanescent triumph : its recollection will not live as long as the blood-stained pavement of your city of a day ! How many millions of men won with their lives the victories Arbela, Pharsalia, and Austerlitz ? Of those millions of dead, how many survive in memory ? Three : Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon.

Amidst the gloom of these disasters, Ferdinand and his family were developed in an odious light. Their characters betrayed despotic passion and female fury. A timid tyrant urges on a catastrophe, and trembles when it arrives. He descends from the intrepidity of his head to the

cowardice of his heart. There are monarchs of base alloy, who seem as if they had been seated on their thrones by mistake. Most of the calamities of our times may be traced to fears. The coward is seen in the back ground of great events, like the mummy of a king in the pyramid of Cheops.

Continuing their plagiarisms from the French empire, the Spaniards borrowed the name of *sacred batallion*, from the retreat of Moscow. In like manner they copied the buffooneries of the *Marseillaise*, the *sans culottes*, the sayings of Marat, and the diatribes of the *Vieux Cordelier*; but always rendering actions more vile, and language more low. They created nothing, because they did not act on the impulse of the national genius. They merely translated and acted our revolution on the Spanish stage. Our heads without bodies, and bodies without heads, viewed from a distance, whence their horror could not be discerned, at least presented by the symmetrical arrangement of the vast ossuary an aspect of terrific grandeur. But in the Peninsula the picture was divested of that character. The Spaniards passed over two centuries at one leap, in order to overtake our history; and they took their stand with Voltaire on the one hand, and the Convention on the other. But the repressed

ages returned, resumed their influence, and disturbed the order of things which violence had established. The Spanish nation was truly great in those times, when the people were independent, and the kings absolute. When the nation said *If not, not*, and the monarch signed *I, the King*, the two complete liberties of the democracy of *all*, and the democracy of *one*, met without jostling, and addressed each other in their own proud language : this state of things never existed in any country except Spain.

After the affair of the 7th of July, 1822, the ministry resigned. Fruitless endeavours were made to retain Martinez de la Rosa. The voice of the bard is free. Columella of Gades courageously expressed his regrets for the Republic, in the reign of Claudius. Feelings of melancholy are connected with the name of Martinez de la Rosa, when we behold him leaving the ruins of Grenada to figure in political life. Lope de Vega was in error, when, dedicating to his daughter his play of the Remedy for Misfortune, he wrote to her thus : “ May you be happy, though you do not seem born to be so, if you inherit my destiny.” He ought not to have complained of “ the loss of precious time, and the advance of old age.” Old age is an unavoidable evil ; but the noble heart and the consoling talent are less befitting to the world

than to retirement, where we retain the honour of having an immortal soul.

Lopez Banos was made minister of the war department; San Miguel, minister for foreign affairs; Gasco, minister of the interior; and Navarro, minister of justice. The Marquess de las Amarillas, the Marquess de Castellare, the Count de Casaserria, General Longa, and Brigadier Cisneros, were exiles. Castro-Toreno, the Duke de Belgida, and the Duke de Montemar, grand steward of the household, were dismissed. General Palafox, by way of an expiatory offering, was again received into the palace. San Martin, a man of honour, and Morillo, an able general, found themselves passed over. Morillo nevertheless had declared himself for the conqueror, even before success was insured. He was enervated by civil employments: honours seemed to strip him of his glory.

Victims were demanded; but care was taken to disguise them under the name of the assassins of Landaburu. Goiffieux, who was specially marked out, left Madrid; but he was soon arrested. He might have saved himself by silence or falsehood. He was asked his name, and he replied, "Goiffieux, a first-lieutenant in the guards." He disdained to speak an untruth: he was a Frenchman.

Ellio was executed at Valencia, on a spot which he himself had planted with trees. *Valencia la bella* is deceitful. Her beauty is that of Venozza and Lucretia ; her intrigues and murders are those of Alexander VI. and Borgia.

In Navarre and Catalonia the royalists were triumphant. A political government was established under the name of the *Supreme Regency of Spain during the captivity of the King*. This regency was composed of the Marquess de Matarflorida, the Archbishop of Tarragona, and the Baron d'Eroles. It was installed on the 14th of September, in the *seu* or cathedral of Urgel. Mozarabic edifices were christened cathedrals in the mountains of Catalonia.

Ferdinand was solemnly inaugurated at Urgel, as Charles VII. had been at the castle of Espally. From the turrets of that ancient castle waved the banner embroidered with *fleurs de lys* of gold. Some peasants, and a few gentlemen invested with their heraldic bearings, proclaimed the sovereign of France amidst shouts of *Vive le roi!* That shout included all the constitution ; it created the monarch, who, by the help of Joan of Arc, was to be anointed at Rheims. Charles VII. was dead ; Ferdinand was a captive.

In Madrid it was projected that the prison gates should be forced, and the captives massacred.

Emigrations commenced. The Mediterranean was covered with outlaws who had embarked from the orange groves of Carthagenæ. The breezes of the Atlantic swelled the sails of pilgrims who had deserted the mountains of St. James. Even on the ocean the fugitives were pursued by lampoons which were hurled from the Spanish shores, and wafted over the surface of the waves.

Tragala, tragala,
 Tu Servilon,
 Tu que no quiere
 Constitution.

Dicen que el rey no quiere
 Los hombres libres ;
 Que se vaya a la
 A mandar Serviles.

Tragala, tragala.*

Ferdinand went whither the infernal chorus directed him. The congress of sovereigns assembled in Italy. Lord Londonderry cut his throat in London, and we departed for Verona.

* Swallow it, swallow it ! *Servile*, you who hate the Constitution.

They tell us that the king does not like free men. Let him go to and reign over *Serviles*.

Swallow it, swallow it !

CHAP. XII.

Congress of Verona—The personages who attended it—The familiar portion of the Congress.

WE left London at the end of September, 1822, and proceeded to Paris. After crossing France, the Alps, and the Milanese, we alighted at the Casa Lorenzi in Verona. As yet scarcely any one had arrived ; but by degrees the town filled : there successively appeared the Emperor and Empress of Austria, and their suites ; Prince Metternich, accompanied by the Aulic Counsellors, Gentz and de Floret, four barons, one count, an Aulic reporter, and two other official persons ; Prince Esterhazy, our ambassadorial colleague in London ; Count Zichy, our old plenipotentiary colleague at the court of Prussia ; Baron Lehzoltern, the minister to the court of Russia ; the Emperor of Russia, accompanied by five adjutants-general

(Menzikoff, Frubetzkoy, Oscharowski, Czernitscheff, and Michaud); Prince Wolkousky, general-in-chief of the imperial staff; Count Nesselrode, the secretary of state; Count Lieven, the Russian ambassador to England; Count Pozzo di Borgo, the ambassador to France. Then followed the Duke of Wellington and Lord Clanwilliam; the Marquess of Londonderry, the brother of the late Lord Castlereagh; Viscount Strangford and Lord Burghersh. Lastly, came the King of Prussia, their Royal Highnesses Prince William and Prince Charles; Count Bernstorff and Baron Humboldt.

The Arch-Duke and Arch-Duchess, together with the Vice-King and Vice-Queen, arrived with their courts.

Parma sent the Austrian Arch-Duchess Maria Louisa, now Duchess of Parma, and called the widow of Napoleon. She was accompanied by Count Nieperg, who filled the posts of chamberlain and gentleman of honour to the arch-duchess.

The Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Tuscany, with his Imperial and Royal Highness the Hereditary Prince, came from the native city of Dante and Michael Angelo—that city of which the Grand Duke Albert said, “it ought only to be seen on Sundays and holidays.”

The Arch-Duke and Arch-Duchess of Modeno came from Calais.

His Majesty the King of the two Sicilies repaired from Naples to Verona, accompanied by the Duchess de Floridia, the Confessor Porta and the Prince of Salerno, and attended by two chamberlains.

Sardinia sent her king and queen, and Count de Latour, formerly secretary of state for foreign affairs.

The deputies from France at the Congress of Verona formed a very numerous party. Viscount de Montmorency, our leader, was accompanied by M. M. Bourgot, Pontois, and Damour, in quality of secretaries. The Marquess de Caraman, M. M. de la Ferronnays, M. de Rayneval and ourselves, represented our respective embassies to Vienna, Petersburg, Berlin, and London. In the embassy to London, the Duke de Rauzan, Count de Boissy, and Count d'Aspremont, were included.

M. de Serre, our ambassador at Naples, and M. de la Maisonfort, our envoy to Florence, attended the spectacle merely as lookers on.

M. de Serre was treated with but little attention at the Congress, on account of his liberal opinions : we were not better liked, but we were more feared. We visited M. de Serre, though we were ranged in opposite parties. We found him to be a man greatly superior to the idea we had formed of him. We formed an intimate friendship with him,

and, at his death, he left us proofs of his remembrance.

Thus all the greatness of the modern world was assembled at Verona, amidst the wrecks of ancient greatness left by the Romans.

But there were other ruins, which, though seen, were disregarded : I allude to the deputies of unfortunate Greece. The old monument of the eternal city would have answered their appeal sooner than the sovereigns of a day ; for Athens raised to heaven her suppliant hands in the name of liberty.

This was not our first visit to Verona. We had already made acquaintance with her antiquities, and had been introduced to the Casino Gazola, the retreat of Louis XVIII., whom we had now the honour to represent in the assembly of kings. We had visited the Canossa Palace and the tomb of Can Grande : this Can Grande was the friend of Dante. “ He was a very illustrious man,” says the historian of Riego, “ and the lord of La Scala was charmed by his genius.”

The Vicomte de Montmorency was likewise among the visitors to Verona. Providence, which had deprived of heirs the descendant of the Bouchards, presented to him in exchange the son of the throne—a Bourbon for a Montmorency. As if this glorious adoptive paternity had been con-

ferred only as a last purification, God visited the famished Christian at the foot of the altar on Good Friday, at the hour when the Son of man had accomplished his sacrifice.

We were presented to the sovereigns ; but we already knew them all.

We at first declined an invitation given us by the Duchess of Parma ; but her highness pressed it, and we accepted it : we found her in excellent spirits. The world had taken upon itself the task of remembering Napoleon ; therefore Maria Louisa thought she need not trouble herself to think of him. We informed her that we had met her troops at Placentia, and remarked that she once possessed a much more numerous army. She replied :—" I never think of that." She made some observations, which savoured of indifference, in reference to the King of Rome : she was then *enceinte*. Her court exhibited rather an antiquated aspect, with the exception of M. Nieperg, who was a man of elegant manners. My visit presented only two singularities ; namely, that I was dining with Maria Louisa, and that the widow of Napoleon wore a pair of bracelets made of the stone of Juliet's sarcophagus.

When crossing the Po, at Placentia, a single bark, newly painted, and bearing a sort of imperial flag, arrested my attention. Two or three

dragoons in jackets and caps, such as are worn by the police, were on the bank of the river, watering their horses. We were entering the states of Maria Louisa. This was all that remained of the glory of the man who had melted the rocks of the Simplon, planted his standard in the capitals of Europe, and who raised up Italy after centuries of prostration. Napoleon revolutionized the world ; filled with his name the four quarters of the globe ; sailed beyond the seas of Europe ; soared to the skies, and fell and perished at the extremity of the waves of the Atlantic :—the traveller crossing the Po sees what we saw.

The Princes of Tuscany welcomed us like persons who were anxious to show respect to literature. The King of Sardinia received us like a monarch whose retirement was near at hand. On the high road to Mantua, we frequently met the septagenarian sovereign of Naples, with his long white hair : he was accompanied by two young capuchins with black beards, whose hands were hidden under their sleeves, and who walked in silence like their master. We followed at a distance this hoary monarch of the spring of Sorento, who was soon to be proposed as a rival to France in Spain.

Parties of singers and actors had come to Verona to amuse the other actors, the kings. Cor-

respondents of the London journals too arrived without passports, for the purpose of keeping watch on historical events, and grasping them as they passed along. In the amphitheatre, which is usually a place of refuge for poor families, and which is occasionally lighted by a large forge at the extremity of one of the porticos, crowds collected after the sittings of the Congress to witness dramatic representations. The surrounding villages sent their contingents to make up the audience, for the inhabitants of Verona were insufficient to fill the vast space. Performances in the amphitheatre had taken place only on two previous occasions ; once in honour of Joseph II., and the second time at the fêtes given in honour of Pius VI. when he was proceeding to Vienna. But for the costumes, a spectator might have imagined he was witnessing a resurrection of the ancient Romans.

Descended from the mountains, which are washed by the lake celebrated in Virgil's lays, and by the names of Catullus and Lesbia, a Tyrolean girl, seated beneath the arches of the ancient arena, excited public curiosity. Like Nina, *pazza per amore*, this fair creature was forsaken by a hunter of Monte Baldo, to whom she had given her impassioned heart. She spent her nights in wandering among the ruins, and watch-

ing for the crowing of the cock. Her accents were melancholy ; they were the echo of a broken heart.

The Congress of Verona and its fêtes closed with a horse-race and an illumination. We fled ; our lights were about to be extinguished.

CHAP. XIII.

Neither the allied powers nor M. de Villèle wished for the Spanish war—Erroneous ideas promulgated respecting the Spanish war in 1823—Five principal affairs treated of at the Congress.

THE grand question discussed at the Congress of Verona was the war with Spain. It has been said, and is still repeated, that that war was forced upon France. This is precisely the reverse of the truth. If any one is deserving of blame for that memorable affair, it is the author of this narrative. M. de Villèle was averse to hostilities. It is but just to render to his wisdom and his spirit of moderation, the honour of having, on that subject, concurred with three-fourths of the alliance, with France, and with England. A remark, attributed to the president of the council, but which, if really made, was misinterpreted, seems to have misled public opinion. We shall speak of this in the proper place.

Thus, therefore, all that the opposition promul-

gated in drawing-rooms, in courts of law, in journals, and in pamphlets, whether in London or Paris, is erroneous. We feel happy in having lived long enough to correct this flagrant error.

Once for all, the war with Spain in 1823 was in a great measure due to us ; and we do not fear to assert, that in after ages politicians will give us credit for what we did.

We do not imagine ourselves to belong to that insignificant class of men, who, as Seneca says, float on the surface of the waves of time ; neither do we imagine that the affairs of this world interest those who are beyond the grave ; but by an illusion of our present existence, we attach greater importance to our memory hereafter, than to the opinion that may be entertained of us in our lifetime. Our memory, if it endure at all, must last longer than our life ; and as we shall not be at hand to protect it, we ought to furnish it with the means of self-defence.

At the Congress of Verona, five questions were discussed.

1. The slave trade.
2. The piracies in the American seas, or on the coasts of the Spanish colonies.
3. The disputes between Russia and the Porte.
4. The situation of Italy.

5. The dangers of the Spanish revolution in relation to Europe, and especially in relation to France.

With these general matters, three special questions presented themselves, viz. : the navigation of the Rhine, the troubles in Greece, and the interests of the regency of Urgel. The deputies from Greece, and the envoys of the royalist regency of Urgel, (the representative of the latter was the Count d'Espagne) were not admitted to the Congress. They stood merely in the character of petitioners, and their task was to appeal to the sympathy of the potentates. As to the navigation of the Rhine, it was a question which concerned only the custom-house duties of Holland, and the powers whose dominions skirted the Rhine.

To return to the five principal questions. The misunderstandings between Russia and the Porte were debated in conferences by the representatives of the cabinets of London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna. The Marquess de Caramans, our ambassador to Austria, attended these conferences on the part of France.

The situation of Italy came under the consideration of a sort of Congress, independent of the general Congress. The delegates who assisted at this meeting, were those of the parties interested ;

namely, Naples, Rome, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, Piedmont, the Milanese, and the Lombardo-Venetian States.

In these complicated affairs, the subjects in which France had a voice were—the slave trade, the Spanish colonies, and the question of the eventual war with Spain.

These are the three questions which we shall proceed to develope, touching occasionally on those on which France was not called to give a special vote.

CHAP. XIV.

Prince Metternich—Sittings of the Congress—The Duke of Wellington's memorials on the slave trade, and on piracies—Unreasonable pretensions set forth in the memorial on the slave trade.

THE man who occupies the first station in a country for a considerable length of time,—who continues at the head of a cabinet under successive sovereigns without changing the system at first adopted,—who secures to himself the inviolability of a king, amidst the jealousies of a court, must unquestionably be endowed with talent of the very highest order. Authority must emanate either from the ability of those who govern, or the mediocrity of those who are governed: this remained to be demonstrated in the administration of Prince Metternich. If some fact, and particularly the mischievous chicanery disguised under the name of the King of Naples, do not show a degree of sincerity superior to diplomacy, the fault must not be attributed to the negotiator,

but to the policy he was bound to pursue. The chancellor of state played what he conceived to be his proper part as an Austrian, in the same way as Louis XVIII.'s minister for foreign affairs played his part as a Frenchman. The Prince, amidst his long and constant prosperity, may well pardon the brief and transient success of a year.

The sittings of the Congress were irregular, being held according as communications were made on the part of the different courts. These communications were heard; copies of them were presented to the plenipotentiaries, who, after the lapse of a day or two, replied to them by notes, which were afterwards annexed to the minutes. On the evening of the 24th of November, 1822, we received two memorials from the Duke of Wellington; the one relative to the abolition of the slave trade,—the other, to the measures adopted by his Britannic Majesty against the piracies in the American seas.

All the powers concurred in pronouncing the slave trade to be an abomination, and declared their readiness to concur in any measures which might be deemed practicable to insure the total abolition of that odious commerce: with respect to the particular measures proposed by His Grace for effecting that object, France signified her intention of taking them into consideration.

In the importance which is attached to this great question, we cannot but admire the spirit of Christianity and its influence, past and present, in extending civilization; but at the same time, what a singular degree of perseverance has been manifested by the cabinet of St. James's to introduce at all congresses, amidst questions the most pressing, and interests the most urgent, this incidental and remote question of the abolition of the slave trade. England feared that the traffic which she reluctantly renounced should fall into the hands of another nation: she wished to compel France, Spain, Portugal, and Holland, suddenly to change the system of their colonies, without considering whether those states had attained such a degree of moral preparation as would render it safe to grant liberty to the blacks, by abandoning to the mercy of Providence the property and lives of the whites. That which England had done, other nations were called upon to do, to the detriment of their navigation and their colonial possessions. Because England, who is mistress of the East and West Indies, the Cape of Good Hope, the Isle of France, Canada, and the islands in the Mediterranean, does not want St. Domingo and the Bermudas, for the sake of maintaining her fleets and her seamen,—we were required to cast into the sea, Pondicherri, the Isle of Bourbon,

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Cayenne, Martinique, and Guadaloupe,—we who possess only those miserable and insulated points on the whole surface of the globe. The Marquess of Londonderry, the Duke of Wellington, the enemies of popular freedom in their own country ; Mr. Canning, the disciple of William Pitt, and the opposer of parliamentary reform ; the tories, who for the space of thirty years had been adverse to the measure proposed by Wilberforce, now became enthusiastic for the emancipation of the negroes, whilst exerting all their efforts to skackle the liberty of the whites. Englishmen were sold for slaves in America as recently as the time of Cromwell. The secret of these inconsistencies is found in the private interests and the mercantile spirit of England. If these considerations be not borne in mind, we may incur the risk of being duped by this ardent, though late coming philanthropy. Philanthropy is the base coin of charity.

The task being consigned to us by M. de Montmorency, we read attentively the Duke of Wellington's memorial, and we replied to it article by article. This memorial, artfully deploring the misery of the blacks, concealed, under well-grounded complaints, three unreasonable pretensions : 1st. the right of visiting and inspecting vessels ; 2nd. the right of assimilating the slave

trade to piracy, in order to attack with impunity all the navies in the world ; 3rd. the right of interdicting the sale of merchandize produced in the European colonies cultivated by the negroes ; that is to say, the exclusive privilege of substituting for this merchandize the productions of India and Great Britain. Our answer, given in the collective name of our colleagues, was as follows. We trust that we defended the honour and interests of France.

CHAP. XV.

MY MEMORIAL ON THE SLAVE TRADE.

Reply of the French plenipotentiaries to the memorial of the Duke of Wellington on the subject of the slave trade.

“THE memorial which His Grace the Duke of Wellington communicated to the Congress on the 24th of this month, has been taken into consideration by the plenipotentiary ministers of His Most Christian Majesty.

“ In the first place they declare that the French government fully participates in the anxiety expressed by the British government, to put a period to a traffic which is alike reprehended by God and man. Even though the number of African slaves transported for some years past to the colonies were less than it is computed to be by England, still that number would be far too great. The increasing suffering of these victims of infamous cupidity inspires profound

horror. The nations of Christendom can never make sufficient efforts to efface the stain which the slave trade has affixed to their character ; and the zeal manifested by England, in the prosecution of her benevolent designs, cannot be too highly applauded.

“ But though the allied powers are of one opinion on this question, considered in its moral and religious point of view ; though they unanimously wish for the abolition of the slave trade ; yet that abolition involves questions of a more complicated nature. The ministers of His Most Christian Majesty will proceed to examine these questions in the order in which they are presented in the memorial of His Grace the Duke of Wellington.

“ By the laws of all civilized nations, Portugal excepted, the slave trade is now prohibited. Hence it ensues that that crime, formerly legalized, has become illegal, and that it is subject to the two-fold condemnation of nature and law.

“ The English memorial affirms that this odious contraband traffic in human flesh is especially carried on under the French flag, whether that flag be borne by ships really belonging to France, or merely employed to protect foreign ships.

“ Pirates may hoist honourable colours : France

cannot affirm that brigands have not borrowed her's ; but it will never be with her knowledge that dishonour and crime find protection under the French flag.

“ It is observed that the profits of the slave trade are so great, and the losses so trivial, that the expense of insurance in France for each voyage does not exceed 15 per cent.

“ This is neither a case peculiar to France, nor a singular result of the sort of contraband in question. In England, merchandize the most severely prohibited may be imported under an insurance of 25 per cent. When commerce arrives at the degree of mathematical precision which it has attained at the present day, every kind of contraband trade has its tariff ; and in proportion as prohibitive laws multiply obstacles, fraud is augmented and profits are increased.

“ The memorial admits that His Most Christian Majesty has sacredly fulfilled all the stipulations of his treaty with the four allied powers ; that he has promulgated a law against the slave trade ; and that he has ordered his ships to cruize along the shores of Africa, to enforce the execution of that law : but the memorial adds that the public in France does not appear to view with equal interest the cause which the government supports ; that the French public merely regards

the question as a mask for mercantile schemes and designs hostile to French commerce. It may happen that some of the mercantile classes of society in France may cherish suspicions which commercial rivalry is calculated to create ; but it cannot be reasonably believed that the few colonies which the war has left to France, should be an object of jealousy to a European power possessing islands in every sea, vast territories in Africa and America, and a whole continent in Asia.

“ If public opinion be less fixed in France than in England on the subject here under consideration, that circumstance is attributable to causes which it is our duty to explain : a people so humane, so generous, so disinterested as the French—a people ever ready to set the example of sacrifices, deserves that this apparent anomaly in its character should be explained.

“ In the first place, the massacre of the colonists in St. Domingo, and the burning of their houses, have left painful recollections in the minds of many families whose relatives and fortunes were sacrificed in those sanguinary revolutions. We may be permitted to call to mind those misfortunes of the whites, when English memory so vividly retraces the sufferings of the negroes, in order to show the natural influence produced on public feeling by any thing which

excites compassion. It cannot be doubted that the abolition of the slave trade would have been less popular in England, had that measure been preceded by the ruin and the massacre of the English in the Antilles.

“ Next, the abolition of this traffic has not been prohibited in France by a national law, discussed in a legislative assembly : it is the result of the article of a treaty by which France expiated her victories. Hence the abolition of the slave trade has been associated in the minds of the multitude with ideas of foreign interests : and because the measure was regarded as one imposed upon us, it has been stamped with that unpopularity which naturally attaches to all acts of force. The same feeling would have arisen in any country distinguished for public spirit and just national pride.

“ A parliamentary motion, ever honourable to its promoter, has at length been crowned with success in England : but during how many years was that measure repelled, (before it was converted into a law), though supported by one of the greatest ministers England ever produced ? During the long debates on this question, public opinion had time to become matured and fixed. Commerce, foreseeing the result, adopted precautions. A number of negroes exceeding the de-

mands of the colonists were transported into the English islands, and permanent generations of slaves were prepared, to fill up the void left by casual servitude, when it should come to be established.

“ None of these favourable circumstances existed for France: fortune and time failed her. The first convention between France and England after the Restoration, acknowledged the necessity of acting cautiously and progressively in an affair of so complex a nature. An article superadded to this convention granted the space of five years for effecting the complete abolition of the slave trade. The declaration of Vienna, dated Feb. 8th, 1815, in alluding to the same subject, says: ‘ However honourable may be the object which the sovereigns have in view, they will not follow it up without a due regard to the interests, the habits, and even the privations of their subjects.’ A laudable and virtuous eagerness has since overstepped these terms; and has perhaps multiplied crimes, by clashing too suddenly with interests.

“ The French government is resolved to prosecute rigorously any of its subjects engaged in this barbarous traffic. Numerous condemnations have already been pronounced; and the tribunals have punished in all instances in which the crime

could be proved against the criminals. ‘It would be horrible,’ says the English memorial, ‘if the necessity of destroying human life should become the consequence of the necessity of concealing a traffic proscribed by law.’ This just observation proves that French law has been rigorously enforced; and the excess of cruel precautions taken by the slave traders to conceal their victims, proves most decisively the vigilance of our government.

“A law which prompts such enormities, to enable the delinquent to evade the punishment of that law, may be deemed somewhat severe; nevertheless, the French government is resolved to augment the legal penalties, as soon as the public mind shall be prepared for the change; and consequently, when the legislative chambers are enabled to renew the discussion of the slave trade. It is painful, but at the same time useful to remark, that all foreign interference augments the difficulties of the French government, and tends to retard the object which all men of generous feeling are anxious to see attained.

“A few words must now be said on the coercive measures proposed in the memorial of His Grace the Duke of Wellington.

“The plenipotentiary ministers of His Most

Christian Majesty are ready to sign any collective declaration of the powers tending to check the odious traffic, and to visit all criminals with the vengeance of the laws. But a declaration which would oblige all governments to apply to the slave trade the punishments inflicted on piracy, and which would be transformed into a general law of the civilized world, is a measure which the plenipotentiaries of His Most Christian Majesty do not consider a political assembly competent to adopt. In questions concerning the adjudgment of the punishment of death, the decision is referred, according to the nature of governments, either to judicial or legislative bodies.

“ To withhold the use and protection of the French flag from foreigners who may employ that flag to cover the slave trade, is perfectly just : but France needs not to defend crimes which she never permitted.

“ The engagement to prohibit, in the dominions of the allied powers, the importation of the products of colonies belonging to powers who shall not have abolished the slave trade, is a resolution which will affect Portugal only : now Portugal has no representative at the Congress, and it is but just that she should be heard in her own defence before she receives sentence.

“ The measures indicated in relation to France

are good ; but they are subjects for the enactment of laws, and consequently they must await the favour of public opinion to insure their success. The government of His Most Christian Majesty will deliberate on these subjects when the proper time arrives. It may be possible that the French government will accede to the registering of slaves : yet it is not to be denied that this intervention of governmental authority will be a sort of encroachment on the right of property,—that most sacred of all rights, which the laws of Great Britain respect, even amidst their errors and caprices.

“ The memorial of the British government expresses regret that France should be the only one of the great maritime powers of Europe which has not taken part in the treaty concluded with his Britannic Majesty, for the purpose of conferring on certain ships belonging to each of the contracting powers, a limited right of inspection and confiscation in reference to ships engaged in the slave trade.

“ The charter of His Most Christian Majesty abolishes confiscation. With regard to the right of inspection, if the French government were ever to consent to it, it would lead to the most fatal consequences. The national character of both nations, French and English, is adverse to it ; and

if proofs be requisite in support of this opinion, it is sufficient to call to mind that this very year, whilst we are in a state of peace, French blood has been shed on the coast of Africa. France acknowledges the liberty of the seas to all foreign flags, to whatever country they may belong. She claims for herself only that independence which she respects in others, and which belongs to her dignity."

CHAP. XVI.

Memorandum of the Duke of Wellington, in relation to the piracies and the Spanish colonies.

WE now come to the memorandum relative to the Spanish colonies. This document contains the following passage :—“ The relations maintained by British subjects with other parts of the world have for a long time placed His Majesty under the necessity of recognizing the existence, *de facto*, of the governments established in the different provinces, in so far as was requisite for treating with them. The relaxation of the Spanish authority throughout that part of the world has given encouragement to numerous pirates and free-booters ; and it is impossible for England to extirpate this evil without the co-operation of the local authorities in places along the coasts. The necessity of this co-operation cannot but lead to some renewed act, recognizing, *de facto*, the

existence of one or several of these self-created governments."

England thus communicated a fact ; and Mr. Canning, seeing the war on the point of breaking out, hastened to make an official announcement of that fact to the Congress. The object of this proceeding was either to check France, by holding out to her the threat of a full acknowledgment of the independence of the Spanish colonies, if our troops entered Spain, or to intimidate the Allies by presenting to them the possibility of a rupture between the cabinets of St. James and the Tuilleries, in the event of our taking up arms against the factions of Madrid.

To this memorandum Austria returned for answer : — " That England had done well to defend her commercial interests against piracy ; but that as to the independence of the Spanish colonies, she would not acknowledge it until such time as His Catholic Majesty should freely and formally renounce the rights of sovereignty which he had heretofore exercised over those provinces."

Prussia expressed herself nearly in the same tone. She observed, that the moment least befitting the recognition of the local governments of Spanish America, was that in which the events of the civil war were urging on a crisis in the affairs of Spain.

Russia declared that she could not adopt any determination which might prejudice the question of the independence of South America.

Here was a serious difficulty ! France did not think it expedient to resign to Great Britain and the United States the exclusive trade of the New World. How was this difficulty to be solved ? We were still entrusted with the duties of representative to the cabinet whence the memorandum emanated. It was requisite that the answer to the memorandum should maintain principles and make reservations. A touch-stone was thrown in. It served as a prop to the edifice when attention was directed to the affair of the colonies during the Spanish war.

CHAP. XVII.

MY REPLY TO THE MEMORANDUM ON THE SPANISH COLONIES
IN SOUTH AMERICA.

“THE plenipotentiary ministers of His Most Christian Majesty at the Congress of Verona have examined, with the most serious attention, the *Memorandum* on the Spanish colonies communicated by His Grace the Duke of Wellington to the representatives of the allied powers, in the sitting of the 24th of November. The cabinet of the Tuilleries, like that of St. James, earnestly wishes that Spain would adopt measures calculated to restore peace and prosperity to the American continent. It is with a sincere desire and wish to see the authority of His Catholic Majesty restored, that the government of His Most Christian Majesty has refused the advantages which have been offered to it.

“France is influenced by considerations of more general importance with regard to the govern-

ments *de facto*. She conceives that the principles of justice on which society is founded must not be lightly sacrificed to secondary interests ; and it appears to her, that those principles increase in importance when the matter in question is that of recognizing a political order of things virtually hostile to that which exists in Europe: she is likewise of opinion, that in this great question Spain ought to be previously consulted, as the rightful sovereign of the colonies. Nevertheless, France concurs with England in admitting, that when troubles are protracted, and the law of nations cannot be exercised by reason of the impotence of one of the belligerent parties, natural law must resume its sway ;—she admits the existence of inevitable prescriptions ; and that a government, after long resistance, is sometimes obliged to yield to the force of circumstances, for the sake of preventing numerous evils, and for fear of depriving one state of the advantages by which other states may exclusively profit.

“ To avoid creating commercial rivalries and emulations, which may drag governments, in spite of their inclination, into precipitate measures, a general plan, adopted in common by the different cabinets of Europe, would be the object most desirable. It is to be hoped that the powers composing the great alliance will one day examine

whether there be any practicable mode of securing at once the interests of Spain, those of her colonies, and those of the nations of Europe, adopting as the basis of negotiation the principle of generous reciprocity and perfect equality. Perhaps they may find, in concert with His Catholic Majesty, that it is not quite impossible to secure the common welfare of governments, to conciliate the rights of legitimacy, and the necessities of policy."

The above document discloses the first germ of the idea of that general congress by help of which we wished to terminate the Spanish war, should that war break out, and to restore peace throughout the world by the creation of new constitutional and Bourbonian monarchies in America.

CHAP. XVIII.

Affairs of the East—Italy and Greece—Instructions of M. de Villèle—Appeal of the regency of Urgel.

THE affairs of the East, of Italy, and even of Greece, were satisfactorily treated. We obtained all that it was possible for us to obtain in matters which did not directly concern us. Our known opposition, though we were not admitted to the private conferences, withheld the Emperor of Austria from proceeding too far in the invasion of Italy. We were seconded by Cardinal Spina, an intelligent and independent man, who was at the head of the Roman legation. We approved the moderation observed by Russia in her disputes with the Porte.

The instructions given by M. de Villèle on these several points were marked by foresight. “The evacuation of Piedmont,” said these instructions, “will be demanded by the King of Sardinia, and

France must support that demand. It is possible that the court of Vienna will accede to it, on condition that an Austrian garrison shall be maintained in Alexandria ; but to that occupation there are two formidable objections :—first, it will be a burthen on the finances of Piedmont ; and next, it will deprive the King of Sardinia of all the advantage which he can and ought to expect from a complete evacuation. Other difficulties will arise on the return of the Prince of Carignano. Without giving credence to all the ambitious views, which may possibly be entertained by the court of Vienna, it is reasonable to suppose that Austria would wish the Prince of Carignano to remain at a distance ; because the sort of vagueness and uncertainty attached to his existence, without positively setting aside the legitimacy of the succession, would give Austria a vast degree of influence in Piedmont, and might, at a future time, enable her to impose hard conditions on the Prince of Carignano. It is the interest of France to oppose this.”

The same temperate spirit pervaded their instructions relative to the Two Sicilies. With regard to Greece, M. de Villèle did not go so far as we did ; but he said, in allusion to the Porte and Russia :—“ It cannot be denied that, whether justly or unjustly, the general feeling of Europe

is painfully affected by the prospect of a pure and unconditional return of the Greek christians to the oppressive and barbarous yoke of the Turks. The plenipotentiaries of the king at the Congress must therefore support with their utmost ability, and offer to second by all the power of France, the propositions which will be made by Russia in the interest of the concessions due to her honour, and the guarantees to be obtained by united Christendom in favour of the christians subject to Turkish domination."

The deputies from the regency of Urgel were at the Congress: they addressed to that assembly an application signed by the Marquess de Matagorda and the Archbishop of Tarragona. The Marquess and the Archbishop declared that "they had directed their attention to the laws and the old Cortes of Spain;—that they had found that the greater number of those laws were proposed to the sovereign by free Cortes, for the most part assembled under the kings of the august house of Austria;—that time would doubtless show the necessity of reforms, which they would endeavour to make, by listening to the voice of the nation, striving among other things to regulate the contributions and burthens levied on the people, without whose concurrence no taxes could be imposed or exacted."

Such was the language of the regency, which professed the *spirit of absolutism*. But whilst thus avowing sentiments so congenial with those of the age, and supplicating the sovereigns to deliver a captive king, the regency of Urgel was annihilated by Mina.

We were now about to enter upon the cause of Spain.

CHAP. XIX.

The war in Spain foreseen from the period of our embassy to London—Our horror at the treaties of Vienna.

At length we arrive at the Spanish war, a subject upon which public opinion has been so singularly at fault. This war had been foreseen long before the assembling of the Congress of Verona. I do not here allude to the *cordon sanitaire*, first established as a precaution against the yellow fever, and naturally converted into an army of observation; I mean to say that the approach of the war was denoted by those subversive ideas, which, rising on the other side of the Pyrennees, threatened to revive in France the excesses repressed by the despotism of Napoleon, but which, favoured by our new institutions, were ready to burst forth in full freedom under the charter of the Bourbons.

So early as the period of our embassy to London, we communicated with M. de Montmorency on the possibility of this war. We traced out to him a plan nearly similar to that which we subsequently submitted to M. de Villèle. Since the restoration we had been constantly absorbed by two feelings: namely, horror inspired by the treaties of Vienna, and the wish to give to the Bourbons an army capable of defending the throne, and emancipating France. Spain, by placing us in danger alike by her principles and by her separation from the kingdom of Louis XIV., seemed to be the field of battle on which we might, with great peril, it is true, but with great honour, restore at once our political power and our military force.

Such was our view of things when we were summoned to the Congress. The president of the council, whose very merits tended to bias his views, did not perceive that legitimacy would perish for want of victories after the triumphs of Napoleon, and especially after the diplomatic transaction which had disgraced it. The idea of liberty in the minds of the French people, who do not very well understand what liberty means, will never be equivalent to the idea of glory, which is their natural idea. Why did the reign

of Louis XV. sink so low in contemporary estimation? Why did it give birth to systems of philosophy, which brought about the destruction of royalty? Because, with the exception of the battle of Fontenoy, and a few triumphs at Quebec, France suffered an uninterrupted series of humiliations. If the imbecilities of Louis XV. and the dismemberment of Poland were visited on the head of Louis XVI., what might not be feared for Louis XVIII. and Charles X., after the humiliating treaties of Vienna!

This thought oppressed us like a nightmare during the first eight years of the restoration, and we did not begin to feel at ease until after the success of the Spanish war.

The instructions of M. de Villèle relative to that war bear the stamp of his mind: they are adroit and intelligent. It is remarkable that they bear on the very face of them a contradiction of the opinion which was erroneously formed of the part which we played at the Congress of Verona. So far from the Congress having required our entrance into the Peninsula, the instructions unanswerably prove that France herself took the first step in that proceeding. This will appear the more evident when we make the reader better acquainted with the three propositions of the

Viscount de Montmorency, which propositions, together with other papers on the same subject, were laid on the table of the English house of commons in the session of 1823. We subjoin M. de Villèle's instructions.

CHAP. XX.

M. de Villèle's instructions.

“ THE situation of Spain will claim the attention of the sovereigns ; and it will doubtless be the most delicate question in reference to France, of any which will be discussed at the Congress.

“ The plenipotentiaries of His Majesty must, above all things, avoid presenting themselves at the Congress as reporters of the affairs of Spain. The other powers are as well acquainted with those affairs as we are ; since, like us, they have kept their ministers and consular agents in Spain. This part might have been suitable to Austria at the Congress of Laybach, because that power had formed the determination to invade Naples. She wished to execute that measure with the support of the other powers. She explained her designs in order to obtain that support, at the same time declaring her intention of acting without it, should

it be refused, her safety imperatively demanding that she should occupy the kingdom of Naples. *But, we have not determined to declare war against Spain. The Cortes would rather conduct Ferdinand to Cadiz than allow him to go to Verona.* The situation of this country (France) does not place us under the necessity of demanding, like Austria at Laybach, support for invading, since we are not under the necessity of declaring war: neither are we obliged to seek assistance for effecting the invasion; for, if Spain declares war against us, we do not want assistance; and indeed we could not even accept it, if it were attended by the passage of foreign troops through our territory.

“ The opinion of our plenipotentiaries on the question of what course it is fitting for the Congress to take in relation to Spain, must be that France, being the only power which will be under the necessity of acting by her troops, she, herself, must be the judge of that necessity.

“ The French plenipotentiaries must not consent that the Congress should take upon itself to prescribe the conduct of France with regard to Spain. They must not accept assistance purchased either by pecuniary sacrifices, or by the passage of foreign troops through our territory. They must consider the question of Spain in its general relations, and they must endeavour to

draw from the Congress a treaty which may be honourable and useful to France, either in the event of a war between her and Spain, or in the event of the powers recognizing the independence of South America."

What the note from the foreign office afterwards says, in allusion to the difficulty of conquering Spain, and the impossibility of maintaining in that country an army of occupation, is contradicted by the invasion of 1823. In short, we see the very natural aversion of the president of the council to hostilities, his fear that the allies should propose our commencing operations in Spain, and the arguments he offers in anticipation of such propositions. The note also bears traces of his commercial views with regard to South America, in the event of *the powers recognizing its independence*. To us that independence was but a secondary consideration. To the restored monarchy, the question was to be or not to be. Except on these points, the instructions were faultless, and quite French.

Encouraged by M. de Villèle's instructions, and perhaps in some degree overstepping their spirit, M. de Montmorency made his famous communications to the Congress.

CHAP. XXI.

VERBAL COMMUNICATIONS OF VISCOUNT DE MONTMORENCY.

Minutes of the verbal communications made by the Viscount de Montmorency at the confidential meeting of the ministers of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, at Verona, on the 20th October, 1822.

“ THE irritated spirit of the government which at present rules Spain, and the numerous provocations which it has offered to France, afford but too much reason to fear that peace cannot be maintained so long as it might be wished. The king's government has already made sacrifices to avoid a rupture, which would entail the painful necessity of rekindling the torch of war, and disturbing the peace so dearly purchased by all the states of Europe. The French government will exert all its endeavours to avert such a misfortune, and it is aware that it has on this point

noble examples to follow. But if France has hitherto succeeded in appeasing her offended dignity,—if she has patiently endured attacks, calculated perhaps to inspire her with feelings of grief and pity, rather than of anger,—yet, nevertheless, she cannot be blind to the danger which must inevitably attend such a state of things. A revolutionary fire, kindled so near her, may scatter fatal sparks over her soil and over the face of Europe, and threaten the whole world with a new conflagration.

“Moreover, the Spanish government may suddenly determine on a formal aggression, and it may hope to find the means of prolonging its political existence by representing that aggression as a glorious effort of liberty against tyranny. France must then foresee that a war with Spain is a possible, perhaps a probable event. In the nature of things, and in conformity with the principles of moderation which she wishes to make the rule of her conduct, she can consider it only as a defensive war. . She cannot assign the period at which it may commence ; but she is resolved to maintain it. Confident of the justice of the cause she will have to defend—proud of her task of defending Europe from the scourge of revolution, she will rely without hesitation on the force of her arms and the fidelity of her troops, who,

often and vainly tempted, have resisted seduction with courage perhaps more heroic than that which they have displayed on the field of battle.

“ But, between the present time and the moment when the war may become inevitable, France, by a chance which is common to other nations, may find herself under the necessity of an intermediate measure between a state of peace and hostility, and of breaking off all diplomatic relations with the court of Madrid. In short, such circumstances may arise—such steps may be taken by the Spanish government and by the Cortes, as may place the French minister under the necessity of demanding his passports, and which, notwithstanding every desire to avoid a rupture, would force the king to recall him formally. In that extremity, which may be foreseen, but which France will exert her utmost efforts to avert, will not the high powers of Europe deem it incumbent on them, in proof of the uniformity of the principles and views of the alliance, to take a similar step, and to recall their legations at Madrid? It may be presumed (and this idea so early as 1820 claimed the attention of one of the powers) that if Spain were to dissolve the connexions which unite her to the sovereigns and governments of Europe—if she were to find herself as it were deserted, in consequence of the recall of the majority of the

corps diplomatique, and the interruption of the communications of which that body is the habitual organ, she would be induced to reflect more maturely on her position, and to employ the monarchical elements she possesses within herself to extinguish the revolutionary fire, which banishes her from intercourse with other nations and governments.

“ This measure (the recall of the ministers from Madrid), which would have the greater effect, in as much as it would be consecrated by the perfect concurrence of the high powers, might, as may be readily imagined, be attended by serious consequences. It would probably irritate the men who are at this moment at the head of the Spanish government, and may provoke them to make an immediate declaration of war against France. But they themselves would exclusively incur the responsibility of such a step, and France would stand in the position which she wishes to maintain to the last moment. She would be ready to defend herself, and would not have attacked.

“ Foreseeing the event of a war with Spain, and subjecting to the common interest of the great alliance all the considerations connected with this great question, France believes that she may count on the moral support of her allies, and

that she may claim from them material aid, should circumstances render it necessary. She is above all convinced that at the present moment the concurrence of the high powers is necessary for the purpose of maintaining that unanimity of views which is the fundamental principle of the alliance, and which it is of the utmost importance to preserve as a guarantee for the peace of Europe.

“ To the form of this moral concurrence, and to the measures calculated to insure to her the material aid which she may hereafter demand, France conceives it necessary to direct the attention of her august allies.

“ Recapitulating the ideas above developed, and with which the allies wished to be made acquainted, France submits to their high prudence the three following questions :—

“ 1st. In the event of France being compelled to recall from Madrid the minister whom she has accredited to that court, and to break off her diplomatic relations with Spain, would the high powers be disposed to adopt a similar measure, and to recall their respective legations ?

“ 2nd. If war should ensue between France and Spain, under what form and by what acts would the high powers render to France the moral support which would impart to her proceedings all the force of the alliance, and inspire

in the revolutionists of all nations a salutary feeling of awe ?

“ 3rd. What is the intention of the high powers in reference to the nature and the form of the material aid which they may be disposed to render to France in the event when, on her demand, their active intervention would become necessary, admitting a restriction which France declares, and which they themselves will acknowledge, to be absolutely required by the state of public feeling ? ”

CHAP. XXII.

Examination of the three causes of war laid down by the Viscount de Montmorency—The Congress did not instigate France to hostilities ; Prussia, and more particularly Austria, were very much opposed to war—Reflections on the notes of the minister for foreign affairs—Noble conduct of that minister—M. Gentz.

WITH the view of coming to a determination, the plenipotentiaries discussed, in the conference of Nov. 17, the three causes of war which had been suggested by the Viscount de Montmorency, and which might follow the eventual questions of the declaration of the 20th of October. These three causes of war were :—

1. That of an attack with military force by Spain on the French territory, or of an official act of the Spanish government directly exciting the subjects of any one of the powers to rebellion.

2. That of a decree of dethronement being

passed against his Majesty the King of Spain, of a process being instituted against his august person, or of a criminal proceeding of the same nature against the members of his family.

3. That of a formal act by the Spanish government, subversive of the rights of legitimate succession of the royal family.

Thus then France herself, through her representative, the Viscount de Montmorency, declared that she might be under the necessity of making war. It was France who, on the supposition of the cause having occurred, asked her allies what they intended to do, if hostilities should break out. The Congress not only did not urge on France to war, but Prussia, and more particularly Austria, were very much opposed to it. Russia alone approved it, and promised moral and physical support.

Before going forward upon so perilous an enterprise it was perfectly natural that we should be desirous to ascertain in what state things would be left behind us, and what might be the intentions of our allies. We had above all things to consider that it was possible England might interfere, and place herself in opposition to us with respect to the affairs of Spain. The only way of eluding this blow was to exhibit to her a compact union of different powers, thus checking her, by making

it appear that a war with France would be for the cabinet of St. James a possible war with the whole continent, a certain war with Russia. The value of this precaution was not however estimated very highly by me; for I am of opinion that a war with England might easily be rendered successful, if it were conducted on a new plan, and if we were not alarmed at the idea of making a few necessary sacrifices; but under existing circumstances it doubtless was prudent to avoid such a rupture, and to restrain Mr. Canning by holding out the possibility of a general conflagration.

This consideration renders the Viscount de Montmorency's notes unassailable. Nevertheless, had he done us the honour of consulting us, instead of drawing up these notes with M. Bourgot in all the secrecy of his cabinet, they would have been framed in a different manner. They would not have demanded from Europe a categorical opinion as to our situation, and the difficulties in which we might be engaged; they would have merely said, — "Should we be obliged to go to war, will you, if England interfere, embrace our alliance?" Nothing about physical support from Russia would have been mentioned, because, on the supposition of defeat in Spain, there would have been a revolution in France,

and then all the Cossacks on the face of the earth could not have saved us.

While entertaining the highest respect for the virtues of the Viscount de Montmorency, we are obliged to confess that we had not the honour of being in favour with him : than he no one had more loved, and still loved public liberty ; but the crimes of 1793 had put him on his guard against his first opinions, and had raised doubts in his mind even as to the value of the principles which he held. Sympathies of humour and character are also to be taken into consideration : in fact, we were not honoured with the confidence of the viscount, and our ultramontane mission was far from being agreeable to him. We were indebted for it to M. de Villèle, who wished to have a friend at Verona. We obtained no real credit at the Congress until after the departure of the viscount. We must however do this justice to him to say, that the noble qualities of his nature triumphed over his indifference towards us personally. On leaving us he, with great magnanimity, removed the prejudices against us with which the mind of the Emperor Alexander had been imbued. He thus became the first cause of our favour with that prince, without fearing to create a rival for himself : but at first every thing was negotiated almost without our knowledge.

With the exception of the motions of the slave trade, and the Spanish colonies, our opinion was not asked on any point ; every thing was transacted between the heads of cabinets, as is sufficiently indicated by the title *Verbal Communications* given to the documents. We had no intercourse except with M. Gentz : we afterwards saw him die, tranquilly listening to a voice which made him forget that of a disastrous age.

CHAP. XXIII.

The Emperor of Russia—the Duke of Wellington—Prince Metternich—Count Bernstorff—Count Pozzo—Answers of Prussia, Austria, and Russia to the Viscount de Montmorency's verbal notes—Support given us against England by the Russian note.

THE Emperor Alexander may be said to have had a strong mind, and a weak character. In consequence of his fickleness, he had now become as ardent a royalist as he formerly had been a decided liberal ; but he was always the steady friend of France.

The Duke of Wellington had committed against legitimacy the offence of making Fouché a minister of the crown ; against the nation, the crime of having gained the battle of Waterloo. Five or six men of genius excepted, all the great captains have been but sorry creatures. No renown is so brilliant as the renown of arms, and none so little deserves the glory which is shed around it.

In vain was the successor of Marlborough caressed to make him overstep the line of his country's policy ; it was all lost time. When tired of us at Verona, his grace, by way of relaxation, sought for some of the Orsini, who could write on the margin of our intercepted dispatches — *Pour mariée, non.*

Prince Metternich, feigning to be quite Russian, though he detested Russia, talked of war, but had no wish for it. He dreaded our success in Spain, for the strength it would give to our arms,—our defeat, for the influence it would give to the revolutionary spirit.

Count Bernstorff was minister for foreign affairs at Berlin when we were minister plenipotentiary from France to that court. His tall and beautiful lady brought to recollection the Danish ambassadress at the court of Anne of Austria, of whom Madame de Motteville says :—" She took the queen's hand, and having drawn off the glove she kissed it so gracefully, and praised it with so much familiarity, that it seemed as if she were talking with a sister with whom she had lived all her life. This pleased the queen ; and all day long nothing was talked of but the fair Dane, her air of gentle dignity, and the many proofs she had given of her wit and understanding." Count Bernstorff, who, instead of his Danish lady, had

brought with him to Verona only his gout, saw France again in possession of her military energy, and reflected that that France was on the frontier of Prussia.

Count Pozzo, prompt in seizing his master's ideas, hoisted every sail for the ultras. Thousands of petty grudges, envies, and calumnies came across one another. When the chamber door was shut, the friend who had been eulogized on the staircase was abused:—the old way of the world.

Under these circumstances it was easy to anticipate the nature of the replies of the three great cabinets to the Viscount de Montmorency.

Prussia declared, "that if the conduct of the Spanish government towards France or her envoy at Madrid was of a nature to compel France to interrupt her diplomatic relations with Spain, his Majesty would not hesitate to adopt the same course on his part.

"That, if in spite of the pains which the French government engages to take to avoid a war with Spain, such war should break out, his Majesty is prepared to co-operate with the monarchs his allies, in affording to France every *moral* support which may contribute to strengthen her position.

"That if the events or the consequences of the war should render a more active assistance ne-

cessary to France, the king will consent to that kind of aid, *in as far as the necessities of his Majesty's own position and the attentions due to the interior of his kingdom may leave him the power of affording it.*"

Austria made a similar declaration ; but in reference to any active or *material* aid, it was declared, " that if such assistance became necessary *a new deliberation in common of the allied courts would be required to regulate its extent, quality, and direction.*" This restriction, quite in the spirit of the Vienna cabinet, jealous of Russia, and friendly to England, was a civil mode of answering in the negative :—as much as we could wish for of *moral* support, but not a single soldier unless paid for in advance, and the furnishing him involved no responsibility.

Russia, more bold and also more sincere, received the Viscount de Montmorency's communications very cordially. No answer called to mind that, so far back as the month of April, 1820, Russia had pointed out the consequences of the triumph of the revolution in Spain ; that, in as much as she had been eager to concur with her allies in giving that nation proofs of her benevolent solicitude, so much the more was she now bound to express disapprobation of an outrage which presaged for Spain all the evils inseparable

from concessions wrested by violence from legitimate authority. The note went on thus :—

“ Internally, anarchy was reduced to a principle ; power became the reward of insults to the throne and religion ; disorder delivered up whole populations to the infliction of a destroying pestilence ; the loss of the rich possessions of the new world was almost consummated ; the public wealth was dissipated ; the most subversive doctrines openly preached ; and some faithful subjects who armed for the defence of their sovereign, were by that sovereign, and against his will, proscribed.

“ Externally, a melancholy spectacle was presented by the countries which the fabricators of the troubles of Europe had destined to become the prey of revolutions : last year the Sicilies were in flames, and the allied powers were obliged to place the legitimate authority under the protection of their armies ; Piedmont, in revolt, was endeavouring to propagate rebellion in the north of Italy, rendering necessary the same intervention, the same assistance.

“ Assuredly it is impossible for such a state of things not to cause regret and disquietude to all the European powers ; they can have nothing to expect therefrom, particularly as to France, but the dangers to which the events of Naples and Turin exposed Austria ; and Russia is firmly con-

vinced that all interests concur in rendering it desirable that the revolutionary conflagration should be extinguished in Spain."

After this preamble, Russia replied formally in the affirmative to all the Viscount de Montmorency's questions. She was ready to recall her ambassador, and to afford every support, *moral* and *material*, which France might need, without any restriction or condition whatever. This frank note dissipated all apprehensions externally in reference to a war with Spain, and left for that war only the internal dangers which we had to incur.

The fear which France justly entertained of the unfriendly disposition of England, was speedily justified by the Duke of Wellington's notes. He refused to sign the minutes of the 20th October and 17th November. He made the reason of his refusal known.

CHAP. XXIV.

The Duke of Wellington refuses to sign the minutes of the 20th of October and 17th of November—His note—Observations on that note—A remark of Mr. Canning—His letter.

“ THE Duke of Wellington is of opinion that the communications of the French government, and the resolution of the cabinets of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, are calculated to counteract the objects they propose to effect. Experience proves that during revolutions the opinions of men are influenced by party and factious motives, and that that which is most repugnant to their feelings is the formal recognized interference of foreign powers. The effect of such an interference is to enfeeble and endanger the party in whose behalf it is exercised. This feeling prevails in Spain in a higher degree than in any other country ; and it is to be apprehended that the existence of these minutes may endanger the august per-

sonages for whose security they are intended to provide. Besides, what articles of these minutes touch on grounds which, properly speaking, come within the jurisdiction of municipal law? The person of a sovereign is inviolable: the laws of all nations, the unanimous opinions and feelings of mankind, have provided for the safety of the sacred person of the monarch. But the law which declares the persons of sovereigns to be inviolable, does not equally protect the persons of the other individuals of royal families; and these minutes may have a tendency to extend to the royal family of Spain a protection which the laws of Spain do not accord.

“ The ministers of the allied powers have deemed it proper to make known to Spain the sentiments of their respective sovereigns, by means of despatches addressed to the representatives of their respective courts, resident at Madrid. The government of His Britannic Majesty does not consider itself sufficiently informed, either of what has already taken place between France and Spain, or of what may occasion a rupture, to be capable of replying affirmatively to the questions submitted to the conference by the French minister. But is this the moment for issuing despatches calculated to irritate the Spanish government, and to increase the embarrassing and diffi-

cult position of the French government? The result of these communications will probably be to suspend the diplomatic relations between the three allied powers and Spain, whatever may be the question at issue between France and Spain. These communications are calculated not only to embarrass the French government, but also the government of the King of England. The government of His Britannic Majesty is of opinion, that to censure the internal transactions of an independent state, unless such transactions affect the essential interests of His Majesty's subjects, is incompatible with the principles upon which His Majesty has invariably acted on all questions relative to the internal affairs of other countries. Thus the cabinet of the King of England must refuse to advise his Majesty to hold a language in common with his allies on this occasion : it is so important that His Majesty should not be supposed to participate in a proceeding of this nature, that the British government must likewise abstain from counselling the King to address to the Spanish government any communication on the subject of the relations of that government with France."

In this way England suddenly broke with her allies. Owing to the form of her government, the intervention of national opinion, and parliamentary

publicity, England was obliged, it is true, to maintain some degree of reserve in her answers. She could not adopt the unrestrained course of those continental monarchies which have no account to render to their subjects; but it would have been impossible to employ worse arguments than those adduced by the Duke of Wellington, or to conceal less adroitly the animosity of the cabinet of St. James towards France. The English plenipotentiary imagined he was still commanding at Waterloo.

In the first place, all that the Duke of Wellington says respecting the dangers of intervention was disproved by facts. The Spaniards, instead of resisting our invasion, received our troops as their liberators; and in the second place, though England declared herself so scrupulous on the subject of intervention in Spain, has she not interfered in other countries, sometimes in support of despotism, and sometimes in favour of liberty, just according as her interests might dictate? She was for Mahmoud against the independence of the Greeks; and she was for the independence of the Spanish colonies against Spain. But we shall speak more fully on this intervention question when the proper moment arrives.

The reservation made in the notes in favour of

the *essential interests of the subjects of His Britannic Majesty*, shows the matter in its true point of view : if England conceives that she has a right to interfere when her *essential interests* are at stake, may not the continental powers have *essential interests* compromised, though their interests may be of a different nature from those of Great Britain? The Duke of Wellington does not perceive, or feigns not to perceive, the new dangers with which France is threatened. The question at issue is not whether France shall open new markets for her trade, or sell her wines and manufactures at a higher price than heretofore,—*essential interests* no doubt in the opinion of England ;—our object is to prevent a new revolution from breaking out amongst us, to raise up the glory of our flag, and once more to take our rank among those nations who derive from themselves the elements of their dignity and power. Surely these are essential interests !

The Duke of Wellington complains of not being sufficiently informed of the circumstances which threaten to occasion a rupture between Spain and France. By help of a little attention, His Grace might have discerned reasons which are obvious to every one. But though he might have discerned them, would he have deemed them satisfactory? Would not England be alarmed at our desire to

escape from the unfortunate tutelage into which we were thrown after Waterloo,—that outrageous tutelage in which we had been rigorously bound by treaties ?

The demand contained in the English notes, in favour of the municipal law, is curious. The sovereign, it is observed, is inviolable, but not so his relations.

According to this doctrine, a whole sovereign family may be proscribed, and as long as the king is kept on the throne, the *political law* of the state is strictly adhered to ; consequently at the death of the king, the legitimate order of succession may be set aside, and the crown may be placed on the head of another branch of his family, or even on a member of another dynasty. Did the Duke of Wellington foresee all these consequences when he drew up his notes ? Whether or not, it is certain that they now apply marvelously well to the case of Don Carlos.

What sympathizing alarm the plenipotentiary evinces for France, when he points out the embarrassment into which we might be thrown by the despatches from the three allied courts, if those despatches should arrive before ours in Spain,—if the King of Prussia and the Emperors of Austria and Russia should recall their envoys from Madrid before we recall our ambassador ? After

expressing her fears for this diplomatic embarrassment, England, resuming her own character, declares that she cannot hold a language in common with her allies, and that she will abstain even *from addressing to the Spanish government, any communication on the subject of the relations of that government with France*. This phrase betrays the secret feelings of the British government. England then thought that if we entered the Peninsula we should be lost; all the liberal party in France, all the statesmen of the empire, were of that opinion. It could not be believed that an old infirm king, without an army, should succeed where Napoleon had failed.

England did not wish then to interfere, even to prevent the effusion of blood; though she would willingly have interfered a short time after, when she herself became alarmed. A war in which we should necessarily be defeated, would prevent any renewal of the *family compact*.

An observation which fell from Mr. Canning when he believed us to be involved in the affairs of the Peninsula, sufficiently denotes the sentiments cherished towards us by our rivals. Mr. Canning, when replying to a speech of Mr. Brougham, joyfully exclaimed: “*Tu l’as voulu, Georges Dandin ! tu l’as voulu, mon ami !*”—and yet he did not believe us to be so stupid as not

to have understood the Duke of Wellington's notes ; for after receiving a letter of congratulation which we addressed to him on his appointment to the office of secretary for foreign affairs, he sent to us at Verona the following answer :

London, Oct. 23rd, 1822.

“ I cannot doubt, my dear vicomte, that you are one of those persons who do me the honour to rejoice most heartily at my appointment ; and I should have more speedily expressed to you how grateful I feel for those congratulations, had not the same letter which conveyed them made me acquainted with your departure for Verona.

“ This letter will doubtless find you much occupied ; and amidst your occupation, I should be unpardonable, were I to add more than these few words, together with the assurances of the respect, admiration and friendship which I cherish for you, my dear vicomte, and which I hope I shall have many opportunities of proving to you both as a minister and a friend.

“ Ever yours,

“ GEORGE CANNING.”

CHAP. XXV.

The intervention of the Congress of Verona confined to three insignificant despatches—Despatch of Prussia.

IN fact, nothing was absolutely determined upon by the sovereigns and the diplomatists assembled with such parade on the Adige, but the plan of sending despatches to the representatives of the allies at Madrid. These despatches were to be shown to the Spanish government: in case they should be treated with contempt, the envoys of the allied powers were to have orders to demand their passports. To this inoffensive procedure, which could not lead to any thing, was confined that famous *intervention of the Congress of Verona*, about which so much noise was made. It will be seen, for the hundredth time, on perusing the documents, that, so far from threatening Spain with a continental war, that Congress manifested unequivocal apprehensions of the possibility of a war between Spain and France.

In her despatch, dated Verona, November 22, 1822, sent off on the 27th of November to M. de Schepeler at Madrid, by Count Zichy, Prussia declares,—

“ That she sees with pain the Spanish government entering a route which threatens the tranquillity of Europe ; she calls to mind all the claims to admiration which attach her to the noble Spanish nation, rendered illustrious by so many centuries of glory and virtue, and for ever celebrated for the heroic perseverance which enabled it to triumph over the ambitious and oppressive efforts of the usurper of the throne of France.”

The despatch then adverts to the origin, the progress, and the results of the military revolution of the Isle of Leon in 1820.

“ The moral state of Spain at the present moment is such that her relations with foreign powers must necessarily be disturbed or changed. Doctrines subversive of all social order are there loudly preached and protected ; insults against the first sovereigns of Europe fill the newspapers with impunity. The sectaries of Spain are sending out their emissaries to associate in their secret operations all the conspirators that are to be found in foreign countries against public order and against legitimate authority.

“ The inevitable effect of such disorders is felt

more especially in the alteration of the relations between Spain and France. The irritation thence resulting is of such a nature as to excite the strongest alarm for the peace between the two kingdoms. This consideration would suffice to determine the assembled sovereigns to break silence on a state of things which is liable from day to day to compromise the tranquillity of Europe."

This despatch concludes with an excellent reflection :—

" It is not for foreign courts to judge what institutions are best adapted to the character, the manners, the real wants of the Spanish nation ; but they have an indubitable right to judge of the effects which experiences of this kind produce in regard to themselves, and to make their determinations and their future position towards Spain dependent upon them."

CHAP. XXVI.

Despatch of Russia.

THE Russian despatch is addressed to Count Bulgary at Madrid, and dated Verona, November 26, 1822. It recapitulates how the cabinet of St. Petersburg hastened, so early as the year 1820, to lift a warning voice against the calamities with which Spain was threatened, when *perjured soldiers betrayed their sovereign and imposed laws upon him*. It declared that the apprehensions of Russia had been but too fully justified; that anarchy had followed the steps of the revolution; that the colonies had definitively separated themselves from the mother country; that properties were laid waste; that blood had been spilt on scaffolds and in the abode of the king; that the monarch and his family had been reduced to a state of captivity; that the king's brothers, compelled to justify themselves, were daily threatened with the dungeon and death.

“ In other quarters,” the despatch with truth asserts, “ after the revolutions of Naples and Piedmont (which the Spanish conspirators never cease to represent as their work), they are heard to declare that their plans of destruction have no limits. In a neighbouring country they are striving, with a perseverance which nothing can discourage, to excite disturbance and rebellion. In more distant states they are labouring to gain accomplices ; the activity of their proselytism extends every where, and every where it is preparing the like disasters.

“ France finds herself obliged to commit the guard of her frontiers to an army, and perhaps she will also be compelled to entrust to it the duty of putting an end to the provocations of which she is the object. Spain herself is partly rising against a system which is repulsive to her manners, to the known loyalty of her inhabitants, and to her wholly monarchical traditions.

“ It is to be feared that the dangers of proximity which are daily becoming more real, those which impend over the royal family, and the just grievances of a neighbouring power, will eventually lead to the most serious complications between her and Spain.

“ It is this disastrous extremity which His Imperial Majesty wishes, if possible, to prevent.

“ To express a desire to see an end put to a long struggle,—to withdraw from the same yoke an unfortunate monarch and one of the greatest nations of Europe,—to stop the effusion of blood,—to favour the re-establishment of an administration at once wise and national, is assuredly not attacking the independence of a country, or insisting upon a right of intervention against which any power whatever has a right to remonstrate.”

CHAP. XXVII.

Despatch of Austria.

THE Austrian despatch of the same date is the best of the three documents.

“The revolution in Spain has been judged for us ever since its commencement. According to the eternal decrees of Providence, good cannot arise for states any more than for individuals from the violation of the first duties imposed on man in social order. It is not with culpable illusions, perverting public opinion, and misleading the consciences of nations, that amelioration of their condition ought to begin; and military revolt never can form the basis of a happy and durable government.

“The Spanish revolution, considered solely with reference to the baleful influence which it has exercised over the kingdom where it has occurred, would be an event worthy of all the attention and all the interest of the foreign sovereigns.

“ Still a just repugnance to interfere in the internal affairs of an independent state, would perhaps determine those sovereigns not to express their sentiments respecting the situation of Spain, if the mischief produced by its revolution were concentrated, and could be concentrated, in its own bosom ; but that is not the case. This revolution, even before it has arrived at maturity, has already provoked great disasters in other countries : and this revolution it is that, by the contagion of its principles and its example, and by the intrigues of its principal agents, has created the revolutions of Naples and of Piedmont.

“ His Imperial Majesty can do no other than support, in the questions relative to the Spanish revolution, the same principles that he has always openly manifested. In the absence even of all direct danger for the people committed to his care, the Emperor would never hesitate to disavow and to reprobate what he deems false, pernicious, and condemnable, as regards the general interest of human societies.

“ It would be difficult for one to believe that the opinion expressed by His Imperial Majesty respecting the events which are passing in Spain can be misunderstood or misconstrued in that country. No object of private interest, no clash-

ing of reciprocal pretensions, no feeling of distrust or jealousy, can inspire our cabinet with a thought in opposition to the welfare of Spain. The house of Austria has but to revert to its own history to find there the strongest motives of attachment, regard, and good-will for a nation, which can call to mind with just pride those ages of glorious memory when *the sun never set for it*; for a nation which, strong by its respectable institutions, by its hereditary virtues, by its religious sentiments, by its love for its sovereigns, has signalized itself at all times by a patriotism ever upright, ever generous, and very often heroic.

“ At a period that is still but recent, this nation again astonished the world by the courage, the devotedness, the perseverance, with which it opposed the usurping ambition that aimed to deprive it of its rulers and its laws ; and Austria will never forget the benefit which she herself derived in a moment of great danger from the noble resistance of the Spanish people.

“ In joining the assembly of his august allies at Verona, His Imperial Majesty has had the happiness to find in their councils the same benevolent and disinterested dispositions that have continually guided his own. The despatches that will be sent to Madrid will prove this fact, and will leave no doubt relative to the sincere solicitude of the

powers to serve the cause of Spain, in demonstrating to her the necessity of changing her route. It is certain that the embarrassments which overwhelm her have increased of late in an alarming progression. The most rigorous measures, the boldest expedients, can no longer enable her administration to proceed ; civil war is kindled in several of her provinces ; her relations with the greater part of Europe are deranged or suspended ; and those with France have assumed so problematic a character as to justify serious apprehensions respecting the complications that may thence result.

“ Every Spaniard acquainted with the real situation of his country must feel that, to break the chains which at this moment weigh so heavily upon the monarch and the people, it behoves Spain to put an end to this state of separation from the rest of Europe, into which recent events have thrown her.

“ To this end, it is requisite above all things that the King be free, not only in that personal liberty which every individual has a right to claim under the reign of the laws, but in that which a sovereign ought to enjoy in order to fulfil his high vocation. The King of Spain will be free, from the moment when he shall have the right to substitute for a system ascertained to be impracticable

even by those whom egotism or pride still attach to it, an order of things in which the rights of the monarch are happily combined with the interests and the legitimate wishes of all classes of the nation."

The paragraph—well written it must be admitted—respecting the house of Austria, signifies, in diplomatic language :—" You were so powerful and so happy under our glorious sway ! Take us back !"

CHAP. XXVIII.

Reflections on the three preceding despatches—When ought France to recall her ambassador ?

THESE despatches must be forgiven for what they say against representative assemblies and the liberty of the press. Absolute monarchies never will comprehend representative monarchies ;—these are two sorts of powers whose elements are incompatible. But those who indited these despatches ought to have dealt out their proper share to persons, and considered, that if the Cortes proved itself rigorous beyond measure, it had to do with an ungrateful and faithless monarch, who only sought to deceive them, and whose character, if it did not authorize the violence of the *Liberales*, at least excused it.

Austria applauded herself too much for her success against the revolutionists of Italy : her fears caused her to perceive conspirators where there was nothing more than the progressive

movement of the ideas of a nation impatient of a foreign yoke, and deprived by conquest of its nationality. One could not think like M. de Metternich, when one saw cages of *order* and *happiness* passing through Verona, and conveying to the Spielberg Silvio Pellico, and all the most enlightened and distinguished men that Italy possessed. Austria had not been, like France, convulsed by a revolution of forty years, ever ready to be rekindled at the least breath ; she did not border upon Spain ; her people and her soldiers were not in contact with people and soldiers, proclaiming constitutions with arms in their hands : she might have shown herself less uneasy, less inexorable, and more skilful, by betraying less suspicion of secret understandings.

Lastly, these despatches, in bestowing such high eulogiums on the Spanish nation for its resistance to Napoleon, forget that this nation was then obeying the *Cortes of Cadiz* ; that the monk who heroically defended Saragossa fought in the name of that same constitution, the object of the present reprobation of the continental powers : the state of France was the only thing justly appreciated in these discussions.

For the rest, the groundwork of the despatches is true : they clearly establish our dangers, and those of the populations bordering upon Spain.

The only threat which the allies hold out is to withdraw their representatives from a country with which they no longer have political relations.

When was France, in her turn, to recall her ambassador? before, with, or after the envoys of the other courts should have demanded their passports? This question could only be resolved according to circumstances, owing to our vicinity to Spain. It was precisely on this question that the Viscount de Montmorency is asserted to have resigned the portfolio of foreign affairs.

CHAP. XXIX.

Our correspondence with M. de Villèle—Letters.

ALL that we have now to lay before the reader, in order to complete the documents relative to the Congress of Verona, is our correspondence with M. de Villèle. The letters of the minister of the finances, lucid, rapid, full of foresight, business, and information, prove that he was fit for the high post which he occupied ; they are even more lively, less reserved, and less diplomatic than our own. We see that the Verona correspondent, from the natural bias of his wishes, exaggerates the disposition of the sovereigns for war, excepting, as we have observed, the Emperor of Russia. We strove to fix the determinations of the president of the council, for his ideas were less intent than our own on an enterprise to which we attached the welfare and the honour of France. We were not minister for foreign affairs ; there

was not the least likelihood that we should be called to functions so ably performed by M. de Montmorency ; but we flattered ourselves that, if we could but induce M. de Villèle to adopt our plan, when we should have arrived in London, our favourable position with George IV. and Mr. Canning would contribute to facilitate the execution of this plan.

Verona, October 31, 1822.

I thank you, my dear friend, for your brief communication of the 23rd. M. de Montmorency's despatch will bring you most likely to-day the conclusion of the Spanish affair in the spirit of your instructions. You will see the verbal notes. This evening we are to have a conference of Congress, to consider of the means of acquainting Europe with the dispositions of the alliance relative to Spain. Russia is amazingly in our favour ; Austria serves us in this question, though in other respects she is quite English ; Prussia follows Austria. The strongly expressed sentiments of the powers are for war with Spain. It is for you, my dear friend, to see whether you ought not to seize an occasion that may never occur again to replace France in the rank of the military powers,—to hoist again the white cockade

in a short war, almost without danger, to which the opinion of the royalists and of the army at this moment forcibly propels you. There is no question about the occupation of the Peninsula ; it is confined to a rapid movement, which should restore power to the real Spaniards, and spare you future perplexities. The last despatches of M. de La Garde prove how easy success would be. All continental Europe would be for you ; and England, were she to be angry, would not have time even to fall upon a colony. As for the chambers, success covers every thing. Commerce and the finances would no doubt suffer for a moment, but every thing has its inconveniences. To destroy a focus of jacobinism,—to replace a Bourbon upon the throne by the arms of a Bourbon, are results which outweigh considerations of a secondary nature. Besides, how shall we get out of the position in which we are, let it last for ever so short a time ? Can we keep for ever an army of observation at the foot of the Pyrennees ? Can we, without incurring the hisses and the contempt of all parties, send our soldiers back some morning to their garrisons ? In the questions which you invited me to propose to you, for the purpose of making them the groundwork of instructions, I adduced to you part of these advantages of the war, which here strike me the

more forcibly, because I find continental Europe ready to second us with all its efforts. You know my political moderation, and how averse I am to violent measures ; but, that I may have nothing to reproach myself with, it is my duty to set before you this side of the question, which is not the one to which you have paid most attention. It is for you to weigh things in your wisdom, and for me to follow the track which you think it right to pursue.

M. de Montmorency talks of leaving us in about a week. After his departure, business will proceed rapidly, for matters are not complicated, and the sovereigns are getting tired of this place.

For my part, I am extremely impatient to learn that you have done for our friends what it is so important that you should do. If my interests were at stake, and not yours, I would long since have ceased to importune you.

Farewell, my dear friend ;

Ever yours,

CHATEAUBRIAND.

Verona, November 1, 1822.

You cannot doubt, my dear friend, how deeply I sympathize with you in the loss that you have sustained ; it increases the difficulties of the mo-

ment, by sorrowfully diverting your attention from business. But I know the firmness of your mind : you will not suffer yourself to be shaken by the clamour of differing opinions, whether you decide for peace or war. Having once formed your resolution, you will steadily follow one or the other system, without fearing the chances, or shutting your eyes to the inconveniences of it. The crisis of the funds will be short. If there be war, success will raise them ; if peace, they will rise in that case. As for me, my dear friend, I will not separate my political destiny from yours : let reverses come, and you shall see whether I am faithful.

M. de Montmorency sets out this week without fail. I wish I could do so to, for here I am absolutely useless : we make a wretched hash of it here, and I should be more useful to you in Paris.

I salute you, ever yours,

CHATEAUBRIAND.

P.S. In the supposition of war, what we have done here will serve you essentially, without your being obliged to go beyond what absolute necessity requires.

Verona, November 20, 1822.

I wrote you yesterday a short letter, my dear friend, by the English courier ; to-day I shall write you a rather longer. We signed yesterday evening a protocol, which M. de Montmorency, who sets out to-morrow, will bring you. I think that you will be satisfied with this sort of act, and that it will have the King's approbation : it is entirely in our favour. We are now in perfect safety against the war, if it must take place, at the same time that we are at liberty to wait for it, and that nothing in the engagements of the alliance obliges us to declare it.

Do not imagine, my dear friend, that while descanting to you on the advantages of this war, in case we should be forced to wage it, I am not at the same time aware of the serious inconveniences that might attend it, especially if it should not be finished in one campaign. England is somewhat soothed, and appears at this moment to be less hostile to the interests of continental Europe ; but, if our fleets were to be long in motion, and if Russian soldiers were to march, the double jealousy of our insular neighbours might be roused. You are therefore quite right not to rush head-long into hostilities, all the chances of which it behoves you to calculate ; but I think that, when

the event does happen, the greatest part of the dangers might be obviated by adopting a line of conduct, the principal bases of which I would thus lay down:—

1. To declare by a proclamation, on entering Spain, that we have no intention of attacking her independence, or of imposing laws on the Spanish nation, or of dictating forms of government, or of interfering in her domestic politics in any way whatever.

2. To make our soldiers assume the Spanish cockade ; to occupy the towns and villages in the name of Ferdinand ; to plant the Spanish flag every where beside the white flag ; never to speak but in the name of the Spanish authorities, which should be every where re-established in advancing.

3. To march to the Ebro ; to establish ourselves there, and not to pass it but in case of necessity ; to furnish the faithful Spaniards with arms and money ; to let them fight out their quarrel themselves, merely supporting them in certain positions, in order to insure them the victory.

4. To declare that we do not mean either to occupy Spain or to make her pay the expenses of the war ; to offer peace incessantly, and to retire

as promptly as we entered, the moment circumstances permit.

Monseigneur the Duke d'Angoulême ought to command the army, and to have under him a marshal of France : marshal Macdonald is naturally indicated ; he enjoys a reputation which would give confidence to the soldiers, and at the same time he is not, like other marshals, obnoxious to the Spanish nation.

These ideas, my dear friend, have no doubt occurred to you as well as to myself. Such a plan, promptly and accurately executed, by rendering the assistance of Russia useless, would diminish the jealousy of England, which our moderate ambition and principles would completely disarm ; the war would be nothing more than a family quarrel between France and Spain, which the strength and good temper of the former would soon have appeased. This war would have for us all the advantages which I have pointed out to you in my letter of the 31st of October, to say nothing of what we might do for our commerce, in concert with the Spanish government, in the colonies. All these considerations cause me, without desiring war, not to fear it ; and, while approving all you do to avoid it, to think that if you are forced into it, it would

soothe the military spirit of France, efface among our soldiers the remembrance of the usurpation, and prove in this respect extremely favourable to the legitimate throne.

M. de Montmorency will tell you how far we have proceeded here. After his departure, very little will be left to do, and in all probability the Congress will be dissolved about the 10th or the 15th of next month. Let us hope that this Congress will be the last. I am glad that I have attended it, because this completes my political studies: I have learned to know many things and many persons whose secret I should otherwise never have penetrated. I have seen with extreme satisfaction that France will again give law to Europe, when she shall be well governed, by profiting by the hopes that our reviving strength begins to excite in all quarters. We will talk this matter over thoroughly, and I have taken notes which will be useful to us.

I must mention to you, my dear friend, something that will not give you any pain: you have been accused here to the man who does every thing—or rather the man who is represented as doing every thing—of extreme moderation. I found myself involved, as your friend, in the accusation; I have therefore been treated coldly, because I was suspected of looking twice before

urging my country into the chances of a war which might become European, if it should chance to be complicated with a war in the East, and with the attack of the Spanish colonies by the English. And then, it so happens that I have remained constitutional when there is an aversion to constitutions. Those who would proscribe us as ultras, who would have had us turned out of all the administrations for the purpose of putting into them the men of the hundred days, are now ultras, while we are liberals, or at least *ventruses*, or ministerialists. What is to be done? Take it all patiently and in pity. However, my stock is likely to rise after the departure of M. de Montmorency. Already I perceive symptoms of coming favour. I shall be the more sure to obtain it, if you write to me, and if it be known that I am your *man*; for, though some fault is found with your prudence, yet the highest idea is entertained of your capacity. In requesting you to write to me, for your own advantage and mine, I do not ask you for much, for I shall scarcely have time to receive a letter from you. For the rest, I must tell you, in concluding this long letter, written without premeditation, that Austria and Prussia are by no means eager for war, and that if you think this war ought not to be engaged in, it will be extremely easy to cause

obstacles to be raised against it on the part of the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin.

Your elections will be over by the time this letter reaches you. The crisis of the funds will no doubt occasion the loss of some votes ; but you will have enough left. Do not forget Messieurs de Lalot, Bertin, Vetrolles, and Bouville : all this ought to be done before the opening of the session. Remember too the peer's pension for little Jumilhac, the new Duke de Richelieu.

Entirely, my dear friend.

Ever yours,

CHATEAUBRIAND.

P.S. This letter has been delayed twenty-four hours : de Lalot and young Fitzjames have been detained till to-day, the 21st, and M. de Montmorency does not set out till to-morrow, the 22nd. I am afraid that he will be a long time on the road, and that they will determine to wait here for intelligence of his arrival, and your answer respecting the course you mean to pursue relative to the notes or despatches to be sent to the ambassadors in Spain. Whatever may be the determination of the council of the Tuilleries, the other cabinets appear decided to send their notes, and to recall their agents in Spain, if the notes produce no effect. My opinion is that we

ought to sacrifice much to the maintenance of the continental alliance, and I think too, contrary to what seems to be your opinion, that the recall of our ambassador would not be war ; but that is a point for examination. At this moment, for example, Russia has no ambassador at Constantinople, and they are not at war ; they are negotiating : how much more reason is there not to suppose that Spain would be induced to reflect, if the ministers of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France were to withdraw all at once. The King, the supreme judge, and supremely wise, will decide this great question.

Paris, November 28, 1822.

My dear Chateaubriand,—I have received your long and excellent letter of the 20th : accept my sincere thanks for it. We expect Montmorency the day after to-morrow, or on Sunday ; his return is unlucky for me, for Monday is my critical day for the settlement of the transactions in our *rentes* during the month : I am sorry for this coincidence, but we shall do all we can to obviate the inconvenience.

Another very serious circumstance for us has just happened, that is, the breaking up of the regency of Urgel and of the army of the Faith.

Baron d'Eroles has been beaten by Mina at the entrance of the gorges towards Talana ; part of his men deserted him ; he fell back upon the Seu, leaving along our frontiers an immense number of women, children, priests, monks, and fugitives. All were well received by our troops, and no disorder has ensued. D'Eroles has been again driven from Urgel, and the town set on fire by Mina. Eight or nine hundred resolute royalists have shut themselves up in the fort, with provisions and supplies for three months ; the rest, with Baron d'Eroles, have fled towards Puycerda, whence the regency has already retired, and where will probably take place the dispersion, as well on our side as in Spain, of the remnant of the army of the Faith. The bishop of Urgel is at Dax with all his clergy ; the Trappist is at Toulouse : there is complete desolation along that whole frontier. Provision is about to be made for the subsistence of all these refugees.

I perceive from what Montmorency tells us, and from your intimations, that upon our shoulders will be shifted the whole weight of the determination relative to Spain : I have no objection, so they leave us the two bowls ; but if they give me but one, I cannot be seduced by the appearance of so much honour : every thing depends on the contents of the notes which are to be

delivered by the ministers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. If their transmission is to produce the rupture, it is clear that we shall immediately have war, or a state which will be so like it that we shall not in reality have any choice.

If they are so couched as to produce a return to reason on the part of Spain, and to leave us the liberty of acting according to circumstances and events, we have only to pursue with wisdom and firmness the track which the Congress shall have opened, and we may be depended upon. We must wait, therefore, and watch, in order to form an opinion. The transmission of a copy of these notes would have abridged the deliberation by three or four days; and the breaking up of the army of the Faith shows us that to abridge deliberations is in general greatly to accelerate business.

As for the protocol, or *proces-verbal* relative to the *casus fœderis*, if it is what we have been told, it is perfect, it is every thing that we could desire; it is an act of confidence in France on the part of the allies, which we shall take care to justify, and which, notwithstanding the defection of England, will have great weight for repressing the revolutionists. We have not yet received a reply to the last note to Mr. Canning; as soon as it reaches me, I will despatch it to you.

I send you the last despatches from Madrid. The English would be unreasonable to censure us for the precautions which we are taking against the Spaniards; they are much stricter on this point when their interests are concerned. At this moment they are going to oblige the governor of Cuba to recognize their right to trade with all the Spanish colonies, upon pain of seeing all the maritime establishments on the island of Cuba, of which they can make themselves masters, attacked and destroyed.

I have this moment received intelligence that the Cortes have despatched a M. Perreira with full powers to recognize the independence of their colonies. He was at Rio Janeiro at the end of September, with the intention of commencing his expedition by the Rio de la Plata. I fear that Congress has done wrong not to connect this question with that of Spain: it has opened a fine field for England, and the Spanish revolutionists.

You have heard of our elections: it is wonderful. Every thing else at home goes on admirably. I shall have at the end of the year a surplus of twenty-five millions, after paying all expenses. Why must these unlucky foreign affairs come to disturb such prosperity!

Adieu, my friend; a thousand kind com-

pliments to your colleagues. Be sure to remember me to Serres.

Ever sincerely yours,

JOSEPH DE VILLELE.

P.S. Being wholly occupied with foreign matters, I have not yet been able to see what we can do for our friends. After Montmorency's arrival we will try to do what is possible.

Paris, November 29, noon.

The departure of the courier having been delayed, I am enabled to add to the packet which I had made up for you a despatch from M. de la Garde, a fresh letter which the King has ordered me to write to him, and lastly, the despatch which I have this instant received from Marcellus.

The King is much pleased with the results obtained at Verona ; he will probably testify his satisfaction by conferring some favour on M. de Montmorency : I am of opinion that it will be the title of duke.

We have no accounts of him yet ; we expect him to-morrow or on Sunday.

Verona, November 28, 1822.

I am going, my dear friend, to open my heart to you : I leave M. de Caraman, the oldest ambassador, to write you the official letter.

The government appears to me to be in a most difficult position ; whatever is done here pleases nobody. France is obliged to act against her will ; Russia thinks that nobody goes far enough ; Austria has stirred merely to avoid breaking with Russia ; Prussia dreads the least movement ; and England opposes every thing.

While we imagined that we had accomplished something at Verona, matters turned out otherwise : England was concluding treaties with Spain. We now see clearly the causes of the violent notes of the Duke of Wellington, and of the note which he all at once transmitted to us relative to the Spanish colonies. England thereby reserved the right of saying to us, when we should be apprised of the conventions of Madrid :—" I have concealed nothing ; I warned the Congress of it by my note." You will find annexed the answer which I have returned to this note, as well as to that relative to the slave trade. I think I have duly upheld your principles in them : they have been much admired here. Now, what are you going to do ? Ouvrard, who is thoroughly acquainted with Spain and England, asserts that the

latter has already given two hundred million francs for what she is desirous of obtaining, and that she promises four hundred thousand more. Your last letter, and M. de la Garde's last despatch, seem to confirm in part what Ouvrard says. If such is the position, things have entirely changed their aspect for us ; and what M. de Montmorency brings you is now but a stale inapplicable proposition, for England would at present have common interests with Spain : she may possibly be so far engaged as to be obliged to defend the persons to whom she is lending her money, and who are delivering Mexico and Peru to her as a security. The question therefore is no longer about a mere war with Spain, but about a possible war with England.

I see three ways of getting out of this position. I will tell you what they are, and class them thus : the evasive way, the way of war, and the way of peace.

1. The evasive way :—When M. de Montmorency arrives and has shown you what he brings, you can reply that the French government does not refuse to join in the collective procedure towards the cabinet of Madrid ; but that, as things have absolutely changed their aspect, and England is now backing Spain, France cannot take the part that is proposed to her till she knows whether

Russia, Austria, and Prussia will engage to support France in a war with England, in case the latter should make common cause with Spain. Austria and Prussia will back out immediately, and you will be released. But what will you do after this evasion? Can you remain as you are, armed and motionless? That is not possible. The insolence of Spain will become unbearable, and when you would act, you will have lost the support of Europe.

2. The way of war:—Here is a grand game to play. Instead of amusing yourself in sending notes to Madrid, invade Spain immediately, after sending an ultimatum to the Cortes, and demanding their answer in twenty-four hours. Fifty thousand men, pushed on rapidly to the Ebro, will overthrow all the loans of England, stop the treaties for the colonies, wrest America from England, and Spain from the revolution. England, taken by surprise, would not have time to act; the purpose of her negotiations would be frustrated before she could declare war against you; and this purpose being frustrated, perhaps she might not choose to commence a fruitless war: you would march without Europe, and this would be an immense advantage, and still you would have Europe at your back. But it would be necessary to act with promptness and vigour,

and so avail yourself without scruple of all means. In this case, Ouvrard's plan would be serviceable to you, and I should not hesitate to recognize the regency, in order to have part of Spain for my cause. Once on the Ebro, you might yourself negotiate and treat with the Cortes, who would no doubt have retired to Cadiz, whither our fleet might sail to annoy them. You might even then treat with England, in order to a participation with her in the affair of the colonies, and you could offer her part of the bargain to induce her to assist you in reducing the Cortes : no doubt she would come to a composition. This plan, if successful, would raise France to a high point of glory and prosperity, and perhaps it is less adventurous than it seems.

3. The way of peace : — This is extremely simple ; it is the retirement of ministers, or at least of all the persons who have been employed directly or indirectly in the negotiations with the foreign courts ; then all the blame will be thrown upon those who shall go out of office. The allies must be told that whatever has been done is not binding, as the King's orders have been exceeded. The army of observation would be broken up, if not without weakness, at least without disgrace ; a new ambassador would be sent to Spain, and the new ministers, withdrawing their attention

from foreign affairs, would confine it entirely to the interior of France. You have but to say a word, my dear friend ; for my part I am ready, and you know that I always carry my resignation in one of my pockets. But recollect that you must come to some resolution, and that you cannot remain as you are : the funds tumbling down, commerce frightened, minds agitated, the allies expecting answers and wanting to do something, Russia and England threatening, oblige you to come to a decision, without which the machine will drop to pieces and fall upon you. Will you make up your mind to follow the plan of Verona, and will you send your note to Madrid with that of the allies ? That will give you a respite of six weeks ; this time expired, there will be peace or war : if peace, England finishes her negociations and secures the whole commerce of America ; if war, it is war with England, for she will have had time to conclude her treaties, and she will be obliged to uphold them. You will find yourself again in the same position, with this difference, that English money will already have created soldiers for the Cortes. Europe will not be the better for you, for Austria is afraid of any rupture with England ; and Austria and Prussia are equally afraid of the success of our armies and the movement of the Russian troops.

I write all this, my dear friend, without reading it over. My letter will reach you amidst the deliberations of the council: perhaps you will find in it some useful idea. I wish I could have done the King better service here; but in the second rank one cannot have any thing but zeal. Write to me, but above all, tell me to come back.

Entirely and sincerely yours,

CHATEAUBRIAND.

P.S. Ouvrard is the bearer of this letter: he and his plans have been much liked here; it is worth while to hear what he has to say. The Duke of Wellington sets off the day after to-morrow; the Congress is dying: had it died before its birth, it would have spared us great embarrassment.

Ouvrard stays, and sends off a courier, of whom I avail myself to transmit this letter. His plan pleases Prince Metternich, who hates revolutions, and who fancies that he discovers in it the means of killing that of Spain. Count de Nesselrode, on his part, finds in Ouvrard's plan money to carry on the business. Ouvrard asks for nothing; he merely says: "Recognize the regency, and I take every thing upon myself. My loan has already given a terrible blow to the loans of the Cortes; and England is so

sensible of the danger of my plan for her that she is enraged." In fact, the Duke of Wellington is all fire and fury, and Gentz has advised Ouvrard not to call upon the duke. Ouvrard means to wait till he is gone, and I should not be surprised if he were to persuade Prince Metternich and the Emperor Alexander to adopt some part of his ideas. M. de Metternich, however, will feel cramped, on account of England. Ouvrard says that he should be satisfied with the recognition of the regency by Russia, in order to accomplish his plan. He says too, that he cares not about the regency being beaten and put to flight, that he wants nothing but its name of regency, and that with his money he will find means to revive it. As for us, it is quite evident that we cannot recognize the regency unless we declare war. I made one striking objection to Ouvrard: I told him that if Russia adopted his plan and recognized the regency, while France remained at peace, he, Ouvrard, would find himself thwarted in France, and that he would equally thwart the government; for it is clear that the Cortes would ask why we suffered a Frenchman, the agent of a power at war with them, to equip, pay, and arm rebel subjects. To this he answers, that if he embarrasses the government, he will act from

Brussels, or even from England, where he will be sure to find what he wants.

All this may be chimerical; but, as Prince Metternich said yesterday: "It is not Ouvrard that is fabulous, but the times in which we live."

Paris, Thursday, December 5, 1822.

My dear Chateaubriand,—I know not whether you can read my scrawl, for I have just been passing the whole night beside one of my children who has been ill this fortnight, and my nerves are in such a state that I can scarcely hold my pen; I shall therefore be brief, both on your account and my own.

I thank you for your excellent letter of the 28th of November, and for the capital answer which you have returned in our name relative to the independence of the colonies. It is only by thus treating questions with force, clearness, and political acumen, that we can cease to remain entangled in the nets of those shopkeeping islanders. They are now playing a new part at Madrid; they wish to make it believed that they are less favourably regarded and treated there than all the others, on account of their armament against the island of Cuba; but don't believe a

word of it: they will derive a profit from their expedition, and then a profit from the desperate state of the Peninsula, in order to get paid the more dearly for the succours which they will consent to furnish.

Can it be possible that the allies were the dupes of this policy, and that they did not perceive how much they were serving it by the inopportune transmission of the notes which they drew up for the government of Madrid?

We are sending off a courier to try to convince them how much things have changed since those notes were written. England has thrown off the mask at Cuba, at Madrid, and lastly at the Congress, by the proposition relative to the Spanish colonies, which she has evidently made merely to authorize herself, in consequence of this communication, to recognize at her ease all the colonies that shall consent to grant her commercial advantages.

The position is also changed by the complete dispersion of the army of the Faith, and the establishment on our frontiers of Mina's army; so that the transmission of the notes, the departure of the ambassadors from Madrid, and the commencement of hostilities, form but one and the same fact, accomplished in eight days.

Lastly, the position is changed by the expe-

rience of the effect produced upon our funds, our maritime trade, our industry,—by the experience of the disastrous effect that a war will have upon them, a war which, I must confess to you, is in opposition to the paid declamations of some of the newspapers, and deprecated by the soundest and most general portion of the public opinion ; while it is desired, and ardently desired, we are certain, by the liberal leaders, who have this time the skill to get their subalterns to proclaim that they do not wish for it.

Such, my friend, are the circumstances in which we are called upon to write a note, which in truth is no longer seasonable,—which, in an affair very difficult and very delicate to conduct, is to engage us in the manner most favourable to the resistance of the Spanish liberals, to the opposition of the French liberals, to the triumph of the liberals of all countries.

On the other hand, it would be frightful for us—and indeed we never could make up our minds to it—to separate ourselves from the Emperor of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, to imitate whom?—the only power that we have reason to distrust, England.

Strive, my dear friend, to the utmost of your power, to prevent such a misfortune ; for, depend upon it, if these notes are followed up imme-

diately, the cause which we serve will be compromised ; and I have more than one evidence to prove that it will be acting in direct opposition to the end proposed.

On the contrary, if the allies would consent that the measure of withdrawing their ambassadors from Spain should be submitted, in regard to the moment of execution, to the decision of the meeting in Paris of their ambassadors and our minister of foreign affairs, we should awe Spain by the fear of this measure, and we should recur to it at the opportune moment. Obtain this concession, all the advantages of which I have not time to explain, but which you will not fail to represent strongly, for they are evident and immense. Let the allies do us justice ; let them be thoroughly convinced that we are more interested than any one in the destruction of the revolution in Spain ; let them recollect that we have not recoiled from any of the consequences resulting from a sincere desire of that destruction ; and let them not impose upon us measures which go directly contrary to the end proposed.

I have but one more word to add, my dear friend. You told me in your letter, that those whose opinion was not followed in so serious an affair could not usefully direct it ; I am precisely of your way of thinking, and have already proved

that I was capable of adopting a decision. God grant, for my country and for Europe, that they may not persist in a determination which, I declare beforehand, with a thorough conviction, must compromise the welfare of France herself.

Farewell, my dear Chateaubriand ; I should have liked to enter into some details with you : you will supply the omission of others : who could do so better than yourself ? Compliments to your colleagues.

Sincerely yours,

J. DE VILLELE.

Verona, December 3, 1822.

This, my dear friend, is probably the last letter that I shall write to you from Verona, unless particular occasion should arise. We expect your courier on the 10th or 11th, and I shall set out immediately after his arrival. The affairs of Italy are finished, and as well as possible for France, considering the circumstances. The evacuation of Piedmont will commence on the 1st of January, and be completed on the 1st of September ; some troops will be withdrawn from Naples, and the contribution in money diminished. There will be no general tribunal in Italy, and the Prince of Carignano will not be excluded from the crown : thus the intentions of the King are fulfilled.

I have written you long letters on our Spanish affairs ; but at the moment that I am writing, your determination must be taken : therefore, if I were to advert again to Spain, I should only be entering into useless repetitions.

Now, my dear friend, one word more on your particular interests : my attachment has gained me a right to talk to you on that subject. I shall no doubt be obliged to go to London ; I shall not be in Paris to preach concord and to collect votes for you in the chamber. You will no doubt have a great majority there ; but bear in mind, that a royalist opposition against a royalist minister, however weak it may be, is the most deplorable thing that can be, and that in the long run it must succeed. You can finish every thing, smooth every thing, by appointing a few individuals, and you are minister for life. When I insist so strongly, my friend, what have I in view ?—Your interests, and those of France. What could happen to myself ?—To retire with you ; and you know by experience how cheaply I hold places. In case of any mishap, my dear Villèle, you will remember the persevering counsels of a friendship equally sincere and disinterested.

Entirely yours,

CHATEAUBRIAND.

Paris, December 10, 1822, 4 P.M.

My dear Chateaubriand,—M. Rothschild offers me an opportunity of writing to you ; I seize it at the last moment, not having been able to do so sooner. The army of the Faith has been driven into France by that of Mina : about 3000 royalist soldiers are at this moment passing from Bourg-Madame to some other point on the frontiers, by which they mean to re-enter Spain. Mina had not more than from 6000 to 7000, whom he has established at Puycerda, where he will not be able to remain, for the guerillas are already harassing him on his rear. But it results from these events, and it is admitted by all the Spaniards whom we see, that the Spanish royalists, even though aided by the other governments, never could effect a counter-revolution in Spain without the assistance of a foreign army : it appears also, that the political direction indicated as a rallying point by the regency was too exclusive to collect sufficient masses, and in all the parts of the Peninsula.

This breaking up—the knowledge more or less accurate of the dispositions of the Congress—the warmth with which war has been preached up by our petty journals, have all concurred for some days past to embarrass our position. If, on this account, they should attempt to drag us

along in the train of the unseasonable notes of the Congress, I think they will do wrong. I have written as much to you, and I hope that what your good understanding must itself have suggested you have forcibly represented to the sovereigns, as soon as you knew that it was adopted here as the rule of conduct.

Adieu. The courier is just starting. A thousand kind compliments to your colleagues.

Sincerely, entirely, and ever yours,

J. DE VILLELE.

P.S. At Madrid the clubs are raving ; the Cortes becoming more moderate ; the ex-ministers, and even the Duke del Infantado, are at liberty.

Verona, Thursday evening, December 12, 1822.

My dear friend,—I received your letter of the 5th instant twenty-four hours before that of the 2nd of last month. As soon as the former reached me I hastened to Prince Metternich, and this morning I had with him a conversation of the utmost importance. The Emperor of Russia also granted me an audience, and that generous Prince conversed with me above an hour, with an interest truly admirable for the King and for France. Prince Metternich advises that I should go myself

to Paris to report these conversations. I start in consequence three days earlier than I intended : I shall travel expeditiously ; and, unless delayed in passing the mountains, I hope to arrive about the 18th or 20th. In a few words, the three powers will not withdraw their notes, and will despatch them to Madrid, granting us however a few days to act with them, if we wish it : but they conceive that the moment is perhaps not seasonable for us, and that we may wish to act a little later after them. The Prince has seized this idea, which I suggested, and you see what advantage you may take of it. You may send off a note at the same time with that of the allies,—a note at once threatening and conciliatory. Our ambassador may stay for a moment after those of the allies have withdrawn, announcing his departure, and the firm determination of France never to separate herself from the continental alliance ; but at the same time expressing all the solicitude of France for the welfare of Spain, and beseeching her to listen to the voice of reason before she precipitates herself into an abyss of misery. It seems, my dear friend, that if this idea were properly acted upon, a new route might be opened to us : we might wrest from England a part which she purposes to play,—that of mediator ; and if we are repulsed, the war is justified

in the estimation of every reasonable man. I will develope all this to you ; and I hope that no determination will have been taken before my arrival in Paris. To-morrow Prince Metternich is to read me the despatch which he is going to send to M. Vincent. I shall be too happy, my dear friend, if my last words from Verona are not thrown away for the happiness of our country.

Entirely and ever yours,

CHATEAUBRIAND.

These letters are very curious, historically speaking : they show the character of mind of the two ministers whose union and division contributed most to the prosperity and the downfall of the Restoration. M. de Villèle saw nothing but the present ; we were engaged almost exclusively with the future. Here is to be found the first sketch of our plan for the enterprise against Spain, as drawn by us in London, and sent to M. de Montmorency. It is singular that this plan is precisely the same as that proposed to the present government by M. Thiers, one of the most remarkable men whom the revolution of 1830 has produced. Envy has outstripped his successes ; it only followed mine.

M. de Villèle, in his last letter, is agitated by

the fluctuation of the public funds,—by the English negotiations relative to the American colonies,—by ideas of finances and commerce, which never leave him, and which prevent him, notwithstanding the perspicacity of his mind, from rising at this moment to higher considerations. He is pleased with our notes on the slave trade, and on the Spanish colonies, because we there defend material interests; but he dislikes war: he is fearful lest, if the despatches of the courts reach Madrid, they should lead to immediate hostilities; he begs us to prevent this misfortune: the despatches had been sent off. Attached to our system, we rejoiced, for our own part, at the transmission of the documents, which after all bound us to nothing whatever, and were even expressly calculated to produce nothing.

It results also from this correspondence, that ourselves and M. de Villèle had each a fixed idea; we were for war, he was for peace. We attributed to all the allies the individual sentiments of Alexander, in order to accustom M. de Villèle to the idea of hostilities: M. de Villèle magnifies, on his side, the reverses of the Spanish royalists, for the purpose of moderating the supposed ardour of the Congress of Verona. We told the president of the council, that the decided wish of the allies is for war; that there is no question about the

occupation of the Peninsula, but only about a rapid movement: we show success to be easy; and yet we knew that the Congress of Verona was disinclined to war: we feared that our movement would be prolonged far beyond the Ebro; we thought that it would be necessary for us to occupy Spain a long time, to make a good job of it; but we did not reveal all, in order to attain our aim; and we said secretly to ourselves, "The Bidassoa once passed, the president of the council, active, capable, and decided, must go forward."

M. de Villèle tells us of his success at home: he calculates the millions of surplus that we have. "Why," exclaims the great financier, "must these unlucky foreign affairs come to disturb such prosperity!"

In another letter, we say to our able correspondent:—"France is obliged to act against her will; Russia thinks that nobody goes far enough; Austria has stirred merely to avoid breaking with Russia; Prussia dreads the least movement; and England opposes every thing."

M. de Villèle is apparently struck by this expression alone, *France is obliged to act against her will*, without noticing what follows, and formally contradicts our assertion. Ever haunted by his idea of peace, he writes to us: "Can it be possible that the allies were the dupes of this policy, (the

English), and that they did not perceive how much they were serving it by the inopportune transmission of the notes which they drew up for the government of Madrid !”

M. de Montmorency was also in favour of war, but he had a different aim from ours ; he was even very warm in his opinion, while we left some doubt about our determination : we had no wish to render ourselves impracticable ; we feared lest if we unveiled ourselves too much, the president of the council should refuse to listen to us. Having taken the initiative at Verona on the question of hostilities, visiting scarcely any one but the Emperor of Russia, Duke Matthieu on his part could not help representing all the princes as seized with a warlike mania. Supposing that one of our letters and one of M. de Villèle’s, separated from the official documents, had fallen into the hands of strangers, would they not have exclaimed : “ See ! M. de Villèle and M. de Chateaubriand say, the one that *both bowls are not left him*, the other that *we are obliged to act against our will*.” Now this would be a palpable falsehood : witness the documents of Verona ; witness our last conversation with M. de Metternich—we shall speak of it presently ;—witness, lastly, the machinations of the alliance against our enterprise during the perilous intervention in the Peninsula. The secret resolution

to leave us there was fully decided in the majority of the Congress, which did not prevent the language used from being interlarded with such expressions as *Par la Pâque-Dieu!* and *Par la mort!* The parties dreaded Alexander; they lulled him with speeches: to hear those talk aloud who besought us in a whisper to prevent the rupture, one would think that they meant to drain Spain completely. And yet, we must repeat it, the whole pretended coercion was confined to the vague despatches of the cabinets of Berlin, Vienna, and even St. Petersburg, in which the predominating sentiment is an immoderate desire of peace.

M. de Villèle was dragged to the combat, not by the continent, but by the very force of things. When the president of the council, in spite of his prudence, found himself involved in war, he directed wonderfully the financial operations, as we conducted with some success the political measures. The funds rose instead of declining; M. de Villèle was astonished: he knew not the power of a people, when one acts in accordance with the instinct of that people. Surrounded by persons belonging to the Exchange, whose jobbing transactions were deranged by the sound of the cannon, he was frightened by the cries of the ruined speculator; he had the kindness to consider as men of experience and matter of fact a

domestic troop of the convention and of the empire, which, changed into scene-shifters, was mortified by the fear of our success and rejoiced by the hope of our reverses. What was there to fear from the two worlds of despotism and anarchy? The first was paralysed ever since victory had ceased to employ its arms; the second had felt its energy checked under the chamberlain's dress, a forced garb, which the first had put upon it.

However, M. de Villèle, though so moderate, was himself resolute when attacked in a tender part. While he was hesitating respecting the expedition beyond the Pyrennees, he despatched the following note to London. He showed that he did not care for England: England recoiled before him when he talked of a treaty of commerce, as she did before us on the subject of the war in Spain.

COPY OF THE NOTE ADDRESSED TO THE ENGLISH
GOVERNMENT.

The undersigned, chargé d'affaires of France, has received from his government the express order to present to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs of his Britannic Majesty the following communications.

The government of His Most Christian Majesty has just been informed that, on the 15th of this

month, the Spanish minister, at a secret sitting of the Cortes, demanded and obtained authority to conclude a treaty of commerce with England. It is added that, during the discussion, a ministerial speaker represented this measure as a sacrifice, at the price of which they might hope for succours that had become indispensable.

The cabinet of St. James well knows and appreciates the motives which have forced France to maintain a corps of observation on the borders of those provinces of Spain which are a prey to anarchy and civil war. Neither is that cabinet ignorant of the dangers to which the person of the King of Spain and his family have recently been exposed.

His Britannic Majesty has sent the Duke of Wellington to the Congress of Verona, where the allied sovereigns are at this moment engaged in concerting the most proper means for putting an end to the calamities of Spain.

Under such circumstances, a separate negotiation with England would have the infallible result of giving to the principles which now direct the Spanish government a moral support, the consequences of which may easily be appreciated.

The French government refuses to believe that such could be the intentions of His Britannic Majesty. It flatters itself that the frank explana-

tions which the English ministry shall furnish will leave no doubt respecting the present state of the relations of the cabinet of St. James with the Spanish cabinet. The French government awaits these explanations with confidence. The ministers of His Britannic Majesty will readily perceive that, in the situation in which France stands in regard to Spain, *an immediate decision of France must result from these explanations.*

The French government, on its part, will always be disposed to give to its allies, by its conduct and by any explanations which they can desire, a proof of the intention which it has constantly shown to concur in the re-establishment of order in the Peninsula, without renouncing, if it be possible, the advantages of peace which Europe is enjoying.

CHAP. XXX.

M. Ouvrard—Letter of the Viscount de Montmorency—
Commencement of our personal relations with the Emperor of
Russia.

BUT what was that apparition of M. Ouvrard, mentioned in our letter of the 28th of November? We had received from Milan the following note, dated the 24th of the same month, from M. de Montmorency :—

“ Milan, November 24, 1822.

“ Noble Viscount,—I have here met with M. Ouvrard, who has excited in me some astonishment, and even painful feelings, by the latest intelligence concerning the regency. You know that he is travelling to promote the interests of the latter and of his loan. He has applied for a letter to one of our plenipotentiaries, and I give you the preference, requesting you to introduce

him to your colleagues. I advise him to stay as short a time as possible at Verona, where his arrival will be too much talked of, and to return as soon as he can. Tell Prince Metternich that I beg him to hear what he has to say. The whole is in good hands, noble viscount. Write back by him. I am much pleased with the news that he brings about the elections: five bad ones. May God inspire you! Remember me to your colleagues and to the whole Congress.

“MONTMORENCY.”

Then came M. Ouyard with his plans for overturning the Cortes in the name of the regency of Urgel, without the aid of any foreign power. These plans, though chimerical as far as regarded moral interests, were not so in reference to material interests. The imaginative banker amused Prince Metternich: the idea of carrying on war by dint of money and the regency of Urgel, and making France no party in the cause, was a scheme quite congenial with the inclination of the Prince.

The chronological order of affairs now leads us to speak of the relations which the Emperor of Russia wished to establish with us. Where is Alexander now? In his grave. The Czar expired in a remote and desolate corner of his empire. A new whirlwind of fortune has cast us

into another solitude. We are well situated, beyond the passed world, on the little spot of earth which we now occupy, for the task of tracing the life of the monarch whose friendship it would have been so useful to the interests of France to have preserved at Verona. Next to Bonaparte himself, Alexander is the greatest historical figure in the Napoleonian epoch.

CHAP. XXXI.

The Emperor Alexander—Summary of his life.

ALEXANDER I., Paulowitsch (the son of Paul), was born on the 23rd December, 1777. He married, on the 9th of October, 1793 (a fatal date), Louisa-Maria-Augusta, afterwards Elizabeth-Alexina, Princess of Baden. Alexander's boyhood was passed under the guardianship of Catharine II. He was educated by La Harpe, a Swiss, or, as he may be termed, a Frenchman born at Lausanne. Alexander ascended the throne on the 24th March, 1801. His father, Paul I., was found strangled in his bed. Paul was insane; but he was not deficient in information, talent, or generosity. All these qualities, but especially the last, distinguished his eldest son. Paul was that northern Count who was received with such *eclat* at Versailles and Chantilly, in the reign of Louis XVI. The violent death of an autocrat is an

event perfectly consistent with Russian manners, as the murder of a sultan is consistent with the manners of the Turks. Emancipation, under despotism, assumes the form of assassination. The virtues of Alexander preclude the suspicion of his having been made thoroughly acquainted with the conspiracy. An abdication had become necessary. He was cognizant of his father's intended abdication, but not of his death. His elevation to the throne was the result of a murder, but not of a parricide.

The first acts of Alexander's reign marked the monarch's character. Successive ukases had the effect of diminishing taxation, extending trade, improving the laws of the customs and the system of finance; the nobility were permitted to engage in commerce, judicial penalties were remitted, prisoners for debt were released, and commissioners were appointed for mitigating the punishment of exiles. Even on the shores of the White Sea, were found exiles bowed down by misery and old age, who knew neither why nor for what period they were imprisoned in the cloisters of a frozen convent. Alexander abolished confiscation, regulated the administration of justice, pronounced punishment on corrupt magistrates, made a law requiring the manumits of judges in condemnation to the punishment of

death, abolished the secret tribunal by which political offences were exclusively tried, founded and re-organized seven universities, created more than two thousand primary schools, banished literary censorship, limited the power of the governors of provinces, destroyed personal servitude in Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland, and restricted it in the other parts of the empire.

On his accession, Alexander maintained the peace which he found restored between Russia and France, after the campaigns of Suwaroff and Korskoff in the reign of Paul I. In 1802, he contracted an alliance, which subsequently became a durable friendship, with Frederick William III. When Napoleon, the conqueror of Austria, (great in battle, but little in victory), subdued Prussia, he circulated those bulletins which calumniated a noble queen.

The peace of Tilsit afforded the Czar leisure to lay the foundation of the military institutions of his empire. Forced by circumstances, and perhaps led away by the ambition of sharing the world with a great hero, Alexander prepared at Tilsit a secret treaty, composed of ten articles. By this treaty, Turkey in Europe was to devolve to Russia, together with the conquests which the Muscovite arms might effect in Asia. Bonaparte, on his part, was to be master of Spain and Portu-

gal, to unite Rome and its dependencies to the kingdom of Italy, to march into Africa, taking possession of Tunis and Algiers, to capture Malta, to invade Egypt, and to open the Mediterranean only to French, Russian, Spanish, and Italian ships.

Though sincere, as a man, in matters which directly concerned mankind, Alexander was artful as a demi-Greek in what related to politics. At the very time when he was flattering Napoleon, declaring war against the English, and pronouncing the attack on the fleet at Copenhagen a *signal act of brigandage*, one of his officers proceeded to London to convey to the cabinet of St. James assurances of the Czar's admiration and approval. Accordingly, when the two Russian ships of war, engaged in the blockade of Lisbon, were captured by the English, they were speedily restored to the Czar. Bonaparte imagined that he had deceived Alexander at Erfurth, and that he had intoxicated him with praise. One of the generals of the empire wrote the following :—" We have just now made the Emperor Alexander swallow a dose of opium ; and, whilst he is sleeping, we intend to employ ourselves elsewhere."

At Erfurth a coach-house was transformed into a theatre. In front of the orchestra, two arm-chairs were placed for the two potentates ; on the

right and left were chairs for the other monarchs ; and behind, were benches for the princes. Talma, the king of the stage, performed before this audience of kings. When he delivered the words—

“ L'amitié d'un grand homme, est un bienfait des dieux ”—

Alexander rose, pressed the hand of his *grand ami*, and said, “ I never felt so forcibly the truth of these words.”

In the eyes of Bonaparte, Alexander was then a mere fool ; and he joined his chamberlains and generals in laughing at him. He despised him because he supposed him to be sincere ; he admired him when he discovered his duplicity. “ He is a Greek of the lower empire,” said Napoleon, “ and we must be distrustful of him.” At Erfurth, Napoleon acted with the bold hypocrisy of a victorious soldier ; Alexander dissembled like a conquered prince. Cunning was endeavouring to dupe falsehood : the policy of the west and the policy of the east were true to their characters.

The son of Paul succeeded, alternately by his alliance and his wars with Bonaparte, in uniting to his empire, Finland, Georgia, several districts of Persia, Bessarabia, and the kingdom of Poland. In 1813, the magnificence of the Russian army spread astonishment throughout Germany. In

1814, Alexander entered Paris ; and in 1815 he set in movement a second army consisting of 500,000 men, and 2000 pieces of artillery. Such was the power of the Czar, to whom Napoleon bequeathed Europe.

Alexander was as great in mind as Napoleon was in genius : his words and his actions were stamped with a character of magnanimity which were wanting in the great man by whose glory he was eclipsed. In his proclamation published at Warsaw on the 22nd of Feb. 1813, he said :—
“ We have deemed it proper to make known our projects to Europe ; it is to subjects as well as to kings that we recall their duties and their interests.—

“ — Profiting by our victories, we extend a helping hand to oppressed nations. The moment has arrived ; never was there an occasion more propitious to unfortunate Germany. Our enemy flies—he astonishes by his fear the nations which he heretofore astonished only by his boldness and his barbarity.—We wish to extend our benefits, and not the limits of our empire, to the remotest regions of the earth.—The fate of the Guadiana and of Vesuvius has been decided on the banks of the Borysthenes ; Spain will thence regain the freedom which she heroically defends in an age marked by feeble-

ness and pusillanimity. By this manifesto we address to subjects, that which we have directed our envoys to say to kings. —

“ Germania must summon her courage.— If the people of the north imitate the sublime example set by the Castilians, the mourning of the world will be brought to a close.—If, after all, a misled nation, should, on a review of her late extraordinary career, be prompted to generous sentiments,—if she should look back with tearful eyes to the happiness she enjoyed under her kings, we will hold out to her a succouring hand. Europe, on the point of becoming the prey of a monster, will at once regain her independence and her tranquillity. May heaven grant that this sanguinary colossus which threatened the world with his criminal eternity, may endure only in a long recollection of horror and pity !”

In another proclamation, dated Kalisch, March 25th, 1813, Alexander called the people of Germany to arms, and promised them, in the name of the allied sovereigns, constitutions calculated to secure their independence. The young Germanic generations heard this voice in their studious retreats : their professors became their captains ; they laid aside Homer, to unsheath the sword.

Shortly after the campaign of France, the most ably conducted of all Napoleon’s campaigns,

the mayors of Paris proceeded to the Russian head-quarters, for the purpose of arranging the terms of a capitulation. Alexander addressed them thus : " Your Emperor, who was my ally, marched into the very heart of my states, and visited them with misfortunes whose traces will long remain. A just defence has brought me hither. It is far from my wish to visit upon France the injuries which I have received from her. I am just, and I know that the French people are not to blame for those injuries. The French people are my friends, and I will prove to them that I can return good for evil. Napoleon is my only enemy. I promised my special protection to the city of Paris. I will protect and preserve all its public establishments. I will allow none but picked troops to enter the French capital. I will preserve your national guard, which is composed of the elite of your citizens. It is in your power to secure your future welfare. You may obtain for yourselves a government which will give peace to France and Europe. It is for you to manifest your wishes ; you will always find me ready to second your efforts."

These words were literally fulfilled. On the 31st of March, 1814, innumerable armies occupied France ; the shops of Paris, which had been previously closed, were re-opened. Within the space of six months all these foreign troops re-

crossed our frontiers, without a single musket being fired, or a drop of blood being spilt, after the restoration of the Bourbons. The boundaries of old France were extended on some of her frontiers, and she received a share of the ships and magazines of Antwerp. Five hundred thousand French prisoners, scattered about in different countries, were sent home. After twenty-five years of bloodshed, the din of war ceased from one end of Europe to another. Alexander departed, leaving us the works of art we had won by conquest, and our liberty secured by the charter;—a liberty for which we were equally indebted to his intelligence and his influence. The chief of the supreme authorities,—autocrat alike by the sword and by religion,—Alexander alone, of all the allied sovereigns, understood that in the advanced stage of civilization which France had attained, she could be governed only in virtue of a free constitution.

There was something calm and melancholy in Alexander:—he used to go about Paris on horseback or on foot, without attendants, and without ostentation. He appeared to be astonished at his own triumph; he gazed almost with an air of compassion on a population which he seemed to regard as superior to himself. He seemed to feel that he was a barbarian in the midst of us, just as a Roman might be supposed to have felt ashamed

in Athens. Perhaps too he thought that these same French soldiers had been in his ill-fated capital; that his troops in their turn had become masters of Paris, where he might find some of the torches extinguished by those who had at once delivered and destroyed Moscow. This destiny, this changing fortune, this misery, alike common to subjects and kings, could not fail to make a profound impression on a mind so religiously disposed as that of Alexander.

The Czar considered himself merely as an instrument in the hands of Providence, and he arrogated no merit to himself. Madame de Stael complimented him on the happiness which his subjects enjoyed in being governed by him, though deprived of a constitution. Alexander replied :—" I am merely a fortunate accident."

A young man, in the streets of Paris, expressed his admiration of the Emperor's demeanor even to the humblest persons. " Is it not the duty of sovereigns to behave so?" was Alexander's answer. He declined residing in the Tuilleries, recollecting that Bonaparte had been pleased to fix his quarters in the palaces of Vienna, Berlin, and Moscow.

Looking up to the statue of Bonaparte on the column of the Place Vendome, he said: " If I

were elevated so high, I fear my head would be turned."

When he visited the Tuilleries, he was shown the *Salon de la Paix*. "What use," said he smiling, "had Bonaparte for such an apartment?"

On the day of Louis XVIII.'s entrance into Paris, Alexander stood quietly at his window, without any mark of distinction, and looked through the panes of glass, to see the procession.

There was sometimes a graceful gallantry in his manner, which ingratiated him in the favour of the fair sex. When visiting a lunatic hospital, he asked one of the female patients, whether there were many women in the establishment who had gone mad for love. "We have very few yet," replied the lunatic, "but it is to be feared that their numbers will be greatly augmented by your Majesty's visit to Paris."

One of Napoleon's grand dignitaries said to the Czar:—"Your arrival, Sire, has been long and anxiously wished for here."—"I should have come sooner," replied Alexander, "had not French valour prevented me." It is certain that when he crossed the Rhine, he regretted that he could not retire in peace to the bosom of his family.

At the *Hotel des Invalides*, he saw the muti-

lated soldiers who had conquered him at Austerlitz. They were silent and gloomy. Nothing but the sound of their wooden legs was heard in their deserted courts and their denuded chapel. Alexander's sympathy was moved. He ordered twelve Russian cannons to be presented to these brave veterans.

There was a proposition for changing the name of the bridge of Austerlitz :—" No," said Alexander, " it is enough that I have passed over the bridge with my army."

It was Alexander who originated the idea of the sacrifice on the *Place Louis XV.* An altar was raised on the spot where once a scaffold stood. Seven Muscovite priests performed the service for the dead, and the foreign troops, on their return from a review, defiled before the altar. *Te Deum* was chaunted to one of the beautiful melodies of the old Greek church. Soldiers and sovereigns knelt down to receive benediction. The memory of the French spectator involuntarily wandered back to 1793 and 1794, when even cattle refused to pass over the polluted pavement, which emitted the odour of blood. What hand had conducted to the expiatory ceremony those Tartars, many of whom inhabited sheep-skin tents at the foot of the great wall of

China? Such spectacles will never be witnessed by the feeble generations succeeding the present age.

There is one serious reproach attached to the memory of Bonaparte. Towards the close of his reign he rendered his yoke so heavy, that the hostile feeling against foreigners was diminished; and an invasion, now deplored in recollection, was, at the moment of its occurrence, regarded in some sort as a deliverance. All the most able men of the time concurred in the terrible judgment pronounced on Napoleon: Lafayette, Lanjuinais, Camille, Jordon, Ducis, Lemer cier, Chénier, and Benjamin Constant, rising above the creeping crowd, dared to despise victory, and to protest against tyranny. Who does not remember their avenging words, and their glowing writings! The government of Bonaparte waged war against all independence; violated private as well as public freedom; and the generous opposition raised against these enormities was declared to be calumnious and blasphemous. If success is to be regarded as innocence; if the tyrant is to load even posterity with chains; if that suborned posterity, (the future slave engendered of a past slave), is to become the accomplice of the triumphant criminal; where would be right or justice?—where

would be the reward of sacrifices? Right and wrong being thus rendered merely relative, all morality would be effaced from human actions.

“Proud defenders of the monarchy,” says Benjamin Constant, in the *Esprit de Conquête*, “will you suffer the *oriflamme* of Saint Louis to be superseded by a standard stained by crime? And you who advocate a republic, what say you of a master who has deceived your hopes, and withered the laurels whose shade veiled your civil dissensions, and caused even your errors to be admired?”

Other parts of the work are still more accusatory and energetic. Posterity is not so equitable in her decrees as we sometimes imagine. There are passions and errors in distance as well as passions and errors in proximity. When posterity admires without restriction, she is scandalized to discover that the contemporaries of the individual she admires did not cherish the exalted opinion of him which she entertains; but this is easily explained. We do not hear the imprecations, the cries of pain and distress uttered by the victims; we do not see the flowing of blood, and the shedding of tears. The glory purchased by misery remains, and we have not felt the misery. The faults of the great hero are forgotten: his infirmities perish with his mortal

parts: nothing survives but his imperishable renown.

Alexander proceeded from France to England. He beheld, not without envy, the arsenals of Great Britain, the armories in the tower of London, and the artillery at Woolwich. The Prince Regent, who had obtained a degree at the University of Oxford, received Alexander and the King of Prussia as graduates, wearing the appropriate costume. One of the dignitaries of the University delivered a Latin speech; some students declaimed pieces of poetry on the burning of Moscow and the fall of Napoleon: this was the representation of a past era amidst the events of the present age.

At the commencement of the year 1815 the Czar proceeded to Vienna to attend the Congress. Alexander had then several subjects of complaint against the sovereign who had now become possessor of the crown of Saint Louis. Louis XVIII. had just then refused, on the plea of religion, but really on some offensive ground, his consent to the marriage of the Duke de Berry with the sister of Alexander; a union which would have changed the course of events, and the fate of legitimacy. This want of friendly cordiality gave umbrage to the generous Czar. Alexander was soon made acquainted with the project of a triple alliance

between France, Austria, and England, an alliance evidently directed against the presumed ambition of the cabinet of St. Petersburg. La Bernardière, an *attaché* to the French embassy at Vienna, made a report on the grounds of complaint entertained by France against the legitimate family. Alexander, already wounded, and moreover indignant at the precipitate flight of Louis XVIII., without even an attempt at self-defence, was struck with the report of La Bernardière, and he suddenly suggested to the allies, that it might be advisable to place the Duke of Orleans on the throne of France, in the event of Napoleon being a second time defeated. This proposition threw the Congress into the utmost dismay; but it failed of producing any effect, owing to the opposition of Lord Clancathy, who declared that he had no authority to give an opinion on so serious a question. By a despatch from Vienna Louis XVIII. was made acquainted with this curious affair, which proves that at the second restoration, as well as at the first, the allies had not formed an irrevocable determination to re-establish legitimacy. Alexander, in spite of his personal feelings, remained faithful to the general engagements to which he had pledged himself. He received whilst at Vienna, at two o'clock on the afternoon of the 5th of March, intelligence

of the landing of Napoleon. At five o'clock that same evening an estafette proceeded to St. Petersburg, with orders that the imperial guards should immediately march to France. The foreign troops which were returning homewards suddenly halted ; their long lines wheeled to the right about, and eight hundred thousand enemies turned their faces in the direction of France. In that France, then only a vast nest of soldiers, the genial wings of the fame of Marengo and Austerlitz sufficed to hatch armies.

The Duke of Wellington was instructed to await the arrival of the Russians ; but Bonaparte did not give him time to do so. Waterloo is an event which must not be passed over unnoticed.

During the Hundred Days we were with the King. On the 18th of June, 1815, about mid-day, we left the city of Ghent by the gate of Brussels. We were alone, and we proceeded to take a walk along the high road. We had brought with us *Cæsar's Commentaries*, and we sauntered along slowly, reading as we went. We had proceeded to about the distance of a league from the city, when our attention was arrested by a sound like the rolling of distant thunder. We stopped, looked up to the sky, which seemed to be overcharged with clouds. There appeared to be every prospect of a storm, and we deliberated within

ourselves whether we should continue our walk, or whether we should return in the direction of Ghent. We listened again : we heard only the cry of a fen-duck in the rushes, and the chiming of a distant village bell. We continued our walk ; but we had not proceeded above thirty paces when the rolling recommenced. It was sometimes long, sometimes short, and at unequal intervals, and occasionally it was perceptible only by a sort of tremulous motion of the air, which communicated to the earth on those vast plains. These detonations, which were less loud, less undulating, less combined than peals of thunder, suggested to our mind the idea of a battle. We crossed to the opposite side of the road, and leaning against the trunk of a poplar tree, we turned our eyes in the direction of Brussels. A south breeze sprang up, and we clearly distinguished the sound of artillery. That battle, yet without a name, of which we now heard the distant echo, was the battle of Waterloo !

We stood at the foot of the poplar tree, a silent and solitary auditor of the formidable decree of Fate. Our feelings might, perhaps, have been less powerfully excited, had we been in the midst of the *melée*. There the presence of danger and death would not have afforded us time for meditation. But standing alone in the plain of Ghent, like the shepherd of the flocks which were graz-

ing around us, we were oppressed by the reflections which crowded on our mind. What was this battle? Was it to be decisive? Was Napoleon there in person? Was the dominion of the world, like the garments of Christ, to be given away by lot? On the success or reverse of one of the contending parties depended the liberty or slavery of the nations of Europe. But what blood was being spilt? Was not every peal of artillery that reached our ear mingled with the dying groans of Frenchmen? Was it another Crecy; a new Poitiers; a second Agincourt, to rejoice the hearts of implacable enemies of France? If they triumphed, was not our glory lost? If victory crowned Napoleon, where was our liberty? Though the success of Napoleon might have doomed us to eternal exile, yet the cause of our country was at that moment uppermost in our hearts. Our wishes were for the oppressor of France, if he, by saving our honour, could rescue us from foreign domination.

On the other hand, should Wellington triumph? Legitimacy would then enter Paris in the rear of those red uniforms, to whose tint French blood had imparted a deeper hue. The triumphal cars of royalty would then be the hospital waggons of our wounded grenadiers. What was to be expected from a restoration accomplished under such auspices?

These were but a few of the ideas that tormented us. The report of every cannon seemed to vibrate through us, and redoubled the beating of our heart. We were a few leagues distant from the scene of the great catastrophe : we could not see it ; we could not touch the vast funereal monument which was momentarily increasing at Waterloo. Our sensations resembled those which we experienced at Boulac on the bank of the Nile, when we unavailingly extended our hands towards the Pyramids.

No traveller appeared within sight. In the adjoining fields a few women were quietly employed in weeding, and did not appear to have observed the noise which had riveted our attention. At length a courier approached. We left our post at the foot of the poplar tree, and advanced to the middle of the road. The courier stopped, and we questioned him. He belonged to the Duke de Berry, and was coming from Alost. " Bonaparte," said he, " entered Brussels yesterday (June 17th), after a sanguinary engagement. The battle was to be resumed again to-day (June 18th). The decided defeat of the allies is expected, and the order for the retreat is given." The courier then galloped on.

We turned in the same direction, walking at a very hurried pace. A carriage overtook us. It

contained a merchant and his family, who were flying with the utmost speed. The merchant confirmed the account given by the courier.

On the 19th of June the truth became known. The French had at first gained some advantage on the left wing ; but fortune soon turned. Blucher coming up with fresh troops, separated from the main body of our forces the Imperial Guards. Around this immoveable phalanx thronged a torrent of fugitives, amidst clouds of dust and smoke, and the roar of three hundred pieces of artillery, and the galloping of twenty-five thousand horses. It seemed like the fatal summary of all the battles of the empire. Twice did the French raise the cry of victory ! and each time their cry was smothered by the pressure of the enemy's columns. At length the fire of our lines died away. A few wounded grenadiers, amidst forty thousand carcasses of the slain, and a hundred thousand blood-stained bullets collected at their feet, were seen resting on their muskets, their bayonets broken, their firelocks uncharged. At a little distance from them stood the man of battles, watching, with eye fixed and ear intent, the firing of the last cannon he was ever destined to hear in his life.

This catastrophe, which was the death blow of the empire, brought the Czar back to Paris.

He was not received with the favour which had been shown to him on his former visit. The first invasion of the allies was regarded as a deliverance; the second was viewed in the light of a conquest. As this second invasion did not bring liberty, and imposed enormous burthens, the yoke of the foreigner was felt in its full weight. In 1815 it was not the Russians, but the Prussians who were masters of Paris. The Prussians had humiliations to avenge and defeats to conceal beneath the insolence of triumph. An English camp was established in the Bois de Boulogne; and the French had before them, in the character of oppressors, the two nations to which they were most antipathetic. In 1814, we were delivered from the presence of the foreign troops in less than six months; but now they were to occupy France for the space of five years. We lost Landau in Alsatia, Sarrelouis in Lorraine, Philippeville and Marienbourg in Hainault, Versoix in the Pays de Gex. France assented to the demolition of Huningen, and to the surrender of Savoy and the Netherlands, territories which had been secured to us by the treaty of 1814. She surrendered for the space of five years sixteen fortresses on the frontier, binding herself to maintain there an army of occupation, composed of 180,000 men. An indemnity

of five hundred millions of francs was stipulated, and twelve millions forty thousand francs of *rentes* were created to liquidate debts contracted to private individuals out of our present territory. Adding to these sacrifices the loss caused by the passage and sojourn of the foreign troops, it may be estimated that each one of the hundred days cost France thirty millions, and the total of the hundred days, three milliards : such was the expense of Bonaparte's march from Cannes.

The objects of art were now taken from us. The most painful consternation prevailed in Paris when the Duke de Richelieu presented to the chambers the fatal treaties, and when the chambers silently acceded to those treaties. The same painful feeling was observable when our invaders removed the manuscripts from the public archives, and stripped the gallery of the Louvre. Canova himself pointed out the works of art belonging to Italy. Victory took back what victory had taken.

For these proceedings no blame could be attached to Alexander ; but public opinion, when excited, does not draw just distinctions. The Czar himself was mortified at witnessing the levity of a people for whose liberty he had done so much ; and he now regarded the French only

as a brave, but volatile nation, without reason and without gratitude. In 1814, France appeared overjoyed at being delivered from Napoleon. In 1815, she received and supported him: the senate and the generals who had decreed and applauded the abdication of Napoleon, restored him in the following year, and placed an army at his disposal. But Alexander, on the other hand, was far from satisfied with the restored royal family. He conceived that a king who had fled without even endeavouring to defend himself, was unworthy to reign, and afforded an alarming prospect for the future. The Emperor of Russia, who was coolly received on his second visit to Paris, was no longer animated by his former sympathies or by the enthusiasm of a first victory: he lived retired, wrapped up in the mystical ideas which then began to take possession of his mind.

Alexander, in his early life, was an unbeliever, with some tendency to atheism. He afterwards became a deist. From deism he changed to the Greek religion, with an inclination for the Catholic faith; with which the Jesuits, and, above all, Father Grivel, had inoculated him. He then remained for some time a waverer: his feelings being sincere, and his imagination excited on religious subjects, he ultimately became a convert to the illuminism of the German sects.

Madame Krudener exercised for a long time a powerful ascendancy over him.

However, neither the new aspect of affairs nor Alexander's altered disposition diminished his generosity. On his arrival in Paris on the 11th of July, three days after the return of Louis XVIII., he checked the work of Vandalism which had commenced, and stopped the destruction of the bridges of Austerlitz and Jena: "The law of reprisals," said he, "always appeared to me odious." He would not permit the division of Russian troops which arrived under the command of General Barclay de Tolly to consume the last resources of the inhabitants, and he supplied the troops with provisions from his own magazines. He reviewed the troops in the *Plaine de Vertus* on the 10th of September, 1815. At that famous review, which the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria also attended, the *alliance* received the name of *Holy*.

At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Alexander consented to abridge the period of the occupation of France. He again opposed the violent measures of his allies, and presented to the Duke de Richelieu that map on which was traced the line separating our old territory from the provinces to be dismembered from France.

On his return to Russia, the Emperor, as usual,

travelled with scarcely any retinue. On his journey he stopped to attend mass in a little country church. When the mass was ended, he approached the priest and kissed his hand according to the Greek custom; the poor priest, in conformity with another custom, kissed the forehead of the Czar without knowing who he was, though the perfumed hair of the stranger attracted his notice. This was all he ever new of the Emperor.

Alexander forbade that any rejoicings should take place in honour of his arrival. The Synod and the Council of State wished to confer upon him the surname of *blessed*; but he would not receive it. "I cannot," said he, "allow myself to accept and bear this surname. I should forswear my own principles, were I to set before my faithful subjects an example so contrary to the sentiments of humility with which I have endeavoured to inspire them. May my people bless me as I bless them! May Russia be happy; and with her and me be the benediction of God for ever!"

The Czar was not struck with the beauty of France. How could he! He saw her in her mutilated deformity. He did not behold her seated on the shores of the Mediterranean, nor reposing amidst her vineyards between the Py-

rennees and the Loire. On his return to the winter palace of St. Petersburg, Alexander adorned it with pictures which he purchased at Malmaison on the death of Josephine. One day, whilst we were in Italy, we were walking with him on the banks of the Adige, and he gave us a description of the city of Peter the Great. "The twilight of summer evenings," said he, "at St. Petersburg resembles neither daylight nor moonlight. In my capital, you will see the vegetation of Syria, and the costume of the east, illumined by the rays of the polar light. The Neva, as blue and pellucid as the Rhone at Geneva, flows between quays of red granite, and is covered by the ships of every nation."

At the close of our last conversation with Alexander at Verona, the melancholy to which he was subject gained possession of him : he was taciturn, and we remained silent. When at parting he took our hand, he pressed it, and it seemed as though something whispered we should never meet again ;—that ere three years elapsed we should look for him in vain,—he so young, so vigorous, and so handsome ; and we so little likely to survive him. His disgust at the course of public affairs and the conduct of public men was augmented when we were thrown out of office : he died eighteen months after our fall. We had

written to inform him of our dismissal; he replied by the following note :—

“ The esteem with which you inspired me, Monsieur le Vicomte, was independent of the post whose functions you discharged. That esteem your principles and talents must secure to you in whatever situation you may be placed. I feel pleasure, therefore, in reiterating to you my sentiments, and I thank you for the feelings you express towards me in your letter. A glorious recollection is attached to the period of your administration. The good cause owes to you a debt of gratitude : possibly it may yet owe new services to the spirit of loyalty and the wisdom which distinguish you, and which, rising above personal considerations, looks only to the interest of mankind and public tranquillity. This task is worthy of you : you will perform it ably. In that conviction I offer you, Monsieur le Vicomte, renewed expressions of the cordial and sincere sentiments, on which I beg you will always rely on my part.

“ ALEXANDER.

“ Peterhoff, July 24, 1824.”

The favourite residence of the recluse autocrat was Czarkoë-Selo. Here, secluded from society, he used to amuse himself by reading or walking

in a park two or three leagues in extent : in that park no human beings were seen except sentinels. In the evenings the band of the guards played melancholy airs before the window of the Czar.

The Empress Elizabeth too passed her days in profound retirement : she was attended only by one lady of honour, and never received any company at Czarkoë-Selo. In person she was slender, and her complexion and features were delicate : her conversation and manners were characterized by an air of languor ; her smile was melancholy, her voice soft, and no one could look at her without feeling the conviction that her life would be brief. In the evenings, she used to walk or ride on horseback in the most secluded parts of the park, attended by her lady of honour and an equerry. She avoided going out in the morning, lest she should annoy the Emperor.

Alexander had had his foibles : amidst those variable foibles there arose an attachment which endured upwards of eleven years. One of the Emperor's aides-de-camp, from being his intimate confidant, became a favoured rival. By those singular vicissitudes which occur in exalted as well as in humble life, the favoured lover became a colleague of our embassy at Rome, and the faithless princess, whilst still in the bloom of her beauty, became an *Ermitaine* of the Vallée-aux-

Loups. She wore mourning for Alexander in those groves which were no longer a part of France, but which the French had planted in the days of their illusion, now vanished like hers. A daughter was the fruit of this connexion, which was long kept secret. Alexander was the more attached to this natural child, inasmuch as he had no legitimate offspring. The young lady, who had been educated in Paris, returned to St. Petersburg when she had nearly attained her sixteenth year. She was about to be married with the sanction of her Imperial father, when she suddenly died. On the arrival of the nuptial dresses, which had been ordered from Paris, the young bride was no more. Alexander was on the parade when he received intelligence of this melancholy death. He turned pale, and said,—“I am punished.”

Alexander was an amiable man,—and therefore he required an excuse to justify to himself his infidelity to the Empress. He persuaded himself that she did not love him;—that she was cold and insensible, and incapable of affection;—that her husband's errors did not render her unhappy;—in short, by supposing her to be without love, he believed her to be without pain, and without jealousy.

But this was a mistake. Elizabeth was passion-

ately attached to Alexander ; but a natural timidity and reserve inclined her to repress her feelings. She might have said, with Manzoni's *Hermangarde* :—" Thou wert mine, and I was silent in the security of my happiness. My chaste lips could never have revealed all the transport of my heart."

Mortified by the infidelity of the woman, from whom he deserved a better return, and deeply afflicted by the death of the child who was the object of his tender affection, Alexander manifested a disposition to live on more social terms with the Empress. When he discovered that he was beloved by her, his remorse increased. Their first meeting, after their estrangement, took place at Carlsruhe in 1814. In the same year, the Imperial couple joined each other at Vienna.

Religion completed the task of repentance. But the health of Elizabeth began to decline just at the moment when she was most happy, and when her love for Alexander was increased by the admiration with which his glory inspired her. The Empress, who had never been a mother, accompanied the Emperor to the grave of his regretted daughter, and mingled her prayers with his.

Alexander now became quite absorbed by thoughts of his own death ; and was sometimes seen on his knees in a church-yard during the

night. When he set out on any journey, he was accustomed to say, "Every year people seem anxious to wind up their affairs with me, as if they never expected to see me again." He often said:—"I shall perish in some obscure corner; in a wood, in a ditch, or at a road side, and I shall soon be forgotten."

On the day when he left his capital to set out on that tour which terminated his life, the tide of the Neva rose so high that it was feared it would overflow St. Petersburg. Alexander, from the upper windows of his palace, viewed the threatened disaster with dismay. A cross, which the flood had dislodged from its place in a church-yard, was washed up in front of the palace, before the eyes of the Imperial family. This moving Calvary was regarded as a fatal presage. The Czar was observed to be affected beyond measure on taking leave of his relations, prior to his departure from St. Petersburg; and when he had proceeded to a little distance on his journey, he ordered his carriage to stop, and looked back on his natal city with evident emotion.

Meanwhile Elizabeth would not separate from her husband, nor exile herself to her native land, Italy. With the sovereign of her heart, she repaired to Greece. She departed full of present happiness, but she bore within her the seeds of

death, planted by past suffering. They passed through those uninhabited deserts, formerly ornamented for Catharine with the semblance of villages and hamlets: but to Elizabeth no desert was lonely, for Alexander was with her.

Reports of military insurrections reached the ears of the Emperor on his journey. Several young officers had imbibed, from the Czar himself, sentiments favourable to liberty. Alexander, himself the author of the influence, whether ill or good, that was now turned against his authority, withdrew, lest he should be urged to act with a severity repugnant to his naturally merciful feelings. At the same time, he found himself in a dilemma,—he doubted whether he ought not to become the leader of the desired reforms. He heard, in the steppes of Russia and Greece, the spirit of the age, making a plaintive appeal to him. But he was anxious to obey the will of God, without presuming to see into the wise designs of Providence; he feared to enthrall himself in an erroneous course by favouring those innovations which had already made so many victims, and produced so little happiness.

Leaving the Empress at Taganroy, he visited the Don, planned a journey to Astracan, and proceeded along the southern coast of the Crimea; he seemed to be wandering wheresoever chance

might conduct him. A fever, occasioned by the humid cold of the climate, obliged him to repair to a residence belonging to Count Woronzoff: he became worse, and expressed a desire to be removed to Taganroy. There it is understood he obtained proofs of the conspiracy formed against his life, and which subsequently endangered the existence of his brother. Alexander merely said: "What harm have I done to them?" The Czar expired:—there was a rumour of his having been poisoned, and the doctor was suspected; but nothing certain was discovered. The dying Empress was at a short distance from her husband, but was not able to see him. He was ill only eleven days. Alexander breathed his last on the 13th of September, 1825. In his final moments, he ordered the blinds of his windows to be drawn up, and said: "What a beautiful day." These were the last words he uttered. The Empress, in a letter which she wrote to St. Petersburg, said:—"Our angel is in heaven, where I hope soon to join him."

Three days afterwards, when the people presented themselves at Taganroy to kiss the hand of their deceased sovereign, the face of the corpse was covered with a veil.

It is believed by some that towards the end of his life Alexander embraced the Catholic faith.

His accession to the throne deprived him of a father ; his descent to the grave well nigh led to an empire's downfall. After so much fame and glory, nothing remained but his coffin and his wife's bier, sealed and silent coffers, which were carried through woods lighted by fir torches, and followed by a horde of those baskirs who were once encamped in the court-yard of the Louvre.

Thus terminated the differences between Alexander and Napoleon. Both perished in deserts. Napoleon had already fled to another world. Eagle like, he stood on his rock, and the sun shone on him till his last moment. He was seen from the remotest corner of the earth.

During the illness of Alexander, some little symptoms of convalescence caused a consolatory letter to be written to the Empress-Mother from Taganroy. In consequence, *Te Deum* was chaunted in the churches of St. Petersburg. The people fervently prayed for his recovery, for Alexander was adored by his subjects. The *Te Deum* was not ended when a second courier brought to the Grand Duke Nicolas intelligence of the Emperor's death. Nicolas went out to receive the courier, and then returned to the church. When he entered, every one was struck with his altered looks. At first he was unable to speak ; but, after an effort, he advanced to the bishop, and in two or

three words acquainted him with what had happened. The prelate then took a cross covered with a black veil, and presented it to the Empress-Mother. She instantly understood her misfortune, and swooned just as the chorus in the *Te Deum* were chaunting the words : — “ *In te, Domine, speravi.*”

Notwithstanding the excellent qualities which distinguished the Czar, it cannot be doubted that the policy of his reign was fatal to his dominions. He brought Russia too much into contact with Western Europe, and he scattered among his subjects the germs of a civilization which he afterwards wished to destroy. Alternately thrust forward and backward, the people knew not what was required of them, intelligence or barbarism, passive obedience or legal obedience, advancement or retrogression. It was natural that Alexander, the Tartar Prince, should wish to exclude his subjects from intellectual advancement ; but Alexander, the enlightened prince, leading them by degrees to improvement, would better have served the interests of his country. He was too strong to employ despotism, and too feeble to establish liberty. His wavering did not create national emancipation, but it gave birth to personal independence, which, in its turn, produces not liberators but assassins.

CHAP. XXXII.

The narrative resumed—Alexander—Conversation with him.

WE have now scarcely courage to represent, holding conversation with us, the sovereign whom we have just described descending into the St. Denis of the Czars. What are now the congresses and sovereignties of this world to Alexander? The grandeur of the tomb makes all other things seem insignificant: death and life are two things of an order so different, that after speaking of the former, we seem, in returning to the latter, to degenerate into the puerilities of childhood.

M. de Montmorency having left the Congress, our task, though short, augmented in importance. This little interval is dear to our remembrance, since it gained for us the most illustrious friendship conferred on us throughout our political career,—a friendship, too, which remained unchanged to the last.

The Emperor of Russia had been warned to be on his guard respecting us : he had been told that if he saw us, we should exercise over him a seduction which he would find it difficult to resist. We had been presented to him in Paris : he then supposed us to entertain *ultra* opinions ; and as he was a *liberal*, we naturally concluded that we could not agree except on religious points. When we met Alexander at Verona, he had become an *ultra*, and we remained, what we had always been, *liberal* ; consequently, the same principles of disagreement appeared to exist, only they were now reversed. At the Congress, the Czar behaved to us with courtesy, but at the same time with reserve. We frequently met him in his promenades ; but we felt that it would seem intrusive to notice him, until he should think proper to make some sign of recognition, or address to us a word in passing by. At length he accosted us, and we walked together on the banks of the Adige. He spoke of St. Petersburg, in order to avoid speaking of politics. Though M. de Montmorency had not been favourable to us, (he behaved to us according to the dictates of his high birth and his opinions), still what he said at parting with the Emperor caused Alexander to be less afraid of us. The Countess Tolstoy, whom Alexander frequently visited, contrived to bring me

into his presence. Alexander was rather deaf ; we do not like to talk loud, and our indifference to princes is such that we did not even observe the coolness of the man, from whom every body else was courting a look.

M. de Montmorency having left Verona, Alexander sent for us. We had not been together a quarter of an hour, when we found ourselves mutually agreeable to each other. We are aware that our acquaintance with that great potentate of the earth, savoured too much of familiarity ; but it was the familiarity of souls, and did not imply any want of respect. The Emperor experienced that sort of surprise which we have frequently remarked on the countenances of persons who have known us only through the medium of a fanciful portrait. Absorbed by the idea of the Spanish war, and foreseeing no dangerous obstacle except British jealousy, we endeavoured to gain over Alexander, so that he might counteract the ill feeling of the cabinet of London.

In our different conversations, we touched upon every thing ; and he listened to us without appearing to recollect his exalted station. We expressed to him our dissatisfaction of the treaties of Vienna. Alexander did not think proper to come to any explanation on this subject ; he

merely replied : " You were better satisfied with the treaty of Paris."

When alluding to Poland, we ventured to represent to him the dismemberment of that nation as the consequence of one of the vilest measures of the old French monarchy. We expressed our conviction that the iniquity of that dismemberment would fall heavily on Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and that Alexander would secure immortality by repairing the injury. The Czar had the patience to listen to us when we added that a small and very ill-governed state, for which Rousseau had in vain schemed a constitution, could not be dangerous to neighbouring states ; and that the Poles would be always tempted to revolt, not from a revolutionary spirit, but because it was a characteristic of human nature, that a nation should wish to preserve her name and refuse to sacrifice her independence.

We did not forget our dear Athens. We have long pleaded her cause in public, and in the chamber of peers. After the death of the Czar, we did not fear to appeal on the same subject to Nicolas and Constantine.

Alexander was perplexed by a conflict between his nature and his position. Destined to take the lead in the progress of society, he was grieved to find himself obliged to repel the Greeks, the

people of his own faith, and to disown a nation of whom he was the natural protector. But though favourable to liberty, he believed that Europe demanded his protection against the encroachment of destructive principles. He was the more convinced of the growth of these principles, since they had revolutionized Naples, Piedmont, and Spain, and since his own army manifested symptoms of the French fever.

Thus Alexander, after having granted a constitution to the Poles, suspended its operation ; after having induced us to *octroyer* the charter, he witnessed its developements with anxiety ; and after having desired the independence of Greece, he disapproved the insurrection of 1820. He regarded the Hellenic revolution merely as the result of an order issued by the directing committee of Paris. At the Congresses of Troppau, Laybach and Verona, he imagined that he was defending civilization against anarchy, as he had protected it against the despotism of Napoleon.

We touched upon the union of the Greek and Roman churches. Alexander was favourable to that project, but he did not consider himself strong enough to attempt its execution. He was anxious to visit Rome, yet he remained on the frontier of Italy : more timid than Cæsar, he did not cross the sacred torrent, for fear of the

interpretations which would undoubtedly have been given to his journey. These internal conflicts were not unaccompanied by scruples of conscience: amidst the mystical ideas which ruled the mind of the autocrat, he was not certain whether he was obeying the hidden will of God, or whether he was yielding to some inward suggestion which made him guilty of apostacy and sacrilege.

CHAP. XXXIII.

M. Metternich avows to us his apprehensions on the subject of the Spanish war—Last conversation with the Emperor of Russia.

WHEN our increasing favour with the Czar became known at Vienna, we observed an alteration in the manners of certain individuals towards us. Our society was sought with as much eagerness as it had previously been avoided. M. Metternich, in particular, showed himself exceedingly gracious. In a conversation which we had with him, he avowed to us his fears respecting the Spanish war, the favourable view taken of it by Alexander, and the intention of that sovereign to march his troops into Spain whenever their aid should be necessary. M. Metternich implored us to preach peace to the powerful neighbour of Austria. We replied, that we had never preached war, which was literally true, because we believed France stood in no need of aid. We added, that

we did not fill the post of minister to the Congress, and that we could only express our own private opinion, which of course would not be consulted. "Besides," we observed, "M. de Villèle is far from having determined to come to hostilities. His last letters show his dissatisfaction at the publicity given to the communications with Madrid. He fears that those despatches may force on a crisis, and oblige him to withdraw the French ambassador sooner than he wishes."

We assured M. Metternich, that we would mention this fact to his Imperial Majesty at the farewell audience which he intended to grant us. M. Metternich thanked us, and seemed anxious to be made acquainted with the result of the conversation.

We proceeded to the Canossa Palace ;—we told the Emperor the circumstance which we had promised to communicate to him. He replied as follows :—

"France will of course act as she thinks fit. M. Metternich inquired of me what course I should adopt, in the event of war breaking out between France and Spain, and in case of that war being attended by disastrous consequences to the former power. I replied, that my sword would be at the service of France. If France finds that she can dispense with my aid, that is her affair.

I do not presume to influence her conduct ; but you, Monsieur de Chateaubriand, what think you of this question ?”

We replied, “ Sire, I think that France should lose no time in regaining, by her own exertions, the rank which the treaties of Vienna caused her to forfeit. When she shall have recovered her dignity, she will become a more useful and more honourable ally to your Majesty.”

We know not whether the Emperor thoroughly entered into our feelings ; but he smiled nobly at the reply by which we declined his aid and demanded war. After a pause he said, “ I am glad that you came to Verona in order to bear evidence to the truth. Would you have believed, that which our enemies assert, that the alliance is a mere word, intended only to open a path to ambition ? Such might have been the case under the old order of things ; but we have now to stand on our guard against certain private interests, by which the civilized world is placed in jeopardy !

“ There can be no longer any such things as English, French, Russian, Prussian, or Austrian policy : there must henceforth be only a general policy, which must, for the welfare of all, be admitted in common by subjects and sovereigns. It was reserved for me to be the first to prove

my conviction of the sound principles on which I founded the alliances. An occasion presented itself: the insurrection in Greece. Doubtless nothing could appear more in accordance with my interests and those of my people,—more congenial with the feelings prevailing throughout my dominions,—than a religious war against Turkey. But I could perceive the revolutionary spirit in the troubles of the Peloponnesus.

“ I therefore paused. What efforts have not been made to break the alliance? Endeavours have been made alternately to inspire me with prejudice, and to mortify my self-love: even insult has not been spared. They little know me who imagine that my principles are founded on vanity, or that they can yield to resentment. No, I will never separate from the monarch with whom I am allied. Sovereigns may be permitted to form public alliances, for the purpose of defending themselves against secret associations. What is there that can tempt me from the fulfilment of my duty? Can I have any wish to increase the boundaries of my empire? Providence has placed at my disposal 800,000 troops, not for the gratification of my ambition, but for the defence of religion, morality, and justice, and for the protection of those principles of order on which human society depends.”

It has become the custom now-a-days to place little faith in the statements of authors, who are unfortunately too apt to invent, or at least to colour facts. We at least possess the humble merit of being an honest writer. *The Itinéraire de Paris à Jerusalem* serves as a guide to travellers. After the lapse of thirty years, some of the most obscure persons whose names we mentioned are still to be found. The Abbé Abougosh recently sent us a letter by a pilgrim from the mountains of Judea.

What we reveal of our conversations with the Emperor of Russia possesses the same veracity. In a speech which we delivered in the Chamber of Deputies in 1825, we quoted some remarks which had fallen from Alexander. Were they the offspring of our imagination? No. We always found it impossible to mingle fiction with truth: of this I here adduce another proof. The Emperor of Russia wrote to us on the subject of the conversations at Verona: he thanked us for our speech; in his letter he however stated, that his words, faithfully reported by us, expressed the opinion of the whole alliance. We beg pardon of the memory of that great sovereign; but our recollection was most faithful.

We may presume to say, that Alexander became our friend, if princes have affections, and if friendship can exist between persons separated by

such a vast difference of rank. It was through Alexander that we opposed the intentions of Austria, when, by instigating disturbance in Naples, she hoped to produce a catastrophe in Madrid. It was Alexander too who held England in check. He addressed to us the most flattering letters, and declared that he would sign with his eyes shut any thing we might send him. An estafette brought us the cordon of St. Andrew as soon as the deliverance of Ferdinand became known.

At the time of our dismissal from office we might have proceeded to Russia, where honours and fortune awaited us ; but we attached little value to either, and consequently were not anxious to obtain them. Alexander was the only prince for whom we ever entertained a sincere attachment. What are all the other sovereigns of the earth ? Mere necessities, consequent on the yet incomplete education of mankind,—a necessity to which we submit respectfully and faithfully : is not that enough ?

CHAP. XXXIV.

Conversation of Prince Metternich—Note from the Austrian Arch-Chancellor—Letter to M. de Montmorency—Our departure from Verona.

FROM the Canossa Palace we proceeded to Casa-Castellani. We described to M. Metternich our conversation with the Emperor Alexander, only reserving that part relating to the general policy of the world. That did not concern the Austrian Arch-Chancellor ; and he would have thought the Emperor and I had been indulging in vague reveries. He appeared, or pretended to appear, satisfied with what we had said to the Czar respecting the repugnance of M. de Villèle to the military expedition. Either the Prince did not perceive our real sentiments, or he was forced in spite of himself to allow us to perceive his ; for he again expressed to us his opposition to the war. He conjured us to depart, in order to

support M. de Villèle, and to restrain the ardour of M. de Montmorency : we replied, that immediately after our arrival in Paris we should proceed to London, but that we would inform M. de Villèle of his (M. Metternich's) ideas respecting Spain ; so that, if the allies were so inclined, they had still time to send couriers to Madrid to suspend the presentation of the *ostensible letters*. We withdrew, adding that we should have wished to lay our last respects at the feet of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria. We received soon after the following note.

“ Verona, December 12, 1822.

“ I have this moment, Monsieur le Vicomte, presented to the Emperor the expression of your regret at quitting Verona without being able to take leave of him. His Imperial Majesty commands me to inform you, that he attaches too much importance to your return to Paris to think of detaining you here.

“ I shall be charmed to see your excellency before your departure, the more especially as I should wish to make you acquainted with my communication to M. de Vincent : but I shall have not a moment to spare during the whole of to-morrow morning, which I must devote partly

to audiences with the sovereigns, and partly to consultation with the Emperor my master. If your excellency would do me the honour to come and dine with me, we should have an opportunity for a little conversation. If you are determined to leave Verona before the evening, I will endeavour to see you during the little interval between half-past one and two o'clock.

“ I beg you will let me know your intention, and accept the assurance of my high consideration.

“ METTERNICH.”

We complied with the Prince's wish to see us, and we called upon him on the morning of the 12th. He showed us a despatch which he had just written to Baron Vincent. It contained only those diplomatic phrases which say nothing : no doubt there was in the back ground a confidential note of a more explicit nature. M. Metternich repeated what he had previously said respecting the objections to the war. We dropped some words about the *aberrations* of Alexander ; and he saw us depart with an air of satisfaction, as if he felt confident that we were a messenger of peace. Either our countenance and language must be very deceptive, or the perspicacity of the

Austrian Arch-Chancellor is not so great as is generally supposed. On our return to Paris we addressed this last letter to M. de Montmorency.

“ Verona, Dec. 12th, 1822.

“ Monsieur le Duc,

“ I this morning had a very long conversation with Prince Metternich, and another with His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. Prince Metternich deems it advisable that I should render you an account of this conversation immediately. Consequently I shall set out to-morrow, the 13th, and I hope to arrive about the 20th in Paris. By the courier which delivers this despatch, I reply to two letters of M. de Villèle. That reply indicates the consequence which may be expected to result from the ideas thrown out in the conversation of which I shall have to render you an account.

“ M. de Caraman has doubtless informed you that the affairs of Italy have terminated in a way honourable to France. To-morrow, the day of my departure, the final sitting of the Congress will take place; and on Monday next the 16th, the sovereigns and ministers will have quitted Verona.

“ I have the honour to recommend to your kind notice M. M. Rauzan and d'Aspremont;

and I beg you will accept, together with my congratulations on your new title, the assurance of the high consideration with which I have the honour to be, &c.

“ CHATEAUBRIAND.”

We left Verona on the 13th, casting back a look of regret on Italy, but consoling ourselves with the thought that we were about to continue our *Memoires* by the pale light of that sun, whose beams shone on the misfortunes of our youth.

WAR IN SPAIN

IN 1823.

CHAP. XXXV.

War in Spain in 1823—Resignation of M. de Montmorency
—Our appointment as minister for foreign affairs.

MR. CANNING occupied in London the place left vacant by the death of Londonderry. George IV., urged by Lord Liverpool, had admitted Mr. Canning into his council, in spite of his very natural dislike of the defender and friend of the Queen. On the way from Verona to Paris, our nature had returned to us. Unbending with pleasure our mind from politics, we thought with delight of returning to London, of making a tour of the three kingdoms, in short, of indulging in our domestic habits and plunging into the solitude of our recollections. On reaching the Rue de l'Université, all had vanished.

The Duke of Wellington, who had arrived before us, had stopped in Paris. At his desire, M. de Villèle had consented that a courier should be despatched to the allies, to invite them to delay the communication of the instructions which they had sent to their chargés d'affaires at Madrid. At the same time, his grace proposed the mediation of England to the government of Louis XVIII. This mediation was refused, because it offered no remedy to the grievance of France. However, in a memorandum of the cabinet of St. James for Lord Fitzroy Somerset, dated London, January 6th, 1823, his lordship was recommended to insist in Spain on certain changes to be made in the constitution.

On the 26th of December, 1822, the Duke de Montmorency sent to the Duke of Wellington an excellent note, in which he explained the motives of the refusal of the mediation. This was the last act of the ministry of M. de Montmorency.

The official reason of the retirement of M. de Montmorency is still a mystery. Had M. de Montmorency entered at Verona into engagements which M. de Villèle did not think fit to fulfil? Did he wish, in case of war, for the immediate and material co-operation of the allies? We cannot think so; we rather imagine that there was incompatibility of dispositions. M. de

Montmorency could not forget the manner in which M. de Villèle had stepped into the presidency, especially as Duke Matthieu, at the moment of his departure for Vienna, had been told by his Majesty himself that the presidency was given away. He had not resigned his place, but kept it from the consciousness of the services that he might render. M. de Montmorency was not without ambition, a legitimate passion in a man of his name and merit: he possessed a good and cultivated understanding. Educated in the great school whence Mirabeau sprang, his elocution was natural and persuasive; you fancied that you heard the voice of his good actions. Noble and calm in the tribune, he belonged to a race which is not to be shaken, and which, being merely forced to a change of greatness, had gone from kings to God. If he spoke with authority of the faith of the constable, his religious convictions were tempered by the suavity of his character and by his benevolence. His face was pale and serene; a charm of youth was not yet effaced from his half-bald brow; a kindly and lively imagination shed over his serious manners the graciousness of the smile. He retained illustrious friendships, whose opinions he combated with a tolerant austerity that strengthened attachment by esteem. You felt that, at the moment of the

great sacrifice, he would have been capable, like Henry, the second Duke de Montmorency, to write to his friends: "My dear heart, I bid you the last adieu with the same affection that has always been between us."

M. de Villèle and M. de Montmorency, placed so high, and so discordant, could not go on long together: there wanted but a pretext to part them. It is asserted that they fell out upon the question of the immediate recall of M. de la Garde. It is a strange circumstance that, on the very same day that the retirement of Duke Matthieu was known, the despatch of M. de Villèle, in which he expresses himself respecting the government of the Cortes, as Prussia, Austria, and Russia might have done, was also made public. M. de Montmorency withdrew, and was regretted by all the good men in Europe.

Having left Verona on the 13th of December, 1822, we reached Paris on the 17th. We hastened to make a report to M. de Villèle of our last conversation with Prince Metternich, of his disinclination for war, of his desire to see the cabinet of the Tuilleries pursue pacific courses, as well from the dread which he entertained of our success, as for that which he felt of a movement of Russia. We found M. de Villèle most favourably disposed towards us, and well pleased with

our correspondence, but uneasy about his position.

M. de Polignac called to see us. He informed us that there was a disagreement between the minister for foreign affairs and the president of the council. We declared that our lot was linked with that of M. de Villèle ever since we had arranged the affair of his first ministry, as he, M. de Polignac, knew, and as the acknowledgments of M. de Richelieu, expressed in a note still in our possession, attested : that from that moment we had always found M. de Villèle sincere. M. Polignac talked to us of our labours at Verona, of the claims that we might have, of rumours circulated concerning a difference between us and M. de Montmorency : we replied, that we were so far from coveting the place of the noble duke, and wishing to remain in France to stir up parties, that we intended to return immediately to London.

We hastened the preparations for our departure ; we had scarcely any thing more to do than to step into the carriage, when two words from M. de Villèle apprised us of the retirement of M. de Montmorency. M. de Villèle offered us the portfolio by command of the King. We passed the night in incredible agitation ; and on the morning of the 26th we wrote the following letter to M. de Villèle.

“ My dear friend,—Night brings counsel ; it would not be beneficial either to you or to me were I to accept at this moment the portfolio of foreign affairs. You have been very kind to me, and I have not always had reason to be satisfied with M. de Montmorency, but still he is reputed to be my friend ; it would be rather unhandsome in me to take his place, especially after the reports that have been circulated : people have been incessantly repeating that I was striving to overthrow him, that I was caballing against him, &c. Had he retained some situation in the ministry, or had the King given him some distinguished employment, such as that of *grand-veneur*, things would wear a different aspect ; but even then there would remain difficulties.

“ You know, my dear friend, how devoted I am to you. I have been fortunate enough to serve you powerfully with that portion of the royalists who are adverse to your system. I temper them, I check them, and I keep them, by means of the confidence which they have in me, within the bounds of a just moderation ; but I should instantly lose all my influence were I to enter the ministry without bringing along with me two or three of those men whom it is so easy to disarm, but who will be extremely dangerous in the ensuing session, if you cannot

come to an arrangement with them. Believe me, my dear friend, the moment is a critical one. You may remain twenty years where you are, and raise France to the highest pinnacle of prosperity, or you may fall before the end of two months, and plunge us all back into chaos. This depends absolutely upon you, and the course which you are about to pursue. I conjure you, in the name of friendship, and of my political fidelity, to seize the opportunity that presents itself to consolidate your work. For the rest, I highly approve of your taking the portfolio of foreign affairs, as you have done, *ad interim*. This will give you time to examine and to adjust matters. I must also tell you candidly that there is one whom you might choose as minister for foreign affairs under whom I could not serve, and my removal would be a serious misfortune at this moment. There, my dear friend, is a part of the thousand things that I have to say to you. We must meet and talk them over. Meanwhile, be persuaded of this truth, that my political lot is linked with yours, and that I stand or fall with you."

In reply to this letter, M. de Villèle sent us the following note:—

"I have just received your letter, my dear Chateaubriand, and cannot decide to carry it to the

King till I have seen you. Can you admit me for a moment, before one o'clock ?

“ Heartily and entirely yours,

“ J. VILLELE.”

We saw M. de Villèle ; we urged all the objections that appeared likely to persuade him to allow us to set out. He went to the King : the King sent for us. He kept us an hour ; he having the goodness to preach to us, we making a respectful resistance. He concluded with saying : “ Accept, I command you.” We obeyed, but with sincere regret, for we were instantly aware that we should perish in the ministry. On Tuesday, January 1st, 1823, we crossed the bridges, and went to sleep in that minister’s bed, which was not made for us,—a bed in which one sleeps but little, and in which one remains only for a short time.

Thus it is false that we had desired the fall of M. de Montmorency. At the foreign office, on going to take my passports for London, I met M. Bourjot ; I told him that, though I was talked of for minister, I was yet far from having consented to succeed a man of M. de Montmorency’s merit. Every change in office produces contentions ; he who goes out has partisans who blame him who

enters. This is perfectly simple, and interests only the two ministers ; the public takes no notice of these paltry squabbles, or only laughs at them. We retain not the slightest unpleasant recollection of all that may have been said at that time. We merely strove to prove that our veneration for M. de Montmorency was as great and as complete as it could be. Duke Matthieu was, like me, above these political bickerings, and he has proved it. In a note written in 1821, informing me that he was appointed minister for foreign affairs, he said : “ You may believe in the sincere devotedness of him who has been long attached to you, and who cannot but be grateful for the manner in which you have often put him forward.” On the 27th of February, 1823, two months after my entrance into the ministry, he wrote : “ I will not wait, noble viscount, for the first day that I should be sure of meeting with you, to thank you for the too flattering manner in which you have spoken of me in your excellent speech. Unfortunately, I arrived too late to hear it ; I have just read it with extreme interest. You have been particularly happy in what relates to England, and that is an essential point.

“ For the rest, in order to pay due attention

to our interests in that quarter, as in all others, permit me to tell you what I hope you will also bear in mind: 'Let us hasten to act against Spain.'"

CHAP. XXXVI.

Louis XVIII.—His dislike of us.

M. DE VILLELE, in offering us the ministry in the name of the King, had expressed himself with a modest friendship ; for, so far from finding his Majesty disposed in our favour, he had the greatest difficulty in the world to determine his will : kings have not more liking for us than we have for them ; we have served them to the utmost of our power, but without interest and without illusion. Louis XVIII. detested us ; in our place he would have had *literary* jealousy. Had he not been King, he would have been a member of the Academy, and he was imbued with the spirit of antipathy of the classicists against the romantics. His Majesty knew but little of us : we most cheerfully ceded the palm to him ; we never dispute any thing with any one, not even with a sceptre-bearing poet ; we knew not a man of

letters behind whom we should not be most sincerely and most humbly disposed to hide ourselves.

We succeeded, however, in pleasing the King more than might have been expected, and in such a way as to excite in our colleagues a dread of our influence. His Majesty often took a nap at the council, and he did quite right ; when he was not asleep, he would tell stories. He possessed an admirable knack at mimicry : this did not amuse M. de Villèle, who wanted to stick to business. M. de Corbière would lay his snuff-box and his blue handkerchief on the table and clap his elbows upon it ; the other ministers listened in silence. We, for our part, could not help being diverted by his Majesty's tales ; the King was evidently delighted. When he became aware of his success, before he began a story, he sought an excuse in it, and would say with his clear, shrill voice : " I am going to make you laugh, M. de Chateaubriand ;" and accordingly we were on such occasions so natural a courtier, that we laughed as heartily as if we had received orders to do so.

For the rest, if M. de Villèle prevailed upon his Majesty to choose us, it was only because he had almost as strong a dislike of M. de Montmorency as of ourselves. A tradition of kings is a prepossession against names, a prepossession which they transmit from reign to reign : their

tenacious memory recollects the wars of the great vassals ; they hire nobles for domestics ; they like them in their wardrobe ; they dread them in their councils.

Louis XVIII. disliked M. de Montmorency for his ancient life, and for his new life,—for his past opinions, and for his present virtues..

CHAP. XXXVII.

History of the secret societies in France—Proclamation of the army of free men—All the parties have had men in foreign countries.

No sooner were we installed in the ministry, than we resumed the ideas which had engrossed us in London, and at Verona : we resolved to push on to the stability of the Restoration, and the greatness of France, since we were in a post from which we could act with efficacy. As a conscientious man, and one who wished to satisfy himself thoroughly of the justice of the cause, we set about reviewing facts and events ; we convinced ourselves more than ever of the dangers with which the monarchy was surrounded. The proofs of treason were superabundant.

Secret societies had arisen in France ever since the last fall of Bonaparte, in 1815. The police discovered successively the societies of the Black Pin, the Patriots of 1816, the Vultures of Bona-

parte, the Knights of the Sun, the Reformed European Patriots, and that of Universal Regeneration. Songs, speeches, pamphlets, caricatures, compact impious and philosophic editions, all entered as poisonous elements into these dissolving societies. People enrolled themselves in them with a knowledge of this, or they were drawn into them without knowing it: as proofs could not be furnished against them all, the public laughed at them, and yet they were real enough. Those who disbelieved their existence, passed in public for judicious and governmental minds: those who belonged to these societies jeered among themselves at these strong capacities, and caught them like idiots. Vast conspiracies, in 1816, embraced Paris, and the departments of the Isère, the Rhone, and the Sarthe. These bodies became more consolidated in 1820, by affiliating themselves with the *Carbonari* of Italy, who produced the *Communeros* in Spain. The Neapolitan and Piedmontese insurrections made us better acquainted with these Carbonari, whose principles, originally monarchical, in order to oppose the sway of Bonaparte, gradually became those of the jacobins of France.

The several societies above mentioned merged in Paris into that of the Carbonari. The Carbonari were divided into sections called circles, or

central ventes, with a supreme vente, or directing committee. No person could obtain admission into the first degree of the association, the particular vente, without the testimony of tried Carbonari; it was requisite to produce evidence of hatred for legitimacy, unless one were a retired military man, or on half-pay; proofs of hatred were then considered as already furnished.

The number of members belonging to the particular vente did not exceed twenty: these were called *Good Cousins*. When any of them were discovered, they were *in the law*. The deputies of twenty particular ventes composed a central vente; the latter communicated through a deputy with the high vente, which, in its turn, received orders through an emissary from the supreme vente, or the directing committee. Every Carbonaro knew only the members of his vente.

According to the terms of article fifty-five of the statutes, "every Carbonaro must keep secret the existence of Carbonarism, its signs, its regulations, and its aim in regard to the PAGANS."

Art. 60, title v. "Perjury, whenever it shall have the effect of revealing the secret of Carbonarism, shall be punished with death." It is tried secretly; one of the good cousins is appointed by lot to execute the sentence.

The Carbonari never wrote, they communicated

with one another only by word of mouth : they revealed themselves to each other by means of half-cards, cut in such a way as to fit to other half-cards ; they had watchwords and passwords, signs of the hand and of the arms : sometimes, by the junction of the fingers, they formed the letters C and double N ; sometimes they pronounced the words *Speranza* and *Fede* : they separated from one another the syllables *Ca-ri-ta*. The letters C and double N signified Jesus Christ and his Father ; Faith, Hope, and Charity were their mysterious interpretation. These atheists marched under the banner of christians : all the revolutions of the globe come and range themselves under this *labarum*, which has given the signal for a change of the world. Carbonarism came from Italy ; and the Madonna, saluted by the Piferari in the woods, had presided over liberty.

The Carbonari engaged to pay implicit obedience to the supreme vente : they were to be provided with a musket, a bayonet, and twenty-five cartridges ; they had daggers ; they paid to the general fund five francs at the time of their admission, and one franc per month : their number amounted in France to above sixty thousand. The invisible members of the supreme vente kept themselves concealed in an impenetrable sanctuary. From this holy of holies they sent to

death the vulgar Carbonari, promising them burning tears and a frequented grave.

In the course of 1821, thirty-five prefects denounced societies of Carbonari. In Paris there were hundreds of ventes : the Victorious, the Sincere, the Success, the Washington, the Belisarius, the Westermann, the Friends of Truth. They met, like the witches of old, in dark cellars, in mysterious chambers, in unknown garrets. A sort of conscripts for the purpose of revolt were paid in the open air ; and persons in confinement received allowances in the prisons. The disturbances of the month of June, 1819, and the conspiracy of the 19th of August, 1820, commenced the action of the affiliated. In the month of December, 1820, the escape of Colonel Duvergier took place ; and French Carbonari set out to assist their brethren of the *Golden Fountain*. From Madrid they were to return with the Spaniards to the French frontiers under the tricoloured flag. They infested our sanitary cordon.

These ventes, whose mummeries were puerile, in order to inflame the romantic imagination of young candidates, had, from their latent and volcanic nature, sufficient power to convulse the world : applied to the feeble throne of the Bourbons, they might have blown it into the air. Fortunately, the French character is not adapted

for secret forces ; we are not disposed, like the Germans, to assemble by moon-light within the shattered walls of some ancient castle ; we do not assemble in the forests of the Apennines, in caverns washed by the desert waves of the Adriatic, like the Italians, to dream of the future ; neither do we retire like the Spaniards in the secrecy of our plots and the silence of our hope, under the palm-trees of *thrice-crowned* Murcia. The dagger on which we swear is but the straw of civic feudalism, which invests us with, or puts us in possession of, a perjury towards our kings : to release ourselves, it is sufficient to break the straw and to throw it over our heads : *exfestuatio*.

The interval between the month of December, 1820, and the 16th of March, 1821, was characterized by collection of funds, military committee of action, training to arms, failure of the reconnaissances of General Berton ; the departments of the West and South were ruined ; affair of Belfort ; the soldiers were surprised descending in arms ; dispersion of the whole : and General Lafayette ran away, after appearing for a moment.

At Joigny the same manœuvre. Cugnet de Montarlot and an officer of the old guard recruit on the frontier of the Pyrennees. At Marseilles and

Toulon preparations are made to march to Paris. Vallée is seized and executed: he carried about him a paper torn into sixty-three pieces. At Saumur, Delon and Sirejean are sentenced to die. The East is to rise; an ex-general guarantees success; he visits the provinces and the communes. At Strasburg, sergeants and corporals are stirring. A *vente* is established in the 45th regiment of the line. This regiment sets out from Paris for La Rochelle on the 21st of January: the conspiracy continues during the march and at La Rochelle. At the foot of a list of the names of jurors was found written: *Blood will have blood*; and under the names of the jurors were the words *dagger* and *death*. Bories was conducted to the place of execution. Brought up in the ventes of Paris, his companions, mute and dismayed, formed a line as he passed: generous blood, uselessly spilt, uselessly deplored, and to which glory promised its splendour on our frontiers.

It is a great pity! all the parties now have graves, and scarcely any of these graves command the complete veneration of men. Let an attempt be made to kill any society whatever, and it kills; a natural reprisal: but when the moment of the conspiracy is past, nothing is left

but a handful of ashes ; and as no amelioration has taken place in the avenged society, it is filled with regret.

Spain had, for several years, connected herself with our factions ; she had, one cannot tell why, ranged herself among the foes of legitimacy ; she had hastened to imitate our constitutions, which, however, had brought her nothing but misfortunes. Should we be fond of adversity, from the sole motive that it seems to render us celebrated ? Celebrity enthrals human reason : the illusion of renown robs us of good sense.

We have already seen the deputations of our ventes to the society of the Golden Fountain, and their secret machinations in the sanitary cordon. The Spanish Observer, in its paper of the 1st of October, 1822, even before the opening of the Congress of Verona, contains this passage :—

“ The sword of Damocles, which is suspended over the heads of the Bourbons, will soon reach them. Our means of vengeance are self-evident. Besides the valiant Spanish army, have we not in that sanitary army ten thousand knights of liberty, ready to join their old officers, and to turn their arms against the oppressors of France ? Have we not more than a hundred thousand of these knights in the interior of this kingdom, and out of that number twenty-five thousand at least in

the army, and upwards of a thousand in the royal guard? Have we not on our side that rancorous hatred which nine-tenths of France have vowed against execrable tyrants?"

In the same journal of the 9th of February, 1823, the government of Louis XVIII. is termed *infamous*; it tells us that a French general, in non-activity, writes that *the first cannon-shot fired against the Spaniards will be the signal of the fall of the Bourbons*. Louis XIV. went to war with Holland for less threatening expressions. Intercepted letters disclose the plan: it was intended to form corps under the tricoloured flag, and to proclaim Napoleon II. The Spanish ministers are represented as lending themselves to these measures, merely recommending to the conspirators not to proceed too fast. The Spanish Observer, the avowed journal of the government of Madrid, states positively that the Empress Maria Louisa will be invited to preside over the *regency*. "If the invasion takes place," says that paper, "*we shall see astonishing things.*"

A man was apprehended at Perpignan, and upon him were found several copies of a proclamation and a manifesto, in which the party completely reveals its projects. Here are those two papers, which would of themselves remove all doubt, if any could exist. We transcribe them

verbatim from the *Moniteur*, with some remarks of that journal.

*" At the head-quarters of the Army of the Free Men, on the
Pyrenean Mountains, the 1823. "*

" Frenchmen !

" The epoch is not long past at which you were called by the destinies of great nations to teach, in your turn, the whole world what love of country and of the national independence can accomplish in great souls ; you fought incessantly and successfully the hydra of despotism, armed against you in all parts of Europe at once ; in vain the hordes of the north, in vain the Machiavelian manœuvres of haughty Albion, strove to tire your perseverance and your courage : you astonished by multiplied prodigies of valour the perverse men who had flattered themselves, in their pride, that they had but to appear in order to impose the yoke upon you, and to make you submit again to feudal power ; you replied to their sacrilegious cries of duty and submission only by sacred cries of liberty and country ; to live free or to die was your motto, which invariably led you into the paths of glory ; you lived, your enemies turned pale ; fanaticism and feudalism broke their torches and their chains in the bleeding despair of rage and death.

“ It would be a most astonishing spectacle to the present and future generations to see you at this day the blind instrument of tyranny against a nation not less great than generous, which, long an admirer of your virtues, has dared to tread in your steps ! Frenchmen, we are hastening to you, not as enemies but as brethren: we are in presence and in arms. Which of you is there, if he prides himself in the name of Frenchman, but would shudder before giving the murderous fire, which, to whatever point it be directed, can only strike a free man !

“ The foreign powers, after striving to efface your glory, which they have not even been able to tarnish, dare to impose upon you a disgraceful, a dishonourable task : conquerors of Fleurus, of Jena, of Austerlitz, of Wagram, will you be weak enough to comply with their perfidious insinuations ? Will you seal with your blood the infamy with which they purpose to cover you and the servitude of entire Europe ? Will you obey the command of tyrants to fight against your rights instead of defending them ; and will you come into our ranks only to bring with you destruction and death, when they are opened to you for sacred Liberty, who calls you from the top of the tricoloured standard which floats on the Pyrenean mountains, and with which she is impatient

to shade once more your noble brows, covered with so many honourable scars ?

“ Brave men of all arms of the French army, who still preserve in your bosoms a spark of the sacred fire, it is to you that we make a generous appeal ; embrace with us the majestic cause of nations against that of a handful of oppressors ; your country, your honour, your own interest command it : come, you will find in our ranks all that constitutes force, and compatriots, companions in arms, who swear to defend to the last drop of their blood their rights, their liberty, and the national independence.

“ Vive la liberté ! Vive Napoleon II. ! Vivent les braves ! ”

“ At the great head-quarters of the Army of the Free Men, on the Pyrenean Mountains, the 1823.

MANIFESTO TO THE FRENCH NATION.

“ Frenchmen !

“ The foreign powers proclaimed, in 1815, in the face of Europe, that they had armed against Napoleon alone ; that they should respect our independence, and the right which every nation has to choose for itself a government adapted to its manners and its interests.

“ But, in spite of so formal a declaration, the armed force invaded our territory, occupied our

capital, and compelled us to adopt, without choice, the government of Louis Xavier Stanislaus of France. In consequence of this violation of the sovereignty of the nation, a semblance of a constitution was illegally given to us under the name of constitutional charter; and the same power which forced us to accept it has since openly neutralized all its effects.

“ The hatred expressed against Napoleon was but a pretext employed by the sovereigns of Europe to veil their ambitious views; the energy of the great nation was too great an obstacle to the re-establishment of the general system of despotism discussed in the cabinet of the King; it was requisite to prolong its action, and the only way to succeed was first to seduce, then to deceive and to reduce it: on these bases, already established, rested the great council of sovereigns called the *Holy Alliance*, which cannot be explained otherwise than by these words: *Coalition of the Tyrants against the People*. The invasion of Poland, that of Italy, and the calamities which, ever since the return of Ferdinand, have afflicted Spain, threatened in her turn with invasion, are a consequence of this principle.

“ From these motives, considering the last acts of the chamber of the representatives of the French people in the month of July, 1815;

“ Considering the law concerning the rights of the French nation of the said month, and the constitutions of the state which call Napoleon II. to the throne of France ;

“ Considering the declaration of the same representatives, in the sitting of the 5th of July, concerning the rights of the French, and the fundamental principles of their constitution, by which all the powers emanate from the people, since the sovereignty of the people is composed of the collective rights of all the citizens ;

“ Considering, likewise, the declaration of the chamber of the representatives of the said day, which purports that the government, whoever may be at the head of it, ought to unite all the suffrages of the nation legally expressed ; that a monarch cannot offer real guarantees unless he swears to observe a constitution framed by the national representation, and accepted by the people ; that any government having no other title but the acclamations and the will of a party, or which should be imposed by force, — that any government which should not adopt the national colours, would have but an ephemeral existence, and would not insure the tranquillity of France and of Europe ;

“ That if the basis laid down in this declaration could be misconstrued or violated, the represen-

tatives of the French people, acquitting themselves of a sacred duty, protest beforehand, in the face of the whole world, against the violence and usurpation ; they commit the maintenance of the dispositions which they proclaim to all good Frenchmen, to all generous hearts, to all enlightened minds, to all men jealous of their liberty ; lastly, to future generations ;—

“ We, the undersigned, Frenchmen and free men, assembled on the summit of the Pyrennees and on the French soil, composing the council of regency of Napoleon II., protest against the legitimacy of Louis XVIII., and against all the acts of his government destructive of the liberty and independence of the French nation.

“ In consequence, we declare as anti-national every attempt emanating from Louis XVIII., or from his government, against the independence of the Spanish nation.

“ Frenchmen, a generous man has dared to address to the throne these memorable words : *The people rises again after great falls.* These words have rung throughout all France, and the hour is at length arrived when the prophecy is to be accomplished. Frenchmen, will you obey tyrants, who wish to seal with your blood the infamy and disgrace with which they strive to cover you, in order to punish you for having been great enough

to carry, in the eighteenth century, the first germs of liberty to every part of Europe? No, you will follow that still louder voice which speaks to your magnanimous hearts, and which commands you to unite yourselves with us under the sacred banners of honour, upon which is inscribed only this motto: *Liberty, glory, country.*

“ Frenchmen, the intentions of the Holy Alliance cannot be mistaken. Recollect that, in 1792, you showed astonished Europe what a nation bent upon liberty is capable of doing. We bring you back the tricoloured standard, the signal of your awaking, at the same moment when, from the summit of the Pyrennees, energetic spirits and nervous arms are launching the liberal bomb, which will make the absolute Kings tremble on their thrones, already shaken by the justice of the public opinion. Unite yourselves with us, and concur in once more honouring social order. It is from the great head-quarters of the army of free men that we make a unanimous appeal to you. Come, you will find only friends and brethren, who swear not to acknowledge or to proclaim as the most powerful King in Europe any other than the most constitutional sovereign. Such is the force and the will of the enlightenment of the age !

“ *The Members of the Council of Regency
of Napoleon II.*”

Subjoined to this last printed paper was the following manuscript note, in the form of instruction :

“ Note.—The present manifesto, as well as the proclamation to the army, will not be given to the public till the commencement of hostilities ; and not till then will the names of those who have signed them be known. It would be impolitic to let these two papers appear before that time. It is proper, however, that they should be communicated to the secret societies, that they may act in the same spirit with us, and that they may immediately set about preparing in the interior of France the elements for this.”

After giving these papers, the *Moniteur* adds : “ Is this clear ? The last proof of these plots was wanting : it has been furnished. The action was destined to follow the word, in order to render evident to all eyes the wisdom of our precautions, and the legitimacy of our defence. Every body knows that a band of refugees is waiting for our soldiers at the advanced guard of Mina’s army : we knew that a detachment of this band had marched from Bilboa, shouting *Vive Napoleon II !* and wearing the uniform of the guard of the late Emperor. Lastly, at whom was the first cannon-shot fired in Spain ? At men who were crying *Vive Napoleon II !* What are the first hostile

signs that have been met with? The eagle and the tricoloured flag.

“ These are facts which revolutionary sophisms will never destroy. Our right to take up arms against a faction that was striving to plunge us back into the abyss, is but too completely proved, unless it be insisted that a government should stupidly suffer itself to be destroyed, and that it should await its fall, in order to demonstrate that it was in danger.”

This manifesto, like that formerly of the Duke of Brunswick, was precise ; it left no free choice. We certainly had no need of this direct provocation to determine us to war ; but still it is serviceable to history to collect these scattered facts : if, within a given time, attention is again directed to the things that are passing away, posterity will at least know, that the throne of the Bourbons had all the reasons of the future, and all the motives of the moment, for attacking and defending itself. So much vapouring, and so feebly supported, is provoking. But when England declared that she did not *clearly* see what we had to complain of, that she should be glad if we would state our grievances, and come with Spain to plead at her paternal tribunal, we were tempted to throw the iron crook of Clovis in her face.

We shall not advert to the three violations of

the French territory before the declaration of war : they would certainly have been sufficient to justify that declaration ; they showed the contempt into which legitimacy had fallen, since the very Spaniards were not afraid to insult it : we could do no other than draw the sword or die with shame.

And yet how were we to act ? What dangers to confront ! The King's army was worked upon in every way. When war became more probable, the plots were deferred till the first shot should be fired, under the impression that it would be easier to produce a movement among the French soldiers, when once face to face with the constitutional troops of the Cortes. We received warnings every moment. Persons who were implicated in the general conspiracy, but who entertained an exceptional good-will towards us, kept writing continually ; they begged us to meet them. " Are you not then aware," said they, " of what is passing ; do you not perceive that this army, collected by you, is against you ; that we are sure of triumph ; that we laugh to see you run into perdition like a child ; that we make game of your candour ? Do you not know that such a general is betraying you ; that such another is deceived ; that he is urged to serve you for the purpose of ruining you ? Nobody cares now for the restoration : the allies are secretly on

our side ; England is with us ; she will declare herself the moment you set foot in Spain. Make haste and leave all this ; give in your resignation ; retire while you have yet time : leave the old ship to perish before she founders under you."

Captain, not in name but in fact, we resolved to perish with the ship, and to remain the last on board : we made no use of these warnings against those who gave them, persuaded that a state is not to be saved by police apprehensions. At any rate, we chose rather to risk the last state of the restoration, than to live in perpetual fears : we said of the monarchy of Henry IV., what Henry IV. said of his person : " One can die but once."

The statements contained in M. de Marchangy's report on the secret societies can no longer be denied ; the conspiracies can no longer be classed among fables, now that they are avowed and boasted of. We have been informed by an esteemed deputy, who belonged at the time to the ventes, that, at the moment when M. Marchangy's report appeared, it was found so accurate by the members, that they doomed the reporter to death. The person from whom we received these particulars opposed the execution of the decree.* It

* For further particulars of the secret societies, see the confessions of M. Andryane, at the beginning of the first volume of his interesting work, entitled : *Memoirs of a Prisoner of State in the Spielberg.*

was not we, who, hearing the strokes of the hammer, seeing the scaffold erecting, and the machine of death preparing, were simple enough to believe the initiated innocents, when they exclaimed: "Conspiracies? What folly! Nobody thinks of conspiring. Nobody wishes any harm to legitimacy. What you are frightened at is merely a theatre that is preparing for a puppet-show."

We neither liked nor admired the *Fantoccini* of 1793.

But, if it be true that these conspiracies existed before the war with Spain, it is likewise certain, that they ceased with that war. ' The swaggering, ever since the days of July, about the comedy of fifteen years, is the satisfaction of men in safety; at the moment of the fall of legitimacy, nobody conspired: it rushed of itself recklessly into ruin. Did it not take the chamber, in 1830, for a chamber of enemies? The only question was about choosing three or four men to be ministers, and who possessed the requisite talents for being so. This is what legitimacy never would comprehend. the too natural susceptibility of its misfortunes obliges it now to admit the existence of the imaginary conspiracies, which console and excuse it.

It is necessary to distinguish dates: thwarted as were the machinations at the end of the Spanish war, so threatening were they at the commence-

ment of that war. We are persuaded of the plot, the trace of which was pointed out by the transmission of the eagle to Bayonne ; it was false in regard to the exalted personages, to whom an attempt was made to attribute it by using their respectable names ; it was true as to the reality of its existence : government acted prudently in not investigating it. The sound of the cannon of the Bidassoa changed consciences : the weight of a lucky ball is not too much on the side of fidelity. On the bank of the Bidassoa, the French who promised the proclamation made their appearance : deceived by Fortune and their friends, they had hoped to see the white flag lowered before the tricoloured flag, ages bow down before their youth. If these men full of energy, among whom we have since found a friend, fell in a fatal rencounter, it was not without honour, for honour increases with adversity. Let it then no longer be said that those whom fatality urges to combat their country are wretches : in all ages and in every land, from the time of the Greeks to the present day, all opinions have been supported by forces capable of insuring their success. We know not a single party in France that has not had men upon foreign soil, among the enemy, and marching against France. Benjamin Constant, aide-de-camp of Bernadotte, served in the allied army

which entered Paris, and Carrel was taken in arms in the Spanish ranks. The *cause* does not alter the question; with the *cause* one might justify any thing: in asserting that one is fighting for liberty or for order, one is always wrong, or one is always right.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Mixed questions—Objections against the Spanish war—
State of the Peninsula at the moment of the passage of the
Bidassoa.

THE impugners of the expedition against Spain have perpetually confounded two things, the *French* question, and the *Spanish* question: if the second should not have been so happily resolved as the first, *French* ministers were responsible to *French* opinion only for the honour and prosperity of France. We shall recur to this subject.

Attempts were making to excite commotion among our people, and in our army, and it became necessary to choose between a war and a revolution; the first seemed less expensive: from the experiment already made, glory is less costly to the French than misfortune.

The war was not unjust; we had a right to undertake it: our essential interests were endangered.

God forbid that we should consider the calamities of a state as an insignificant matter : blame fall upon those who, violating the law of nations, would obtain the prosperity of their country at the expense of the prosperity of another country. It was our duty to spare the Spaniards the evils inseparable from every military invasion. We had disguised nothing from ourselves ; our successes might be attended with inconveniences for the people of Charles the Fifth, as well as our reverses ; but, at any rate, by saving ourselves, we should deliver it from the worst of scourges, the double tyranny of demagogues and soldiery. Can this truth be doubted ? Was it as enemies or deliverers that we were received in Madrid ?

What was the state of the Peninsula at the moment of the passage of the Bidassoa ? Was it a tranquil, happy country, into which we went to carry disorder, upon pretext of placing it in safety against an imaginary evil ? Had not civil war extended itself to the very gates of the capital ? Was not Catalonia in arms ? Was not Valencia threatened with a siege ? Was not the kingdom of Murcia in insurrection ? Was there not fighting in the streets of Madrid ? Anarchy constituted, the insurrection of the camps recognized as a right, the heir to the throne placed under accusation, the prisons violated, the prisoners

slaughtered, private property seized, priests banished or drowned, citizens exiled, clubs preaching up massacre and terror, secret societies agitating and corrupting every thing, the colonies lost, the navy destroyed, the national debt increased in a frightful manner,—such was Spain during the reign of the Cortes.

Do you say that the impeachment of the heir to the throne, the drownings of the priests, and the rest, were matters of little importance? According to you, mankind must *march*; so much the worse for those who are tumbled into the ditch, or run over by the way. But we, the representatives of France, were solicitous that France should *march* above all things; and those atrocities called *useful* prevented her from going to her resurrection. In the next place, what you take for a progress was a descent into a pit of blood: fortunate, if on ascending from this hole of murders, after an age of struggles, you did not excite horror! What had we gained by 1793? The Directory, Bonaparte, the Restoration, the best of our times of stoppage, if it had but known how to save us in saving itself.

Have we used our influence to give institutions to Spain?

Before being so full of love for the institutions of others, we ought first to give good ones to

ourselves, and not to change them every week. We have recorded our opinion of the Spanish people, of its slight esteem for our liberties, written and voted : did it become the French government to set up for propagandist of those doctrines, good in the eyes of some, bad according to the notion of others ; to imitate the Convention or Bonaparte ; the one putting down republics to make anarchy spring up within the circle of its prisons and its scaffolds ; the other engendering despots to multiply tyranny throughout the extent of his fields of battle ?

We wish Spain what we wish all nations, a liberty suited to the degree of the enlightenment of the people : the illustrious land of so many great men would find immense resources in the re-establishment of its ancient Cortes. A body politic of the past, gradually modified by new manners, would appear to me sufficiently powerful to protect the citizens, to create the administration, to found a system of finance, and to restore strength to that noble nation, exhausted by its heroism. At any rate, on this point France was not called upon to decide : happy in her own liberties, she could preach only by example.

Have we at least exercised our right to advise ? Is there any document to prove the moderation of the principles to which the French govern-

ment adhered in regard to the domestic policy of Spain?

The letter of Louis XVIII. to Ferdinand will answer you. On the score of foresight and independent conception, no person can find fault with us. The age advances ; democracy is spreading : if the characters in decline can support it, kings, at the providential hour, will abdicate of their own accord, or be obliged to retire. If corrupted nations, without suffering the time to arrive, without listening to any one, throw themselves from top to bottom, instead of falling into liberty, they will be engulfed in despotism ; and, for a further calamity, that despotism will not be permanent.

CHAP. XXXIX.

Recall of the Count de La Garde—Spanish ministry and newspapers.

SUCH were the antecedents of the Spanish war.

On entering upon office we wrote, as it is customary, to inform the different courts of our appointment, and to declare to them, as it is also customary, that no change had been made in the political system of our predecessor. We addressed a particular communication to M. Gentz ; we were acquainted with his influence over the mind of M. de Metternich, and we knew that our principal difficulties would proceed from the cabinet of Vienna.

These diplomatic formalities fulfilled, we recalled the Count de La Garde from Madrid. He set out on the 30th of January, and arrived on the 3rd of February at Bayonne. The representatives of the allies had already demanded their passports.

M. San-Miguel replied in a haughty note to the envoys of Russia, Prussia, and Austria: the latter, however, left a consul at Madrid: the King and the Cortes warmly approved the note of the minister. The *Universel* of the 13th of January added: "You demand your passports, gentlemen: well, a good journey to you! What sincerely grieves us is that his Excellency should have thought himself obliged to call the Russian minister *unpolished*; but, on the other hand, we ought to consider, that it would be requiring a great deal too much to expect that a Calmuck should be as well educated as a native of the civilized countries of Europe.

"At last, the business is settled, and may God grant fine weather and a good journey to the diplomatic trinity. What must console us for so severe a loss is the arrival of Lord Somerset, who is daily expected at Madrid, to say nothing of the English general Roche, who arrived three days ago. A day will come when Europe, and particularly France, will be able to speak out, and will accuse the silly and criminal conduct of the governments which have forced Spain to strengthen more and more the ties that bind her to England."

We must forgive Spain, the country of *romance* and song. So, she considers herself civilized;

she who has neither high roads, nor canals, nor inns ; she who lives in deserts ! We thought her, it is true, highly civilized in 1807, because we arrived there from Barbary ; we listened with delight to two poor boys, who sang us a long plaintive ballad in the mountainous road between Algesiras and Cadiz ; we were pleased to see butter made for the first time at Grenada before we lost ourselves in the Alhambra ; we loved to sit down with the muleteers before a large fireplace at Andujar, while our attendant went to the butcher's to buy a bit of mutton. We thought of Pelagius, of the Cid of Burgos and the Cid of Andalusia, of the knight of La Mancha and his lions, of Gil Blas and the archbishop : all this charmed us, while smoking our cigar, looking at the bulls fighting in the fields, and listening to the distant tinkling of a mandoline. The Moors, who carried off fair christians, and who died beside streams, Roland, William with the short nose, the tournaments of Seville, and the mosques of Cordova, crowded upon my memory. But Spaniard, you are a poet, and you are not more civilized than myself ; without offence to your liberal institutions be it said, you will live as poet, not as successor of Mirabeau. You and I are not worth a Calmuck in regard to civilization. Let us talk of our rivers, our valleys, our con-

vents, our fine arts of a moment, traces of which are still to be seen in our deserts : let us be silent about the rest. Rinconet and Cortadille teach us that *every one serves his God in the condition to which he is called*.

As for England, to which the *Universel* refers, she has no need of the assistance of other governments to strengthen her ties and to uphold her treaties with Spain ; she knows how those matters are to be managed. She lately conceived that she had something to claim. She did not stupidly pause to consider whether the Spanish government had or had not any colonies, whether it had or had not any finances, whether Spain had or had not been laid waste by Bonaparte, whether she had or had not been again desolated by civil war, whether she had or had not to dread a war with Europe : England in the most amicable manner demanded her money, and threatened to pounce upon the Spanish ships if she were not paid immediately. To furnish a fresh proof of her horror of intervention, she recognized in 1821 the flag of the Spanish colonies, and she proposed to acknowledge forthwith their independence, though the Cortes would not even hear of this independence. To separate the new Spanish world from the old Spanish world is not *intervening*, according to the notions of England.

Lastly, the pleasantries of the *Universel* are no doubt in excellent taste. There was wanting but one thing. When Pichegru wrote to an Austrian general—"General, surrender the place to me; if not, I will attack you and beat you,"—Pichegru kept his word. But not to wait for us at Madrid, to be off to Seville wishing us a *good journey*, was not that running the risk of causing the wish to be returned?

CHAP. XL.

The English newspapers—Division of the Narrative.

So long as the question appeared to be not absolutely decided, the English newspapers showed more reserve than those of Spain. The *New Times* observed, in reference to M. de Villèle: "He has already taken an immense step in securing the support of the great and illustrious name of M. de Chateaubriand, whose works attest at once that he will never flinch before revolution, and that he will ever remain attached to constitutional liberty." But this language soon changed: it is to be observed that the principal spite was directed against us; and yet we were not at the head of the cabinet: the president of the council, who spoke much and ably, was spared; the minister for foreign affairs was abused. A certain instinct seemed to apprise the enemy that we were the grand promoter of the war with Spain.

Two things proceeded simultaneously during our ministry: to avoid confusion, we will separate them, and treat of them one after the other. We will first give what relates to the combats of the tribune, whether in France or in England, because these combats are in the foreground of the picture, and were fought in sight of thousands of spectators. We shall afterwards speak of our diplomatic labours, secret labours, where all was obstacle and peril for us.

It is true that, in relating what *has been*, one tires one's self and one tires others: what does mankind care whether this or that political event was brought about in this or that way, when the result has decided every thing? Has not a novel, when you have read the catastrophe, lost all its interest?

That the antecedents of a fact become insipid to relate, the fact being recently accomplished, is granted: but, at a distance, this fact has changed its nature; it has classed itself in a different way, in a line of things, heirs to one another without being correlative. All the events that have passed away have acquired, each for itself, a sort of separate existence. No ruin would be interesting, for it attests only a past known to all; and yet we are pleased with the fragments of history become a ruin.

CHAP. XLI.

COMBATS OF THE TRIBUNE.

French tribune—Opening of the session of 1823.

THE King opened the session on the 28th of January, 1823, at the Louvre, in the hall of the guards of Henry IV. ; the throne was surmounted by a canopy of crimson velvet: on the carpeted steps the high dignitaries were ranged in order. A salute of artillery proclaimed the moment when the sovereign left the palace of the Tuilleries to repair to the solemnity. M. de Villèle, president of the council ; M. Peyronnet, keeper of the seals ; ourselves, minister for foreign affairs ; the Duke of Belluno, minister of war ; Count de Corbière, minister of the interior ; M. de Clermont-Tonnerre, minister of the marine ; and the Marquess de Lauriston, minister of his Majesty's household, were placed in front of the seat of the Most Christian monarchs.

The King entered ; acclamations arose. Seating himself on his throne, his Majesty uncovered, bowed to the assembly, and covered himself again ; his speech then commenced. Astonishment, increasing from minute to minute, rendered the silence more profound. It was the first time that legitimacy took such high ground, and talked such a language. We called to mind the time when Louis XVIII., on the point of again leaving the Tuilleries, came to bid his subjects farewell, perhaps for ever : now we fancied that we saw our king, trusting to our fidelity, at length taking possession of his crown, in the name of glorious and delivered France.

This passage of the speech produced a prodigious effect :

“ I have tried all means to guarantee the security of my people, and to preserve Spain herself from the greatest calamities.

“ The infatuation with which the remonstrances made at Madrid have been repulsed, leaves little hope of maintaining peace.

“ I have ordered the recall of my minister ; one hundred thousand Frenchmen, commanded by a prince of my family, by him whom my heart delights to call my son, are ready to march, invoking the God of St. Louis to preserve the throne of Spain for a descendant of Henry the

Fourth, to keep that fair kingdom from ruin, and to reconcile it with Europe.

“ I could not avoid submitting to you the state of our affairs abroad. It was for me to deliberate ; I have done so maturely ; I have consulted the dignity of my crown, the honour and the safety of France.

“ Gentlemen, we are Frenchmen : we shall always be united in the defence of such interests.”

The assent was loud, real, and complete. It is sufficient to talk of glory to the Frenchman, to make him thrill with courage like the charger at the sound of the trumpet. The assembly left the Louvre full of enthusiasm.

This first moment over, envy and fears returned. What ! was it that paltry administration which pretended to do what Napoleon, the conqueror of the world, had never been able to accomplish ! When they looked at us, they shrugged their shoulders ; some taxed us with folly, others expressed pity for us ; the ambitious already armed themselves to overthrow us, in the hope of inheriting our places : all promised themselves our speedy defeat, followed by a compulsory resignation, or an inevitable revolution.

Those minds which could even suppose a triumph, had, from this additional motive, a reason for declaring against the war. The members of

the ventes, and of the secret associations, not choosing to acknowledge that they had placed us under the necessity of legitimate defence, believed that the alliance was backing us ; our audacity, according to them, proceeded from the certainty of a new invasion, upon the pretext of a conflict with Spain : we were in their eyes but the gendarmes of the Congress ; they pushed us on in front like cowards, threatening to fire upon us if we gave way.

Clever men had taken us, ourselves personally, for an insignificant scribbler : towards the conclusion of the enterprise they appeared astonished ; they looked as though they meant to say : “ You never told us this ! ”

CHAP. XLII.

Chamber of peers.

IMMEDIATELY after the King's speech commenced the attacks on the subject of the proposed address to the crown. On the 3rd of February, in the chamber of peers, champions, having a supreme contempt for *oratorical arguments* and *sonorous phrases*, promised themselves, like positive men, to crush us to death between two facts.

M. de Broglie honoured us with a speech. It is very difficult for him to come to any conclusion, because he remains suspended between the doubts of his understanding and the scruples of his conscience—a happy indecision, which arises from integrity. A man of cultivated mind, a moral man, nay a religious man, in the usual acceptance of the term, the *honour* of the marshal has changed into *honesty* in his grandson, the citizen : possessing the antidote of virtue, M. de Broglie

can associate with corrupt men without sully-
ing himself, as there are sound constitutions which
never catch diseases. We endeavoured to reply
to the speech of the noble duke.

“ My adversary on this side of the chamber,”
said I to their lordships, “ inveighs against this
principle, that to kings alone belongs the right of
giving institutions to nations ; whence he con-
cludes, that kings can change what they have
given, or give nothing at all, according to their
will and good pleasure. But he does not see that
this argument may be retorted, and that if the
people is sovereign, it may, in its turn, change
to-morrow what it has done to-day, and even sur-
render its liberty and its sovereignty to a king, as
this has really happened. Had the noble peer
been less pre-occupied, he would have seen that
two principles govern the whole social order : the
sovereignty of kings for monarchies, the sove-
reignty of nations for republics. Say in a monar-
chy that the people is sovereign, and every thing
is destroyed ; say in a republic that the sove-
reignty resides in royalty, and all is lost. One
was therefore obliged, upon pain of being absurd,
to affirm, that in Spain the institutions ought to
proceed from Ferdinand, since the question con-
cerned a monarchy. As for the manner in which
he may grant these institutions, whether alone or

in unison with political bodies, recognized by him in his full liberty, this is what we have never pretended to prescribe. We have done no more than express the vital principle of monarchy ; than lay down a truth of theory.

“ The noble duke would not have us go to prevent crimes in the future ; he would not have us reason from analogy. Ferdinand, it is true, has not yet been tried ; he has as yet been only threatened with deposition ; he is so free that he is perhaps travelling at this moment with his gaolers, amidst legislating soldiers, who are going to shut him up in a fortress. There is nothing to fear : let us wait the event.

“ It would result from the doctrine of my adversary that one may punish crime, but that one ought never to prevent it. According to me, justice is one of the eternal principles which preceded evil in this world ; according to the noble duke, on the contrary, it was evil that gave birth to justice. He thus places at the groundwork of society a permanent cause of subversion ; for one would never have a right to step in to the aid of society till it were destroyed.”

The speech of Count Daru confirms what we have already said concerning the dispositions of congresses. M. Daru, laborious and rigidly equit-

able, never gave a twist to the truth, even when that truth was adverse to his opinions.

“ In raising my voice in this place in favour of peace,” said he, “ I am under no apprehension of offending those who have signalized themselves in war. The embarrassment which I feel proceeds from my not knowing either the arguments which I have to refute, or the promises of a resolution which I deem mischievous.

“ This war, ready to break out between France and Spain, is either *spontaneous*, or *provoked*, or *advised*.

“ We have no knowledge either of *provocation* or of *advice*.

“ We see, on the contrary, in the few documents which have been published on this subject, that the ‘ powers assembled in Congress at Verona have committed to France, for the sequel, the settlement of the affairs of Spain ; that they have depended for the solution of the question which interested them all, on that power which had the most immediate interest in that question.’ Thus, whether as the party most deeply interested, or as apparently free in her resolutions, France found herself the arbitress of peace and war.”

Here, then, is an acknowledgment of the pacific dispositions of Verona, even by an opponent of

the war. When people wished to render us odious to the nation, they asserted that we were urged into the war by foreigners; when they strove to deprive us of this paltry excuse, they demonstrated that the allies were averse to war, and that we alone were culpable. These two contradictory assertions were frequently advanced in one and the same speech.

CHAP. XLIII.

Chamber of Deputies.

IN the discussion on the address in the committee of the chamber of deputies, M. de Villèle used the expression which served as a pretext for this popular accusation: "France is going to war by command of the Congress." The despatches of the three courts to Madrid beginning to be known, put some impartial judges on their guard, but the excited multitude would not listen; it adopted every thing blindly: we were declared without mercy the beadles of the Holy Alliance. If it should now be found that the expression attributed to M. de Villèle never issued from his lips in the form given to it, the arguments built upon it fall to the ground. There are several examples of these chance impostures which are, even to this day, regarded as authentic: for instance, "*death sans phrase*" was not the vote of the Abbé Sièyes:

he merely said "death;" the comment has been introduced into the text.

We shall abstain from recurring to the *Moniteur*; it might be asserted that the words of the president of the council had there been complaisantly altered. We shall borrow the report of these curious debates from the *Constitutionnel*, the widely circulated journal of the opposition.

The number for the 13th of February, 1823, thus states the opinion of M. Duvergier de Hau-ranne :—

" I sincerely pity the generous Spanish nation for being governed by a constitution that is vicious in many respects. But this circumstance, deplorable as it may be, does not appear to me a sufficient motive for undertaking a war, the results of which may become mischievous to France ; and, to reply at once to what the president of the council has just said, that ' we are reduced to the alternative either to fight for the Spanish revolution on our northern frontiers, or to make war upon that revolution in Spain,'—I say in my turn that, if we were reduced to such an extremity that the triple alliance were to pretend to dictate laws to us, it would be preferable and more national to resist on the northern frontiers, than to suffer a war to be forced upon us that may perhaps put our institutions, nay even the monarchy itself, in

jeopardy. It would not be for the Spanish revolution that we should fight, but for our independence."

The speaker adds, in a note : " I owe it to truth to state that the president of the council has alleged that I had not correctly understood him ; but his explanation did not seem clear to me."

After the opinion of M. Duvergier de Hauranne comes the opinion of General Foy.

" The president of the council of ministers, although he set out with declaring that we shall make war by ourselves, afterwards insinuated that this war did not depend solely on our will.

" We are placed in the alternative, he said (for I marked his words most particularly), we are placed in the alternative of attacking the Spanish revolution at the Pyrennees, or going to defend it on our northern frontiers.

" Here, gentlemen, is a great, an astounding revelation—a revelation pregnant with uncertainties and calamities.

" If France single-handed, France left entirely to herself, independent France, were engaged in a duel with Spain, I should deplore the calamities of an absurd war, of a war without justice and without morality, of a war without profit and without glory ; I should deplore these calamities ; but I should see the possible end of them, and

thenceforward there would be some alleviation of the evils that we are enduring. . . . But this is not the case. The present war is placed out of our will, beyond our reach; the impulsion has come from without; this wrath is not French—it is the echo of the wrath of the Prussians and of the Cossacks. Ours is not the only hand that kindles the fire; who can tell if we shall ever have the power to extinguish it?

“ It is to this point, gentlemen, that my amendment is directed; this is the alarming danger on the existence of which I call for explanations from his Majesty’s ministers.

“ Would the ministers flatter themselves to make us believe that they are acting alone, upon their own views, and with their entire liberty?—Here facts speak, and they speak with energy. The *occult* and *subterraneous* war (the Constitutionnel gives those words in italics) which our government has been making for a year past on the Spanish nation, has been suddenly converted into threatening explosions.

“ Is it Spain that has provoked these explosions, these threats? . . . but the situation of that country is the same as in 1820 and 1821 . . .

“ We must seek elsewhere for the secret of the policy of the counsellors of the crown. *It is from Verona that the war has come to us.*

“ Our present interference in the internal affairs of Spain is not an act belonging to ourselves alone. The triple alliance is at our back, pressing upon us, after having been itself pressed by the turbulence of the faction which sways our country.

“ The war with Spain is not a separate war ; it will soon be a European war. You will begin it on the Pyrennees ; you know not whither it will carry you ; you know not where it will end.”

General Foy concluded by calling upon the ministers to state ;—

“ 1. What arrangements had been made at Verona with the foreign powers relative to the intervention, and whether those arrangements are of such a nature as to lead to the permanent or temporary occupation of any portion of the French territory by the troops of the Holy Alliance ;—

“ 2. What dispositions have been made to prevent this occupation, in case the foreign powers should be led by the course of events to deem it useful for the accomplishment of their plans either in regard to Spain or to France.

“ In case the national independence should be sacrificed, or even if it should not have been sufficiently guaranteed, it would be an imperative duty for me, a loyal deputy, to demand, in public sitting, *the impeachment of the ministers* who shall

have signed or promised the humiliation of the crown and the ruin of the country."

We shall not cavil either about the impeachment of the ministers or the declamations delivered with warmth and talent. General Foy, a man of imagination, was liable to fall into mistakes: his famous exclamation, "They will not get out of it!" is still recollected. But how could the general ask such a question as this: "Is it Spain that has provoked this explosion, these threats?" We have seen above whether it was we who provoked them. A public provocation offered by one state to another state with which it is deemed to be at peace has scarcely ever been seen. If there were but this single case in which defence would be justified and become legitimate, a government would perish before it would have a right to save itself: though undermined on all sides, it would be requisite that it should wait for a *positive declaration of war* before it could help itself. The hostilities of propagandism were formerly not known: are they on that account the less real? That one may abuse this word propagandism in order to go and oppress a people is true enough; but is it not equally true that propagandism also abuses its secret power to destroy a nation?

The argument that may be drawn from the

resemblance of the years 1820 and 1821 merely proves the long suffering and patience of France. How could the general say: "It is from Verona that the war has come to us?" The very members of his own party admitted that every thing was pacific at Verona. The *Constitutionnel* of January 17th thus expresses itself:

"We publish this day the three despatches of the cabinets of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to their ambassadors at Madrid. It must be remarked, that the three cabinets do not speak in any way of employing force to impose laws on the Spanish nation. We find in those documents no threat of immediate aggression.

"The very ministers of the Holy Alliance profess a great fondness for peace. They cannot fail to incur on this score the indignation of our fanatics."

The same journal of the 1st of February quotes this article from the *Austrian Observer*:

"The courts of Austria, Russia, and Prussia have held at Madrid a language which revolutionary frenzy may misconstrue, which a shallow policy may disapprove, but which a more profound policy cannot but respect. That language was not a declaration of war, and the recall of the legations is not an act of hostility. France, animated by the same sentiments, has acted upon

the same principles, though with different forms. By means of her immediate contact with Spain, the ulterior resolutions of France are founded on motives, the importance of which one must acknowledge, without pronouncing lightly upon the results. War is not yet declared : ulterior events alone can prevent it."

Upon this declaration, which confirms all that we have stated respecting the dispositions of M. de Metternich, the Constitutionnel asks : " How is the clear and positive assertion of the Austrian journalist, the writer of all the protocols of the Holy Alliance, to be reconciled with the language which the revelations of the secret committee attribute to the president of the council ? After giving an account of all the efforts that he had made for the preservation of peace, which he himself sincerely regarded as so necessary for the repose and the maintenance of tranquillity in France, he pretended, so it is alleged, that the hostile position in which Spain is placed against the great powers did not permit France to remain at peace.

" Well, to-day the Austrian Observer, at a moment when it knows all that passed at Madrid at the time of the departure of the ministers of the three great powers, formerly declares that the

three powers do not consider themselves as being at war with Spain.

“ It is not then on account of the hostile dispositions of the three powers that the French administration has decided upon war ; and if it is forced into it, it is to another power that it yields, or rather by other passions that it is hurried away.”

But let us return and settle the expression used by Count de Villèle. In the first place, he did not say : “ If we do not fight on the Pyrennees, we shall be obliged to go and fight on the Rhine.” The adversaries of M. de Villèle give a totally different version of the words of the speaker. According to M. Duvergier de Hauranne, those words were : “ We are reduced to the alternative either to fight for the Spanish revolution on our northern frontiers, or to make war upon that revolution in Spain.”

According to General Foy, who declares that he particularly marked the words as they fell from the lips of the president of the council, the expression was as follows : “ We are placed in the alternative of attacking the Spanish revolution on the Pyrennees, or going to defend it on our northern frontiers.”

What do these two versions, though somewhat

different from each other, imply in reality? That we were so situated, that if we did not go to stifle the revolution in Spain, that revolution would extend to France; that then the alarmed powers would take up arms, and that we, France, should be obliged to go and fight on our northern frontiers.

What can be more evident, what better or more clearly expressed? Take notice of the pronoun *it* in General Foy's reading; it relates to the word *revolution*, not to the word *war*, or to the word *Europe*; it is the Spanish revolution that will have convulsed us, and that we shall be called to *defend* on the Rhine; that is to say, we shall be forced to re-commence our revolutionary wars, to turn back to 1793. Never could M. de Villèle, even according to this version, have spoken more correctly. It is difficult to conceive why he did not repeat the words, taking on himself the responsibility; but was content to deny the false interpretations, and to declare that both his text and his idea had been altered.

But the whole truth is this. M. de Labourdonnais had attacked the decision taken by the King to undertake the war in Spain, with our hundred thousand French. He had expressed regret that this war had not been commenced earlier, and that France had not acted as auxiliary

to the regency of Urgel and to the Spanish royalists ; and then, taking things in their present state, he had observed that France ought now to act in concert with the continental powers, and agreeably to the direction of the Holy Alliance.

M. de Villèle combated these attacks, declaring that, France being particularly interested in restoring order in the Spanish monarchy, our natural ally, we ought, in this circumstance, to refuse the co-operation of the other powers, in order to preserve all our freedom of action, and not to engage in any complication of interest which should determine us to interfere.

On the other hand, the liberal members had attacked the intervention as contrary to liberty ; and General Foy, after drawing a striking picture of the calamities of war, had concluded with preaching a crusade of all the constitutional governments against the absolute governments.

It was to show the inconsistency of this speech that M. de Villèle, in his reply to it, exclaimed :—

“ And how happens it that the honourable general, who has drawn so dark a picture of the evils of war, has not perceived that his system does not exclude it, since, in following his counsels, instead of having to wage it on the Pyrenees, we should have to sustain it on the Rhine ?”

Notwithstanding this authentic version, the

false interpretation has prevailed. Hence all the mischief. France, the dupe of a misconception, which a few minutes' examination would forthwith have cleared up, was seized with vertigo. Such was the rotten pivot on which opinions in and out of the chamber turned. The want of good faith in this, the credulity of that, the levity of others, induced a belief in a coercion, that was disproved by the documents which we have given (Congress of Verona), and which were laid on the bureau of the chamber of the commons. How, besides, was it to be supposed that the continent would make war in the north unless we made it in the south? We were to take the field, whether we would or not, to amuse Europe, weary of peace. Like Molière's physician, she wanted a patient, and was determined to take one wherever she could. And yet she well knew how we fired cannon.

This absurdity was still more manifest, when it was known that three of the four allied powers, England, Prussia, and Austria, would have given any thing to prevent us from taking arms.

We hope, in clearing up this important point, to have destroyed an error, which the lapse of time would have introduced into history.

CHAP. XLIV.

Extraordinary Credits.

ON the 21st of February, M. de Martignac, reporter of the commission appointed to examine the *projet de loi* for opening extraordinary credits for the service of 1823, ascended the tribune. Among the credits applied for was one of a hundred millions for the war in Spain: it was wrong to hide it in this manner; it showed timidity, a detestable thing.

M. de Martignac read the report of the commission. The reading of the report was interrupted by the cheers of the right and the laughter of the left. "Your war is a real plot!" cried the opposition. "All this is but Jesuitism." The president strove in vain to restore order. M. de Martignac descended from the tribune amidst uproar.

A great clamour was raised by General Foy,

M. Demarçay, M. de Girardin, M. Keratry, M. de Chauvelin, and M. Dupont of the Eure. "What infamy! it is an odious plot! it is impossible to put up with it!" M. de Lafayette, M. Royer-Collard, M. A. de Lameth, M. Humann, and Generals Foy and Sebastiani, entered their names against the *projet de loi*.

M. Casimir Perier desired leave to speak. He discussed the application for credit. "It rests," said he, "in part on a surplus of receipts, which has not been legally established before the chamber. Besides, the case is not urgent; war is not yet declared, and it is to be hoped that it will not break out, for *Europe seems to repel all idea of provocation against the Peninsula.*"

The discussion of the *projet*, begun on the 21st of February, was resumed on the 25th, amidst an extraordinary concourse.

M. Royer-Collard first ascended the tribune. On that day, in the loftiness of his designs, he deemed it right to flatter the left. His principles appeared, in our humble opinion, less victorious than his infallible person was conquering: he dogmatised against a system which, weak and decried at home, had gone abroad to seek support for the government. M. Royer-Collard fell into the general error respecting the Congress of Verona, but it must not be expected that a man so

full of grand ideas should deign to descend from the heights of his genius to collect a few vulgar pieces of intelligence.

When we were about printing our *Political Reflections*, we went, with manuscript in pocket, to get it corrected by M. Royer. He struck out the incongruous phrases, and sent us back with a few raps on the knuckles, exhorting us to be more attentive in future. We retired, reprimanded and submissive. We have been, if not the disciple, at least the scholar of M. Royer-Collard. Independence of opinions is one of the things which the French understand best: the royalists in power gag you, the liberals suppress your works, the jacobins your head, and all to promote the utmost freedom in speech and writing.

M. Royer-Collard concluded his speech with this eloquent apostrophe. "And I too am a Frenchman, no doubt, and it is by this title that I come to oppose a war which threatens France as much as Spain, and that I raise my voice against the system which I have just pointed out. Of all the duties that I have had it in my power to fulfil towards the legitimate monarchy, none has appeared to me more sacred, more pressing. Can I keep silence, when blind counsels are urging it on to ruin? As it has been the thought, the wish, the hope, I might also say the action,

of my whole life, it is this day the first of my interests, if I ought to give the name of interest to affections the most disinterested, the most national. And what other sentiment could draw me forth from silence, since I have witnessed the accomplishment of the restoration! What was there left for me to desire for the legitimate monarchy, unless that it may daily strike deeper root in the public interests, unless that it may love France in order that it may be beloved by her!"

Touching and noble *Nunc dimittis!* Alas! M. Royer-Collard has had the misfortune to see that pass away which he had had the happiness to see return. We were as much rejoiced at the re-establishment of legitimacy as the illustrious and loyal deputy, and yet we have not followed the same track.

M. de Labourdonnais appeared: full of ideas, which he produces with a talent appropriate to them, he has an insurmountable aversion to all success. Possessing a vast capacity, but somewhat weak in character, like all obstinate minds which are not dominators, he no sooner entered than he quitted the council of Charles X.; alleging, which was very true, that he was surrounded only by simpletons, incapable of taking a decision. He skilfully withdrew from public affairs at the end of three months. He left be-

hind him a good ordinance, that relative to the School of Maps. Born to occupy the first place in the opposition, M. de Labourdonnais is in a different way what M. de Villèle was, one of the men of the restoration superior to three-fourths of the men of the present day.

The bias of his mind is perceptible in the words which he levelled at us, pitiful ministers. "Can I," said he, "grant new subsidies for commencing war to men who have constantly opposed it, (M. de Villèle), and whose evident interest it is still to oppose it, because it is impossible for them to avoid seeing what does not escape any one, that they cannot, honourably for themselves, and without danger to the country, direct an enterprise which they too long laboured to render unpopular for them now to give to the public mind that excitement without which a war cannot become national, and consequently gain approbation in a representative government?"

M. de Labourdonnais having set himself square with his system of opposition, voted for the *projet de loi*.

M. de Laborde, after some observations on the nature of the Spanish territory, the manners of its inhabitants, &c., declared the war impossible and silly. "The men who could decide upon it deserved," he said, "not so much to be impeached

as cashiered. Besides," added he, "nobody is willing to take upon himself such a responsibility; and I ask, what can be the magic power which gets the better of the wishes and the opinion of all? 'Tis a strange thing, gentlemen; when one strives to penetrate this singular mystery, removes all the ranks, forces one's way through all existences, to reach this warlike den, what does one find there?—Nothing but a few intriguing Jesuits."

Had Count de Laborde penetrated farther to the recesses of this *warlike den*, instead of a Jesuit he would have found a friend, provided some distraction had not prevented him from recognizing us, and he had not laid an interdict upon our old friendship.

M. de Castelbajac spoke very ably in favour of the *projet de loi*.

General Foy again appeared in the tribune. He started this question: "Is the nation desirous of war? No. Is the government desirous of war?" Here the speaker represented the administration as divided, and in the most cruel embarrassment. According to him, it was not M. de Villèle, a man of a most positive mind, and perfectly free from the spells of the imagination, who wished for war. He did not wish for it; he merely authorized with his name a warlike pa-

rade ; he resigned himself to a war which he knew to be unjust. He would do better to express his opinion frankly, without suffering himself to be swayed by the fear of losing his portfolio.

“ What is then that power which controls the ministers, and makes them carry on for the last six months a conciliatory policy and secret hostilities ? I care little what is the *mystic faction*. It is sufficient for me that a will and passions which have nothing French in them are hurrying us where we do not wish to go.”

M. de Villèle replies that, for his own part, he should prefer peace, but that he decides for war because he believes it to be urgent, and not because he is attached to his portfolio.

Thus all agreed that M. de Villèle did not wish for war ; but in France people always set aside the *mystic*, or rather the mysterious personage : Heaven had then given to us the part of Fate ; but England, less good-natured, and more circumspect, was not to be deceived, and it was at us that she directed her blows.

General Foy, whose language was parliamentary, insisted that at bottom the government was averse to hostilities. He called M. de Montmorency the Duke of Verona, a pleasantry between good and bad taste. He proved that we should be beaten.

“ The campaign will miscarry : a moment will come when, after painful losses, a retreat will worthily crown a silly and culpable enterprise.”

General Foy was above the opinion which he represented : he has left a most valuable work on the wars of Napoleon in the Peninsula ; he was somewhat like Cazalès.

The military genius, the peculiar genius of our country, is so strong that it comprehends for us the genius of all other talents : the art of writing and speaking belongs naturally to our military men. François Rabutin, who calls himself a *bit of a soldier*, when he has to describe the place of a battle, finds in the old French language the expressions of Herodotus :—

“ Heaven and earth were alike favourable to us, the day being fine and clear, and the earth neither too moist nor too dry, quite covered with verdure and with various flowers.”

Marshal de Montluc had served in the company of Bayard. “ Retiring to my home,” says he, “ at the age of seventy-five years, having passed step by step through all the ranks of the soldier, finding myself crippled in almost all my limbs, by wounds from arquebuse, pike, and sword, without hope of getting cured of that great wound which I have on the face, I have resolved to employ the time that is left me in describing

the battles in which I have been during fifty-two years."

And this oldest captain of France writes with a mutilated hand, with the vigour of Mars, a whole page on his first battle. The *Commentaries* of General Foy will be read and read again.

M. de Villèle summed up these speeches : he attested (what was true, to our great regret), that the government had done all that it could to preserve peace. He used this judicious language : " And what more signal justification could we expect than to see all the opposition speakers so carefully abstain from approaching the principal question, the only question that is worthy to occupy your minds, and that can be for you the object of serious deliberation ? Assuredly, it was neither time, nor talent, nor information that they lacked. What other feeling but that of inability to cope with truth has made them recoil from the question, as set by the government before the eyes of France, for the purpose of running into real digressions, into common-places a thousand times repeated and always victoriously refuted ? That question, gentlemen, is this : ' Is the state of Spain compatible with the honour of the crown of France, with the honour and safety of our country ? ' "

CHAP. XLV.

M. Bignon—Speech of the minister for foreign affairs—
Exclusion of M. Manuel.

THE sitting of the 25th brought forward M. Bignon. He supported his opinion by historical proofs. He voted against a war which, under a pretext of policy, tended to kindle the same passions to which, under a religious pretext, the war of the League owed its origin ; against a war that might renew all the calamities which France then had to deplore, and which annihilated the house of Valois.

We followed that speaker : it was the first time that we addressed the elective chamber. We naturally excited a movement of curiosity ; the deputies who had gone out returned, silence pervaded the chamber, and the galleries thronged with spectators. We went up to the tribune ; all eyes were fixed upon us. We began thus :—

“ Gentlemen, I will in the first place remove personal objections ; the interests of my self-love ought not to find any place here. I have nothing to reply to mutilated papers, printed, by what means I know not, in foreign newspapers. I commenced my ministerial career with the honourable member who spoke last during the hundred days : we had both a portfolio *ad interim*, I at Ghent, he in Paris. I was then writing a *romance* ; he was engaged with *history* : I, for my part, have stuck to romance.

“ I shall review the series of objections presented in this tribune. Those objections are numerous and various : that I may not lose my way in so vast a subject, I will class them under different heads.

“ The members who spoke at the time of voting the address have had their speeches printed. Yesterday, in public sitting, some of the honourable deputies referred to those very speeches for their opinions : to-day, part of the arguments produced in the secret committee have been recapitulated. I shall therefore endeavour to answer what has been said, printed, and re-said, in order to embrace the whole of the subject.

“ Following in their objections the speakers sitting on the opposition benches, I shall examine,—

1. the right of intervention, since that is the basis of all the arguments ; 2. the right to speak of the institutions which can be beneficial to Spain ; 3. the right of the alliances and the transactions of Verona ; and lastly, some other objections.

“ Let us then first examine the question of the intervention.

“ Has one government a right to interfere in the domestic affairs of another government ? This great question of the right of nations has been resolved in contrary ways.

“ Those who have connected it with the natural right, as Bacon, Puffendorf, and Grotius, and all the ancients, have thought that it was allowable to take arms, in the name of human society, against a people violating the principles on which the general order reposes ; in like manner as, in a particular state, the disturber of the public peace is punished.

“ Those who view the question as a civil right maintain, on the contrary, that one government has not the right of interfering in the affairs of another government.

“ Thus the former place the right of intervention in the duties, the latter in the interests,” &c.

We refer the reader for the remainder to the printed documents ; they are to be found every

where. This speech fixed the epoch of our transformation from an author and a theoretical man to a man of business and a practical man.

On turning to the journals of the time, it will be seen that the effect of our opinion was considerable. Many praised it without reserve ; those who criticised it deemed it their duty to say what they found good in it. We shall notice presently, with the same fidelity, the abuse with which we were assailed : the truth must be sought in this discordant concert of revilings and flatteries.

For the rest, the question of intervention, so much debated at this epoch, is an idle question ; it may serve for a text to the phrases of opposition, but it will never stop a statesman. England interfered, not only at the important epoch of which we are treating, but she has interfered at all times and every where, and for all the causes of liberty or power, when she deemed it right to do so. Formerly, she took part in our civil wars ; she sent money and soldiers to Henry IV. ; at the present day, she does not cease to interfere in Portugal. While she strove to prevent us from interfering in the affairs of Spain, did she not herself interfere in them by acknowledging the independence of the Spanish colonies ? Nay more ; it is seen by our despatch, which was published by the cabinet of St. James, that this

cabinet, in a memorial in reply to a note of Russia, had expressed the opinion that one had a *right to interfere in the affairs of Spain, if the exaltation of those who directed the affairs of that country impelled them to an aggression against another power.* Would liberalism quarrel with the old French government for having interfered in the quarrel between England and her North American colonies? And yet, could we then have said that our national safety was compromised, *our essential interests injured*, because the cabinet of St. James wanted to impose some new taxes on the people of Massachusetts?

Intervention, or non-intervention, defended in turn in the tribune, is therefore an absolutist or liberal puerility, with which no strong mind will perplex itself: in politics there is no exclusive principle; one interferes or does not interfere according to the exigencies of one's country. To say that we must not go to extinguish the fire in our neighbour's house, when it is about to communicate itself to our own; to say that we ought always to take that for fire which is not fire; to employ force at the impulse of our caprice; is to make a wrong use of words. The first duty of a minister is to save his country when danger threatens, in spite of general considerations and particular interests. Whoever does not feel this,

does not see this, does not act in this spirit, will never be a statesman.

The war in Spain was capable of saving legitimacy ; it put into its hand the bread of victory : legitimacy has abused the life that we had restored to it. It seemed to us conducive to its welfare, on the one hand to fix it in liberty, on the other to propel it towards glory : on this point it has judged otherwise.

On the 26th of February the discussion was continued. M. Manuel thought that he had caught us tripping in our quotation respecting the case of intervention which England judged legal in 1793 ; he was mistaken : we were right. Unluckily he proceeded to comparisons and misinterpretations of facts, which disgusted the majority of the chamber.

On the 28th of February, M. de Labourdonnais made the motion of which he had already given notice in the bureau ; he demanded the expulsion of a deputy who, according to him, had publicly pronounced an apology for regicide. M. Manuel, striving to justify himself, quoted this expression of ours : “ Like *Œdipus*, Louis XVI. disappeared amidst a storm.” In the sitting of the 3rd of March, the chamber declared that it excluded M. Manuel from its bosom, for the whole of that session. The English parliament had

furnished several examples of these exclusions, frequent enough in the bodies of our magistracy : it was too much violence for too trivial a cause. Besides, M. Manuel in the tribune would not have annoyed me more than the liberty of the press. He was fortunate in his misfortune ; his silence screened his talent : hence has resulted for the memory of the expelled deputy one of those immortalities which spring up a few paces from the tomb.

For the rest, never had we heard so many maledictions and sinister prophecies, never had we seen so many clever heads turned ; there was a rolling fire of the same objections, a perpetual battology and tautology : unjust war, impolitic war, undertaken for the interest of absolute power ; we had no right to interfere ; we should consolidate what we pretended to overthrow, &c., &c. While listening to these speeches we felt a sort of impatience and astonishment ; we could not conceive how, among all these distinguished men, there did not happen to be one who guessed our idea, who perceived the goal towards which we were tending. We were ready sometimes to exclaim : “ Ah ! clever simpletons ! the question certainly does concern intervention, the Spanish constitution, and all those things which you force us to say to you here ; things true, no doubt,

but which are beside the real question ! Bad Frenchmen, you oppose us from prejudice, jealousy, ambition, without perceiving whither we are going, without knowing what you are about. We cannot proclaim our secret from the tribune. Light and cavilling nation, of what benefit to you is your so highly vaunted intelligence ? ”

CHAP. XLVI.

ENGLISH PARLIAMENT.

Discussion in the House of Commons—Sir Robert Peel and Mr. Brougham.

THE first attacks were made in England in the sitting of the 4th of February, 1823, in the House of Lords by Earl Stanhope and the Marquess of Lansdowne ; in the House of Commons by Messrs. Childe, Wildman, Yorke, and Brougham. The first three declared that if a gun were fired on the Bidassoa, it would be impossible for England to remain neuter. Mr. Canning and Mr. Peel were almost always present at these conflicts, which succeeded one another during the month of February with increasing violence.

Sir Robert Peel, who offered us diplomatic hospitality at his table, had been brought up at Harrow school, almost at the same time with Lord Byron, when we, a poor emigrant, were

strolling unknown about Harrow Hill. The person of the minister of the interior was pleasing ; the harmony of his voice made you overlook the singularity of one of his gestures. Lady Peel, born, as we should imagine, beneath the sky of India, was more delicate than any woman we have ever seen ; one might say that she was transparent : all at once this Niobe of alabaster appeared tinged with the pale blush of a Bengal rose ; she had children, real cherubs. Sir Robert's wealth and happy situation communicated to his mind a certain degree of suavity and moderation : this spirit of temperance accompanied him in the House of Commons. Though approving the opposition, he doubted whether England could interfere ; he asserted that the intervention of Austria at Naples was imperatively *commanded by necessity, and consequently perfectly just, for securing her own states from a real danger* ; and we, we were not to have the right of interfering to secure ourselves from a real danger !

Mr. Brougham attacked us in three speeches, and the virulence of the arch-scoffer increased in a surprising manner. He drew England after him, huzzaing at his heels : newspaper articles, pamphlets, speeches, poured forth ; in the expressions there was none of the delicacy observed in France ; all that the most vulgar coarse-

ness and the most ignorant credulity could vomit was levelled at me, and M. de Villèle was always spared. Yells, cabbage-stalks, rotten apples, assailed me as though I had been a candidate resigned to the pelting of the mob on the hustings at Westminster. Radicalism has introduced *boxing* into British eloquence, as the revolution has introduced the pike and the red cap into our speeches.

CHAP. XLVII.

Replies of the Courier and Mr. Canning to Mr. Brougham.

MR. BROUGHAM, in the House of Commons, affirms that, in France, "it was only one person, and that one of little weight, who strove to urge the government into a war, for the gratification of his bigotry or his pecuniary interests."

My pecuniary interests!

In another speech Mr. Brougham transcends himself. There I am called a "cloggy writer;" he rails at Atala, he overwhelms with his sneers the daughter of the desert; he rips up my whole life: I am a miserable sycophant of Bonaparte; a bigot who went to Jerusalem to fetch some water from the Jordan for the King of Rome [my travels to Jerusalem took place in 1806, and it was not till 1810 that Bonaparte married Maria Louisa: what foresight on my part!]: he is as-

tonished that a poor devil like me should be appointed minister. There is no ground for his astonishment: was it then surprising that a man who entered the diplomatic career under Bonaparte, who was afterwards appointed minister at Stockholm, minister at Berlin, ambassador to London, should become minister for foreign affairs? Was it as an author that he thought it strange of me to take possession of a portfolio? But why did he not experience the same sentiment in regard to Mr. Canning, and M. Martinez de la Rosa, both poets, both authors like me? Was not he, Brougham himself, infected with the same vice? Had he not begun with employing his pen before he used his tongue? The *Courier* justly says of him: "We think that Mr. Brougham's elegance of language and tone of urbanity and politeness, in speaking of the Viscount de Chateaubriand, can excite but one feeling.

"We have reason to believe that this energetic and peculiar kind of style is not familiar to M. de Chateaubriand. At any rate, if he chose to reply in the same tone, merely to prove that these flowers of rhetoric are to be acquired at a cheap rate, we conceive that he might reply: 'Brougham, that statesman and lawyer to the twelve, who

writes wretched reviews, and delivers still more wretched speeches,' &c.

“ Every man who is not afraid of soiling his fingers can fling mud ; but, in general, in this kind of war, the *scavenger* must have a decided advantage over the *gentleman*. But, though the scavenger should have covered his adversary from head to foot with mud and filth, the latter would still be a gentleman and the other a scavenger.

“ On all occasions Mr. Brougham seems to act upon the idea that hard words are strong arguments, that to mention names is to prove facts, and that to heap up epithets of horror and reprobation is to demonstrate that they are well applied. He certainly keeps a shop for invectives, which ought perhaps to be attributed to the habits of his profession,” &c.

We should not have solicited from the *Courier* so acrimonious a reply ; but we will add, for the purpose of soothing our self-love, that the first articles in the *Edinburgh Review*, so abusive of Lord Byron, were by Mr. Brougham : the critic treated us as he treated Childe Harold ; he must permit our vanity to lay hold of this flattering analogy.

Sir Robert Peel defended Alexander, attacked

and represented as the murderer of his father : we were rolled in the dirt along with the Emperor of Russia by the sturdy fists of the English bruiser. Mr. Canning ventured to make, in our behalf, a paltry, shameful excuse, saying that the French government was culpable, but that it was not right to confound me with that government : this was true in a very different sense from that intended by the speaker. His Britannic Majesty's secretary for foreign affairs, in alluding to Mr. Brougham's speech, applied to us the comic expression of Molière, which we have already quoted : *—"Thou wouldst have it so, George Dandin !" Our illustrious friend had, however, on many occasions, expressed himself with indulgence and politeness concerning us, especially in his speech on the subject of the Literary Fund, during our embassy in London, in the letter which he sent to us at Verona, and in the other letters which will presently be laid before the reader. He was stung with emulation ; he tilted with us at *memorandums* with all the advantage of his talent. When we were appointed minister, he said to the persons in his office : " Let us bestow great care upon our despatches, gentlemen !" he corrected them, frequently wrote them himself,

* See the *Congress of Verona*.

and, when he was satisfied with them, he would ask: "What will Chateaubriand think of it?" This contest between two minds which esteem and fear one another, is a curious fact in the history of diplomacy, in general the school of lying and dissimulation.

CHAP. XLVIII.

Lady Jersey—Dinner in London in 1822 with Mr. Brougham—Our reply in the Chamber of Peers to our English adversaries—Lord Brougham calls to see us in Paris.

WE had dined in London with Mr. Brougham, at the house of the beautiful Lady Jersey, who reminded me of the first Duchess of Devonshire, the author of the poem on the St. Gothard. Lady Jersey, the English Duchess of Chevreuse, *minus* the high adventures and *plus* correctness of morals, was of the opposition party by nature, as one is a bird or a poet by the will of the stars. Her father, the Earl of Westmoreland, a member of the cabinet, an Englishman of the old school, was fond of his bottle, treated all new ideas as he did his slipper, and had invented leg-preservers for riding on horseback, as the Knight Robert the Horned had the honour, in the reign of William Rufus, to be the inventor of the peaked shoes called *souliers à la poulaine*.

Mr. Brougham, at the grand dinner of the opposition to which we are alluding, was almost mute : he eyed us with a sort of sarcastic uneasiness that was painful : he would have been more insolent if he had had a right to be so. We had heard him in the Commons : his countenance appeared to us plebeian, though he belonged to a good family. From his gestures and delivery, we might have taken him for a French orator ; he had, in addition, that expression of the streets inherent in the humour of John Bull.

The filth flung at us by the member of the lower house having only soiled our clothes without touching our face, we got rid of it by desiring our coat to be given to the first comrade of Mr. Brougham that passed the door of the foreign office. We went, on the 30th of April, to the chamber of peers ; we addressed the chamber for the purpose of replying to our English adversaries. The opinion that we expressed is one of those whose success was least contested ; it was as follows :—

“ I have been called upon, gentlemen, to reply to the questions that people have thought fit to put to me ; my silence has been censured. I shall explain to you the reasons for it, and they will perhaps appear to you to have some weight.

“ If the British government is not, in some

respect, so wary as ours ought to be, it is evident that this proceeds from the difference of political positions.

“ In England, the royal prerogative is not afraid to grant the greatest concessions, because it is defended by institutions which time has consecrated. Have you a wealthy clergy possessing landed property ? Have you a chamber of peers owning the greater part of the soil of the kingdom, and of which the elective chamber is but a sort of branch or drain ? Do the right of primogeniture, substitutions, Norman feudal laws, perpetuate in your families fortunes that may thus be termed immortal ? In England the aristocratic spirit has penetrated every where : there is nothing but privileges, associations, corporations. Ancient customs, like the antique laws and the old monuments, are preserved with almost religious reverence. The democratic principle is nothing : some tumultuous assemblies, that meet from time to time by virtue of certain rights of counties—this is all that is granted to democracy. The people, as in ancient Rome, clients of the high aristocracy, are the supporters, not the rivals, of the nobility.

“ You may conceive, gentlemen, that, in such a state of things, the crown of England has no-

thing to fear from the democratic principle ; you may conceive, too, how it happens that peers of the three kingdoms, that men who would have every thing to lose by a revolution, publicly profess doctrines which must, it would seem, be subversive of their social existence : the reason is, that at bottom they run no risk. The members of the English opposition securely preach democracy in the aristocracy : nothing is so agreeable as to gain popular honours, while retaining titles, privileges, and an income of some millions.

“ Is this our case, gentlemen, and do we offer to the crown similar guarantees ? Where is the aristocracy in a country where you do not find twelve thousand proprietors paying taxes to the amount of one thousand francs ? Where is the aristocracy in a state where the system of equal shares annihilates great properties, where the spirit of equality has not left any social distinction remaining, and even at this day scarcely endures natural superiority ?

“ Let us not deceive ourselves ; in France there is no monarchy but in the crown ; it is this which, by its antiquity and the force of manners, serves us for a barrier against the waves of democracy. What a difference of position ! In France it is the crown which protects the aristocracy ; in

England it is the aristocracy which serves as a rampart to the crown. This single fact forbids all comparison between the two countries.

“ For the rest, gentlemen, representative governments would become impossible, if the tribunes were to reply to one another. Imprudent recriminations would soon have changed Europe into a field of battle. It is for us to set the example of parliamentary moderation. Wishes have been expressed to our prejudice : let us wish prosperity to every power with which we keep up amicable relations. Some there are who have dared to raise their voices against the wisest of kings and his august family ! What have we to say of the King of England, but that there is not a prince whose policy is more upright and whose character more generous ; not a prince who, in his sentiments, his manners, and his language, furnishes a more correct idea of the monarch and the gentleman ? The French ministers have been severely handled. I am acquainted with the ministers who now govern England : those eminent personages are worthy of the esteem and the consideration which they enjoy. I have been the particular object of insult : what signifies that, if you find, gentlemen, that I have deserved it only by having zealously served my country ; and when the point is to maintain good harmony be-

tween two powerful nations, never will I remember the affronts that have been offered me."

It was considered, even in England, that we had the advantage.

Mr. Brougham, having become Lord Brougham, forgetting what he had said of us, did us the honour to call twice to see us in Paris. When he was announced, we were somewhat surprised : we rose, advanced to him, and said, " My lord, I am very glad that you do not bear me the same grudge as in your old speeches." His lordship took a seat : the lustre of his rank had already given a tinge to his manners, and his democratic trivialities had a certain grace of frankness under the less familiar tone of aristocracy. We chatted cordially together, as though Lord Brougham had always been our admirer and our friend. He thought no longer of the Jordan, of our bigotry, of our pecuniary interests ; he honoured us as a poor gentleman, sincere in his opinions, and faithfully attached to misfortune ; while we, on our part, were delighted to converse with a scholar of such superior understanding and information.

CHAP. XLIX.

Cobbett's letter.

BUT we had, out of parliament, a strange defender and a singular enemy. Cobbett, the famous pamphleteer, was at this moment writing letters against the ministers of His Britannic Majesty : among these letters he addressed one to us. This popular politician showed himself more sharp-sighted than the statesmen of France and of Europe ; he had well nigh divulged our secret : he, for his part, was not mistaken in regard to the result of the expedition to Spain ; only he did not foresee that we should no longer be there to derive from our successes that advantage with which we lulled our hopes.

This letter, unknown in France, is an historical monument.

TO MONSIEUR DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

On his speech in the French Chamber of Deputies, on the 25th February, 1823, relative to the war proposed to be undertaken by France against the Revolutionists of Spain.

Kensington, 5th March, 1823.

SIR,—Your speech of the 25th of last month has been translated into English, and published in England. When a war, which may lead to events affecting a great part of the civilized world; when such a war is just about to begin, it is of great importance that the *real grounds* of it be clearly understood. In your speech you have stated what France means to rely upon as to those grounds. The speech is intended, not only to justify France in the eyes of the world; but also to justify the French government in the eyes of the people of France. The matter of the speech, therefore, naturally divides itself into two parts: *first*, the *right of France* to interfere in the affairs of Spain, agreeably to the laws and usages of nations; *second*, the *expediency* of exercising such interference at this time, for the benefit of France.

As to the *first*, you rest, and very wisely rest, upon the principles promulgated by the English government at the outset of the war, in 1793. The reference which you make to a passage of the King of England's declaration of the 19th of October, 1793; that reference goes completely to a justification of the French government, in the present case. It is true that the French

had then put to death Louis the XVIth; but, if the putting to death of Louis the XVIth gave England a right to interfere, it was only a right founded *on her judgment*. The putting of the king to death was as much an *internal concern* as any other act of the National Assembly, or the Convention; and it could, by no means, be considered as an unpardonable sin, in the eyes of foreign nations; because the English government actually made an offer to treat, and to live at amity with, the Directory, which was actually composed of regicides.

Besides, in the year 1800, the English government, in answer to a proposition from Bonaparte, took objection, not to him, but to the state of things existing in France. It refused to treat with him (he being then First Consul), not because he proposed any thing degrading or injurious to England; but because, as it alleged, there was no security for peace or justice while such a system existed in France. It professed not to want to dictate a government to France; but, while Lord Grenville told Monsieur Talleyrand, that “the best and most natural pledge of an abandonment of the restless schemes which *endangered the very existence of civil society*,” while he told M. Talleyrand, that the best pledge of this abandonment, would be, the *restoration of the family of Bourbon*; while he told him that such restoration would at once remove *all the obstacles to treating with France*, while he told him this, he told him also, that England would not treat with France, *under her then present system*.—Never was interference in the affairs of a foreign nation more com-

plete than this. This declaration of Lord Grenville was dated on the 4th January, 1800. In answer to this note he received the most solemn assurance from the French minister that France was become settled and tranquil; that she sought not to disturb the peace of other countries; that she was desirous, above all things, to return to a state of peace with England. In short, the French minister almost supplicated peace. The supplication was rejected; and that, too, upon the sole ground of the unfitness of the sort of government that then existed in France.

All, therefore, that is now said about the *disclaimer* made by the Spanish government about not wishing to extend the effect of their principles beyond their frontier; all that is said by *our government* urging this alleged disclaimer, as a reason for your not invading Spain, falls, at once, to the ground; for here was a real official disclaimer, on the part of Bonaparte and the French nation. Besides which, this government actually made peace with this same Bonaparte, without having first lived to see the smallest change either in the form of the government or in the disposition of the rulers of the people of France. Lord Grenville, in the note just referred to, said that he wanted the "*evidence of facts*;" that he wanted the evidence of facts to convince him that France had relinquished her projects of ambition, and those restless schemes which had endangered the existence of civil society. Two years later he received this evidence of facts, and the facts consisted of most terrible beatings given by the allies to the French, of enormous additions made to the French

conquests, and of pretensions as to terms of peace a great deal higher than those which Bonaparte aimed at in the year 1800! These were the facts, the evidence of which the English government wanted to make it *think it safe* to acknowledge the new government of France; and, if the Spaniards could now sally out and capture a province or two of France, I verily believe that you would discover no sort of danger in treating for peace with the Cortes of Spain. The effects of a good hearty drubbing tend to pacify nations as well as individuals. However, this has nothing to do with the question before us. In these two proceedings of 1800 and 1802, we have complete proof that our government acted upon precisely the same principle that you are now putting forth as a justification of your invasion of Spain.

But, Sir, to say nothing about the renewal of the war in 1803; to say nothing of the declaration of the 18th of May of that year, which was so completely exposed in the *Moniteur* of the 7th of June of that year; to say nothing of the renewed assertions then made, that it was impossible for England to live at peace with France with her then system; to say nothing of these, I marvel that you omitted the declaration of the allies contained in their published accounts of their minutes of conferences at Vienna, dated on the 12th of May, 1815. At this time Bonaparte had returned to France. He had issued the most solemn declarations of his pacific disposition; he had abolished the slave trade entirely; he had sent solemn assurances to our government of a most anxious wish to be at peace with it; and in answer

to all these declarations and assurances, he received from them war, on the part of Austria, Spain, *England*, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, Bavaria, Denmark, Hanover, the Netherlands, Sardinia, Saxony, the two Sicilies and Wurtemberg, all of whom signed the publication of the conference, which publication was to serve instead of a new declaration of war. In this publication, you might have found the following passage :—

“ The powers know too well the principles which ought
“ to guide them in their relations with an independent
“ country, to attempt (as it is endeavoured to accuse
“ them) to impose upon it laws, to interfere in its in-
“ ternal affairs, to prescribe to it a form of government,
“ to give it masters according to the interests or pas-
“ sions of its neighbours. But they also know that the
“ liberty of a nation to change its system of government
“ *must have its just limits*, and that if foreign powers
“ have not the right to prescribe to it the exercise
“ which it shall make of that liberty, they have at least
“ indubitably the right of protesting against the abuse
“ which it may make of it at their expense. Impressed
“ with this principle, the powers do not deem them-
“ selves authorized to *impose a government* on France ;
“ but they will *never renounce the right of preventing*
“ *the establishment in France of a focus of disorders and*
“ *of subversions to other states, under the title of a*
“ *government.*”

This is the old language. This is neither more nor less than what had been urged as the ground of war from the year 1793 up to the hour of this very declaration. In a subsequent part of this publication, the

powers declare that they will have *no peace with Bonaparte*. One of our Lords of the Admiralty, in the year 1814, said in his place in parliament, that we would have no peace with James Madison; some *good drubblings* had the same effect in this case as they had in the case of Bonaparte between the year 1800 and the year 1802. However, the assertion with regard to James Madison was not made in a solemn official manner like that in the declaration from Vienna which I have just quoted, and which was signed by the three English lords, Clancarty, Cathcart and Stewart. This conference, or declaration says, in another part of it: "Peace, with a government placed in such hands and composed of such elements, would only prove a perpetual state of uncertainty, anxiety and danger. No power could really disarm: nations would not only not enjoy any of the advantages of true pacification; they would be crushed by charges of all kinds; there would be no stability in political relations; alarmed Europe would expect fresh explosions; the sovereigns have thought open war, with all its inconveniences and sacrifices, preferable to such a state."

This was the language of England; or, at any rate, of the English government, in the year 1815. How, then, can the same government, with almost all the same men at the head of it, now pretend to say that their passed conduct did not proceed upon principles, precisely the same as those, upon which you now justify the war which you are about to undertake? I, for my part, wholly dissent from the principle. I, with a vast majority of the English nation along with me, hold the

principle to be monstrous; but this is nothing to you and your country. That which is very laudable in me, would be precisely the contrary in you, because you have now to apply this principle for the benefit of France, and because you are a Frenchman and I am an Englishman. Against me, and against divers able writers of your own country, your statement and your argument are not worth a straw; but as an answer to our ministers, and to their supporters of every description, your answer is complete. Accordingly, it has called forth no attempt at refutation. A great quantity of *personal abuse* upon you; but, no attempt at refutation: a great deal about your having been in the service of Bonaparte; a great deal about your having offered him divine honours; a great deal about your comparing the birth of his child to the advent of the Redeemer; a great deal about your having brought water from the river Jordan wherewith to baptize this child; but not a single word in answer to your speech; not a single word to show that the principle which our ministers made use of for the invasion of France; invasion repeated over and over again; not a single word to show why that principle which justified them in going to war to prevent the "*moral contagion*" from reaching us across the sea, ought not to be made use of by the King of France to prevent the moral contagion from reaching his subjects across an imaginary line drawn upon the ground. When your opponents are reduced to the employing of personal abuse; when they talk about water brought from the river Jordan, instead of denying that they have held the same principles in repeated

manifestoes and other public papers; when they are reduced to the necessity of meeting you in this way, you may be perfectly satisfied that victory is on your side.

It may be said, though the saying it would answer very little purpose, that this declaration from Vienna did not speak the sense of the English nation. It did not speak the sense of the good part of the English nation; for many of us held in detestation the principle upon which the declaration proceeded. But, to make this matter clear; to put it upon its fair footing, we ought to see what was said *in parliament* upon this subject; and this is the more necessary, as there have now been speeches in parliament holding up the King of France to detestation. During the debates upon the subject of the war then about to be undertaken against Bonaparte, several persons, now in power, or in parliament, expressed their sentiments; and with their leave, I will now quote a few of their expressions. At the time when this debate took place, I was well satisfied that, at some future day, the expressions that I have alluded to would become of importance. Therefore I collected them together and inserted them in a letter addressed to Lord Castlereagh, which letter I concluded in these words: "Here I close my extracts, my Lord. "These are *memorable passages*. They will have to be "*reverted to many hundreds of times*. Here they are "*safe*. They will not now be *lost*."

Upon this occasion, Lord Liverpool said, that "we were compelled to have recourse to arms against that system; that state of things, that afforded no security

“ for peace, without the most imminent danger to other
“ nations ; that with such a government in France, it
“ was impossible to expect safety in peace ; that he
“ wished France to have a limited government, like
“ that of this country ; but that, at any rate, while the
“ *plan and system of government* remained as it was in
“ France, it was impossible for this country to enjoy
“ safety in a state of peace ; that he did not want to
“ curtail the resources of France, but only wanted *such*
“ *a government* existing in that country as would afford
“ security to the rest of Europe.” After this he said,
“ the argument, then, is this : in the first place, you
“ clearly have a *just cause of war* against that *system of*
“ *government* in France, which experience had decidedly
“ proved to be incompatible with the peace and inde-
“ pendency of the nations of Europe : next you have,
“ at present, *means of opposing that system*, which you
“ could not reasonably hope to possess at a future time ;
“ and the question is, whether under these circumstances
“ it is not incumbent upon you to take advantage of
“ this state of things, and *oppose so pernicious a system.*”
He then said, “ we have a right to say, that France
“ *shall not have a government* which threatens the repose
“ of other nations ; and that we ought not to refuse to
“ join in crushing one of the greatest evils that ever
“ existed.”

Thus far the man who was *prime minister* then, and
who is *prime minister now* ; and, yet, this same man is
now, by our newspapers, represented to have asserted,
that the King of France *has not now justifiable grounds*
for the invasion of Spain. We had a right to say to

France, "*You shall not have a government that threatens our repose;*" but the King of France is not to have a right to say the same thing to Spain. After the prime minister, came Lord Grenville and Lord Bathurst, who maintained the same opinions. In the other house of parliament, Mr. Grattan, Mr. Plunkett, and Lord Milton maintained the same opinions. These were persons, too, of what was called the *Opposition*. Mr. J. Smith called the French system a system of *plunder*; and he called the French army *banditti*. Mr. Grattan said that the French government was a *statocracy*, and the French constitution was *war*. He said we had no right to dictate a government to France; but we had a right to say to France, "*You shall not choose a government, the object of which is to raise your strength against Europe.*" He added that "he had *Mr. Burke's authority*, and *Mr. Fox's practice* to support him."

So much for the principle upon which they went to war against France and invaded her in 1815. Then came the argument of *power*. All the same speakers and many others boasted of the great body of allies that we had; and insisted upon the policy of going to war *while we had those allies*. Not a word was then said about the "*three gentlemen of Verona*;" that very moderately good jest was not then thought of. Our parliamentary speakers did not rail against "*combined despots*" as they do now; or, at least, those who took part with the ministers did not. The ministers at that time *boasted* of their *allies*, and there was nobody who cried out against the *thirty-one* plenipotentiaries from *sixteen states* who signed the declaration from Vienna.

Do they now say that the Spaniards are *weak*, compared to what the French were then? Let us hear the speakers upon this point, then: the Earl of Liverpool: "The bulk of the French people are *extremely averse to Napoleon.*"—Mr. Grattan: "Bonaparte has *no cavalry, no money, no title, no credit*; his power is at present *tottering to the very base.*"—Mr. Plunkett: "Bonaparte has embarked his fortunes in a vessel labouring with the storm, and *its mast bowed down to the water's edge.*"—Lord Castlereagh: "The military force of all *the rest of Europe* is now combined against *one half of France.*"—Mr. Plunkett again said, that "this was the great crisis, and that all the great powers of Europe were now with us as well as *a considerable portion of the population of France.*"

So that, that *weakness*, which was one of the great motives to the attack upon France, is now represented as one of the motives *for not attacking* Spain. The noisy bawlers in England say, "Do not attack the Spaniards: they are *too weak* for their principles to do you any harm. They have no power to sally out upon you." Just the reverse of this was the argument which these very men made use of at the outset of that short war which was made *in alliance with the King of France*; and yet, curious to remember, which stripped his capital of its museums, his kingdom of its frontier towns, and his people of the amount of a tribute! It was not then said in the English parliament: "Do not invade France: France is *too weak* to hurt you." It was then said in the English parliament: "Go to war with France; *because she is now so weak,*

“and because you are so strong, having all the powers
“of Europe with you, and the half of France with you
“too.”

This was a memorable scene in 1815. Well might I collect the sayings together. Well might I say that they would be *reverted to* many times! In short, the doctrines of that day were so monstrous. The injustice was so flagrant. All was so insincere and so wicked, that I deemed it impossible that the evil should not finally recoil upon ourselves. We now behold France holding, only with better reason, precisely the same reasons which our government held in 1815; and, curious enough it is, that nobody now, either in parliament or out of parliament; that is to say, nobody except myself, reminds the nation of what the conduct of our government then was. It is a very interesting fact, that I, who was so opposed to the principles upon which the war of 1815 was commenced, should have so carefully put upon record, and arranged with so much regularity and exactness as will be visible to any one that will turn to the Register of that year; it is an interesting fact; a very interesting historical fact, that I should then have selected out of the speeches all these passages, with the names of the speakers, and have pointed out by CAPITALS or *italicks* the very words that would thereafter be reverted to. There they are all in order as regular as if they formed part of a record in a court of law. What should induce me to do this, but a very powerful impression made upon my mind of the importance of the matter; of the consequences to which such principles must inevitably lead? The thought

that naturally arose out of the reading of such speeches was, that, one day or other, these principles would recoil upon ourselves. And this thought led to the putting of the sentiments upon record ; and here they are, an eternal answer to the ministers and all their supporters, whenever they call in question the right to interfere with foreign nations to make them model their government according to the will of their more powerful neighbours.

One thing more before I quit the declarations of 1815. The great cry here, in England, is against the "*combined despots*." Now, in 1815, this combination was, as I before observed, matter of *boast*. To act with such a combination was deemed, and spoken of, as fortunate, and even glorious. Nay, this *combination*, now spoken of with so much bitterness (and which well deserves it) was then boasted of as having been *formed by England*, and as having been first projected by Pitt ! Lord Castlereagh in speaking of the *Congress of Vienna*, said, "That it was a great satisfaction to those who "reverenced the politics of that *great statesman*, Mr. "Pitt, that they had lived to see that *reduced to practice*, which his great mind, when given to the consideration of this important question, had fondly "imagined in the abstract as the utmost of his wishes." Thus, then, it was the English government that invented the Holy Alliance ; and not the French government. This invention was matter of boast in 1815 ; but now, when this alliance is supporting France in a project which must be injurious to England, instead of supporting England in a project that must be injurious

to France; now this very alliance, which was so extolled in 1815, is, by the very persons who then extolled it, called a "*combination of despots*!"

You will perhaps have been surprised, Sir, to perceive that our "gentlemen opposite," who, in such cases, have been very gentle gentlemen; you will have been surprised, perhaps, that these gentlemen opposite should, upon this occasion, never have reminded the ministers of their former principles and practice; that they never should have said a word about this war of yours being full as just as their war of 1793, or that of 1815; you will, perhaps, have been surprised, that our gentle gentlemen should never have uttered a word of this sort; but should let the ministers go off with flying colours; be praised for their humanity and their independent spirit; while, at the same time, such volumes of abuse have been poured forth against you and your allies. But, Sir, one of our members of parliament has lately written a pamphlet in which he has observed that there are in England wheels within wheels. You call us the shop-keeping nation; but, we are, also, you know, great *manufacturers*, and famous, indeed, for our *machinery*. It would surprise you to see the number of wheels that we have in our machines, and how curiously they work, being moved and stopped and worked upon in all sorts of ways by a power that is wholly invisible to vulgar eyes. In your Chamber of Deputies what anger; what a storming, what *real* opposition. Ah! Monsieur de Chateaubriand! You should come over and spend a winter with us. After that you would be at no loss to discover very satisfactory reasons for a

great many things that appear to you to be extremely odd, and wholly inexplicable.

There remains not, then, the shadow of a doubt of the truth of this proposition; namely, that, according to the principles promulgated by the English government; and according to the practice pursued by that government, the King of France is fully justified in the invasion of Spain. Mark me, I say the principle is monstrous, and the practice was detestably wicked; but though all the rest of mankind may have a right to cry out against France upon this occasion, no such right exists in the English government and its partisans. Had I been a member of the parliament on the first day of the present session, the greater part of what I have now said to you, I should have said to the faces of the ministers. Well aware as I am of the real motives of France; knowing well as I do, that she seizes hold of the present opportunity and of the fair pretence that is offered her, sanctioned as she is by the principles and the practice of the English government; well aware of her real motives, and of the great probability that there is that she will succeed in her enterprise, what an opportunity would it have been for me to carry the House back to the year 1815; to show it that in that year, and under the very pretences that France is now about to invade Spain, England invaded France, placed upon the throne those very Bourbons that now inspire us with fear; lavished the treasure of England upon those very allies who are now at the back of France, and at the same time boasted of our *conquest* of France, and did those things with regard to France and the French

people which fifty ages will not make that people forget or forgive. Should I have lost an opportunity like this? Could I have seen these ministers sitting in their place and not have traced back to their former conduct all the causes, not only of your war against Spain; but also of our inability to meet you in that war, without producing dangers at home even greater, perhaps, than those that must arise to us out of your success in that war? Could I have suffered such an opportunity to pass without showing that our enormous and all-paralysing debt arose out of our acting upon that very principle which we condemn in you; without showing, which I could as clear as daylight, that our own unjust interference in the affairs of France; that the ruinous consequences of that interference deprives us of the power of preventing your interference in the internal affairs of Spain? So much for that part of your speech which relates to the *right* of interference. The *expediency* of that interference is another matter, with regard to which, however, you have spoken out plainly and manfully. You say, and very truly, that to place Spain under the control of France is necessary to the interest of France. This is so obvious that it must be seen by every one. It is very certain that, if Spain were free to form alliances without any attention paid to the wishes of the family of Bourbon, the position of France would be much less secure than it formerly was. A very good argument, this, for your going to war, and a most excellent one for our joining the Spaniards against you; but no reason at all does this furnish for our orators and our corrupt newspapers reviling you and telling you of the

water that you brought from the river Jordan. You are our enemy; but we are yours. This is well known to all the rest of the world, and is certainly not hidden from the parties. Seeing you going upon an expedition that promises you such great advantages is a very good reason for our endeavouring to prevent the success of the expedition; but no reason for barking speeches and bellowing paragraphs made and written for the purpose of reviling you and your allies. It seems to have been imagined here, that speeches full of thunder; the bawlings upon the stock-mart; and that an outcry set up in the newspapers, would terrify you from the pursuit of your project. These makers of noise were told by me, that you cared for no noise except that which came from the cannon's mouth; that as to mere bawling, the French king had heard enough of that in his lifetime, and knew well how little he had to fear from it.

Another part of your speech confirms, too, that which was told to this nation by me many months ago. I told them that a war on the part of France, having, for its object, injury or humiliation to England, would be sure to be popular. I reminded them of the transactions in Paris, in the years 1814 and 1815; and particularly of those in the latter year. I asked them how they would have felt towards France, if France had, in that year, done to England what England then did to France. I reminded them of the language of the English newspapers of that day; and I will now take a short extract from two of those papers which at that time had the greatest degree of influence; the one called the *Courier*, and the other the *Times*. The *Cou-*

rier of the 28th July, 1815, has this passage: "A new
" army may be faithful and loyal to the King of France;
" and the king *may be* pacifically inclined; but, *suppose*
" *he should not; suppose his successor should not; sup-*
" *pose he should be forced to follow the warlike im-*
" *pulse of the nation. The real, wise and sane policy*
" *is, to reduce the power of France; that is the only*
" *way to prevent her from disturbing the peace of*
" *Europe. We should insist upon the surrender, or, at*
" *least, upon the raseing of all the northern fortresses*
" *of France. We should make her give up the spo-*
" *liations of Louis XIV.—Why not bestow Lorraine*
" *upon Austria and Alsace upon Prussia? Lastly, every*
" *one of her pictures and statues should be removed."*
This was written after the allies; after England, the ally of Louis XVIII., had got military occupation of Paris. We know that this advice was very nearly followed to the very letter. Thus, you see, the hostility of this writer of a well-known newspaper in London was not against Bonaparte; was not against any form of government; but against France; against the power of France; against the French people, their happiness and their safety. Even the pictures and the statues; even these, the trophies of their valour, was too much for them to retain; they were taken away by *the allies of the King of France*; by those who had signed, along with him, the Declaration at Vienna. We were his allies in the war; and we entered France as his allies; and, being at Paris as his allies, we acted pretty much in the way recommended by the Courier in the above paragraph. The *Times* newspaper recommended the put-

ting of Bonaparte to death; and, in the month of September following, he justified the massacre of the protestants at Nismes. Such then, was the conduct of the English press. Such was its regard for the people of France. I could, if I were to go back, and had time to read speeches, find you speeches enough applauding the conduct of Blucher in being the first to seize upon the statues and pictures. I could find you speeches enough applauding to the skies every act tending to oppress and insult the people of France. I could find you twenty speeches in which it was called a conquest to have entered France as the allies of the King; I could find you hundreds of speeches containing boastings about this *glorious conquest*, though the war had been begun with a declaration of the English ministers themselves, that it was a battle between all Europe on one side, and one half of France on the other side.

This glorious conquest has hardly ceased yet to be rung in our ears. A Waterloo column is to be erected to commemorate the victory gained by all Europe over one half of France. We have a bridge that bears the glorious title in waiting for the column; and we have a great naked statue made of brass, stuck up in one of the parks, dedicated by the ladies of England to the heroes of Waterloo; where again, I say, all Europe combined, triumphed over one half of France. And, are we to suppose, that Frenchmen have no feelings as well as ourselves? If a big naked figure were stuck up in Paris with this boasting inscription; if you had bridges or columns to commemorate your triumphs over us; if you had stripped us of only a parcel of old beer-

barrels, or of gog and magog; if you, in short, had done to us what was done to you in 1815, and that, too, after entering our territory as our allies, and declaring beforehand that the better half of us was with you; if this had been the case; if you had stripped us of the trophies, of which we were justly proud, would there have been one drop of English blood that would not have boiled for war with France? How stupid, then, must those be; how little must they know of the French nation, or of the heart of man, not to know that all little miserable considerations will vanish before feelings which must necessarily be excited by reflecting on the transactions of 1815!

If I had been the minister of England I should, long ago, have prepared for the effect of these feelings in France. I should have duly considered what that effect must necessarily be. I should have known that the French nation would compel the government, if the government itself were not so disposed, to strike some signal blow at England. I should have been prepared for that blow, and you would not now have dared to talk of invading Spain, in spite of all your resources, all your revenge, and all your allies. You never should have had a "*sanitaire*" *cordon* on the frontiers of Spain. I should have discovered that the yellow fever or the plague was not to be kept out of the country by a great mass of human bodies, begirt with belts, holding ball-cartridges; and, at any rate, if yellow fever or plague you must have for want of a *sanitaire cordon*, have it you should. For, the moment you placed your cordon on the Spanish frontiers, I would have assailed

your commerce, your colonies and your sea-ports. Nevertheless, it is impossible for me to blame you; much less can I be so base as to cover you with personal abuse. Your speech is that of a gentleman, a scholar, a statesman, and, as you say of yourself, a good Frenchman; and as we take the liberty to talk of good Englishmen, we must be stupid as well as unjust to wish to deprive you of the same liberty.

It is not for me to contest the question of right. That has been settled in the minds of all sensible and honest men long and long enough ago. Neither is it for me to judge as to the result of the war which you are about to undertake. I have, in fact, no means of judging. But, this I know, that if you be not driven out of Spain in disgrace, you will owe your good fortune to those men in England who have exhausted our treasures and brought us into the state in which we are by wars carried on for the purpose of replacing the Bourbons on the throne of France. I do not pretend that any gratitude is due to these men or to the English nation from the family of Bourbon. It was always manifest that these men fancied that they should make France *weak for ages* by restoring the Bourbons. This was always manifest; it was called *clipping the wings of France*. This was well known to all the world. But, it is nevertheless true that our mill-stone was tied round our necks by a war to restore the Bourbons. There were men, and men calling themselves *statesmen*, too, who thought, that when the Bourbons were once restored, France would be so contemptibly weak that we might loll ourselves back into ages of repose, except

just to rouse ourselves now and then and talk big about the conquest of France. I warned these men of the danger of entertaining such hopes. I bade them prepare immediately for war. I reminded them of the fertility of the soil of France, of all its numerous advantages, and particularly of the effects of that industry to which the new order of things must inevitably cause a wonderful addition. I described to them at the very moment when the pictures and statues were removing, —I described to them the rapid progress that France would make in restoring herself to prosperity and power. I besought them to relieve us from those hundreds of millions of debt, which the vain attempt to clip the wings of France had cost us. All my representations, supplications and prayers were in vain. They have persevered in their own course, and, now, with “national honour” eternally upon their lips, here they stand with their arms folded while that France, which they thought they had crippled for ages, is now about to make herself mistress of that country, the independence of which ought to be nearly as dear to us as the independence of England: as a measure of expediency; as a measure of policy, your war against Spain, or, rather, against the Spanish revolution, or, in other words, Spanish liberty, is a measure of wisdom, of really sound policy. You are going to take possession of the country; you are going to make the country yours, though not in name, in reality. Nothing can be more true than your observation that if you do not change the government in Spain; if you do not bind it up with France as it formerly was bound up;

nothing can be truer than that unless you do this, France will be comparatively weak. Your reasons for subduing Spain are even stronger than ours would be for subduing Ireland, if it did not already form part of the kingdom. There is a part of the sea between England and Ireland; but France and Spain are one piece of ground. If Scotland were a separate kingdom, how necessary would it be for England to bind Scotland safe up with itself! We recollect how many wars have walked into England from Scotland, in former times; and a French statesman must be an unworthy creature indeed, when he surveys all the coasts of Spain; when he sees the endless facilities of introducing armies into her territory to co-operate with her. A French statesman must indeed be unworthy of the name if he does not seize the opportunity of shutting out this danger. You see the danger; you frankly state it, and you seem resolved to put an end to it if you can. It is our business to prevent you from doing this. A most imperious duty upon our ministers it is to cause the prevention; but, if they neglect, or be unable to perform this duty, that gives their partisans no right to abuse and traduce you. I, as an Englishman, thank you for having frankly stated your object. You say distinctly that France has been invaded from the Spanish territory; all the world knows that an English army marched from Spain to Paris, after traversing a country that had never before been pressed by a hostile foot! Why, Sir, the bare recollection of this is quite enough to stimulate all France to the war; and it ought to be much more than enough to stimulate all England to

face her in that war. What! shall we, under whose wing the first Cortes was created; shall we, who expended a hundred and fifty millions of pounds sterling to expel the French from Spain; shall we, who gave an implied pledge of protection to that people; shall we now suffer our arms to be rusting and confine our efforts to the boisterous and impotent hostility of speeches and newspapers? It is not for you to answer this question. It is a question between the English government and the English people. It is, however, a question which must be very soon answered; and if it be answered in the affirmative, then may we say to this once proud and brave people: "Behold the consequences of interfering in the affairs of foreign nations; of endeavouring to compel other nations to *submit to governments chosen by you*; and of contracting hundreds of millions of debt in the prosecution of wars for the purpose of effecting that object!"

In conclusion, Sir, I beg you to be assured, that I do no more than express the opinion of all sensible and worthy persons in this country, when I say that I hold in contempt and scorn all those who, whether in houses or in the street, whether in speeches or in paragraphs, resort to that personal abuse of you and of the French government, the like of which we never find in the speeches and newspapers of France.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient and most humble servant,

WM. COBBETT.

Such is the letter of the popular political writer: a fire that is incessantly blazing up afresh, a sound reason that political passion never disturbs, an irony the more cutting inasmuch as it is tempered by delicacy—all these qualities are conspicuous in this little master-piece of Cobbett, superior to the Letters of Junius, though in language less pure.

If we thought it incumbent on us to enter into a defence of the enterprise against Spain, it would be sufficient to produce this letter of the radical, whose character, talents, and principles, have been persecuted by England and the United States. Cobbett, a violent revolutionist, was not inclined towards us by any sentiment; he detested the nobles and the royalists, to whose party he considered us to belong; he had exhorted Louis XVIII. to remove them from his council, as incapable men and oppressors: nevertheless this man was the only one at this time, who undertook our defence, who did us justice, who judged soundly, both of the war in Spain, and of the idea which we had of restoring to our country the strength of which it had been shorn. Luckily he did not guess our whole plan; he did not penetrate our intention of breaking or obtaining a modification of the treaties of Vienna, and

founding Bourbon monarchies in America : had he lifted the whole veil, he would have put France in jeopardy ; for alarm had already seized the cabinets of Europe.

CHAP. L.

Diplomatic works.

Now that we have finished the recapitulation of these debates, as forming an integral and nevertheless separate part of the war with Spain : after this *oral* history, we shall continue, or rather commence the *written* history of that war. For this purpose, we shall have but one thing to do, namely, to give our private correspondence with London, Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid.

The *animation*, the *actuality*, the *spontaneity*, living qualities in direct correspondence, would disappear in the *indirect* style of the narrator. If, like most secretaries of state, we had required despatches from our chiefs of division, contenting ourselves with minuting the margin, such despatches would have had no other value than that of manufactured documents made with the office-

machine : in that case, no doubt, it would be better to collect those political common-places, in order to extract a history from them. But few diplomatists have found themselves in our position : chance had for once, placed in a high post, a man accustomed to *write*. Hence our correspondence bears the stamp of an *individual* character : springing from our own head, our letters are by our own hand. The reader has seen our literary works ; he shall now see our diplomatic works blended with the letters which we received from kings, ministers, generals, and ambassadors.

Before he commences the perusal of them, we request the reader to bear in mind our object ; that object we are about to indicate afresh : let him then go through with attention the statement of the impediments of all kinds by which we were beset. Holding this clue, you may enter, without losing yourself, the labyrinth of the letters. You will comprehend why we tell such a thing to such a cabinet, in apparent contradiction to what we write to another ; you will have no need, or very little, of explanatory notes concerning a fact obscurely touched upon by the way in these letters.

CHAP. LI.

Necessity for distinguishing the revolutionary ideas of the time, from the revolutionary ideas of men—Spain a compulsory ally of France—Why ?

So far from excusing ourselves on account of the Spanish war, we reckon it an honour, as you know, and we do not fail to say so. The result would have been as beneficial as it has been glorious, if we had been allowed time to reap the harvest that we had sown.

In the first place, the object was to save the Bourbons. Turn again to the proofs, now not contested, of the plots of the Carbonari, that have been given above. We were fortunately impressed with the conviction, contrary to the general opinion, that the obstacles were surmountable : our excuse was our confidence ; our faith absolved and saved us.

Not that we think of preserving monarchy in

the long run from the operation of ages : the world changes ; new principles are gradually destroying the old principles ; democracy is tending to substitute itself for aristocracy and royalty. We must beware of taking these revolutionary ideas of the time, for the revolutionary ideas of men ; the essential point is to distinguish the slow conspiracy of ages, from the hasty conspiracy of interests and systems. If we were not to separate these two things, we should be liable to prosecute mankind instead of prosecuting a faction. This is what we have comprehended : we have endeavoured to check the factitious movement, which, precipitating society too rapidly in its downward course, would prevent it from finding its level, when the world shall be transformed into republic or republican monarchy. When one breaks one's shackles with violence, one is almost always retaken and re-enchained : there is no durable liberty but for those whose chains are worn away by time.

We therefore purposed, in the first place, to screen the throne, scarcely re-established, from that propaganda of clubs and ventes, which came to us by the worst of conductors, military democracy, the constitution of the Spanish Mamelukes ; we meant, secondly, to restore soldiers to France, and to bring her natural ally back to her.

Spain had become English : in consequence of the institutions which she had given herself, and the influence acquired by Great Britain during the war of independence, it was evident to us that our enemies would get the better of us in the council of Madrid ; that change after change, would lead either through legislative corruption, or through the vices or weakness of the prince, to some disastrous innovation in the order of the succession to the throne.

Hence one or other of these dangers : either France would be again plunged into the troubles of jacobinism, under the inspiration of the Spanish jacobinism, or the Catholic crown would be transferred by marriage to some *foreign* race, two things which it behoves the minister of a King of France to oppose with all his might. The drift of the establishment of the Salic law at Madrid, is not the right of succession of the Bourbons, but the welfare of France. Do you conceive that the time of this law is past ? Then make haste, let France and Spain immediately become republics, or prepare to conquer Spain, and to unite it with France. If you do not effect this, our descendants, in a country weakened, harassed, and convulsed, will curse you.

At the present time, a day-by-day policy, without foresight and without maxims, is pursued : at

any rate the event whose consummation one has suffered because the effect was not instantaneous, accuses, in its developement, the short-sighted politicians who could not discover the evil in its germ. Spain, in the state of an alienated domain, affords an inlet upon us : was it not by this inlet that the army of Wellington debouched in 1814 ? From Cardinal de Richelieu to the Duke de Choiseul, the statesmen of our cabinet have never lost sight of the obligatory adherence of the Spanish Peninsula to this soil of France, by which it is connected with Europe.

Without going back to Queen Brunehaut, Charlemagne, and the mother of St. Louis, have we not the treaty of John and Peter, King of Castille, in 1351, on occasion of the marriage of Blanche of Bourbon ; the treaty of Charles V., and Henry II. the magnificent, King of Castille, in 1368 ; the renewal of the same alliance in 1380 ; the treaty of Charles VI. and John King of Castille, in 1387, against England, and renewed in 1408 ; the treaty between Louis XI. and John II., King of Aragon, in 1462 ; the treaty of the same Louis XI. and Henry, King of Castille and Leon, in 1469 ; another treaty with Ferdinand and Isabella, King and Queen of Castille and Aragon, in 1478 : Louis XII. renewed this treaty in 1498. Germaine de Foix, niece of Louis

XII., was promised in marriage to Ferdinand, King of Spain, in 1505—another treaty of alliance.

The treaty of the 13th of December, 1640, with Louis XIII. and the principality of Catalonia, and the conditions of Barcelona of the 19th of September, 1641, gave us claims upon Catalonia. Then come the treaty of the Pyrennees of the 7th of November, 1659, and the contract of marriage of Louis XIV., all the treaties that accompanied and followed the succession war, from 1701 to 1713; lastly, the family compact in 1768, which, by its 18th article, declares that the respective States are to be considered and to act as if they formed but *one and the same single power*.

See what mischief Spain did us under Francis I., Henry II., Charles IX., Henry III., Henry IV., and Louis XIII., when she was separated from us, and when the daughters of Philip III. and Philip IV. had not yet ascended the throne of Hugh Capet.

The most striking proof, perhaps, of the necessity of France for placing her Pyrenean frontier in complete security, was the treaty signed at the Hague on the 11th of October, 1698: that treaty, which was not carried into execution on account of the death of the Prince of Bavaria, stipulated that the electoral prince of Bavaria

should be the future King of Spain; that the dauphin should have the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the places dependent on the Spanish monarchy on the coast of Tuscany, *the province of Guipuscoa, Fontarabia, St. Sebastian, and the port of Passage*. It is only strange that, in this plan of a treaty of partition, there is no mention of the Spanish colonies, unless they were secretly given to the King of England and the States-General, co-partitioners; but we see what care France took to secure her frontier in causing *Guipuscoa, Fontarabia, St. Sebastian, and the Passage* to be given to her.

Were we to assert that every thing is changed and that interests are no longer the same, we should be mistaken: the authority of the ancient treaties and the ancient politicians cannot, it is true, be always recognized; but it ought to be when all these treaties, and when all these politicians agree upon one point, when the little and great geniuses agree: this forms a spirit of reason, springing from an enduring and similar interest, which neither times, nor constitutions, nor men, are able to change. This agreement of all politicians is to the interest of the State what the universal agreement of nations is to the existence of God.

So long since as 1792, Mr. Burke, in his *Memoirs on Affairs of State*, observed :—

“ *Spain is not a substantive power*: that she must lean on France, or on England. That it is as much for the interest of Great Britain to prevent the predominancy of a French interest in that kingdom, as if Spain were a province of the crown of Great Britain, or a state actually dependent on it ; full as much so as ever Portugal was reputed to be. This is a dependency of much greater value : and its destruction, or its being carried to any other dependency, of much more serious misfortune.

“ If Spain should be forced or awed into a treaty with France, she must open her ports and her commerce, as well as the land communication for the French labourers, who were accustomed annually to gather in the harvest of Spain.

“ In this, England may acquiesce if she pleases ; and France will conclude a triumphant peace, with Spain under her absolute dependence, with a broad highway into that, and into every state of Europe.”

It is sufficient to cast an eye on the map and upon history to judge of the interest that we have in the union of the two kingdoms. In disagreement with Spain, our Southern provinces

are cut off from a commerce which constitutes their wealth, and our navy is deprived in both worlds of the succours and ports so necessary in our conflicts with the English. During the war of 1756, the efforts of Spain spared us the disgraceful conditions to which we submitted by the treaty of 1763; and in 1778 the junction of the two fleets forced the English squadron to seek refuge in St. George's channel. The republic learned from the presence of a Spanish army the danger of leaving open our frontier of Languedoc and Bearn, and hastened to conclude the peace of Basle. Bonaparte also felt the political necessity: but instead of making an ally, he endeavoured to make a conquest of Iberia—an egregious blunder.

The accession of the Bourbons to the throne of Charles II. was not a mere affair of testamentary bequest and acceptance; it was an act of high diplomatic science, which was not concluded at too dear a price, at the price of the disasters of the war of 1701. Spain is one of our flanks; we ought never to leave it uncovered; Spain is a satellite which ought always to remain in our sphere, for the regularity of its own movements and of ours.

The advantages of a good understanding between the cabinets of Madrid and Paris were so

well understood by England, that a secret article of her treaties in 1815 prescribed *the destruction of the family compact*. Spain, English and Austrian, unrolls before us a new frontier to defend ; we go back to the reign of Philip II., and lose the work of Louis the Great. Then again, the territory of Switzerland being no longer respected, we are become liable to wounds on the side next to the Alps, as well as on the side next to the Pyrennees.

Such was the perilous state to which we had undertaken to put an end, in order to replace ourselves within the inviolable rampart in which France had reposed ever since the 17th century. Thanks to Louis XIV., there was left us but a single line to guard from Tournay to Basle ; Vauban had studded that line with fortresses ; France was shut up like a box ; there was no penetrating into it but by a narrow aperture on the north-east, and by two entrances, the one on the west, the other on the south, entrances the gates of which were guarded by our fleets and by two seas.

CHAP. LII.

Treaties of Vienna—Extract from the “Memoir on the Affairs of the East”—Cabinet of Louis XVIII.

THE demagogue spirit stifled, our ally brought within the sphere of our attraction, an army newly created, we should immediately resume our political and military rank. Then, in the cabinet or beneath the tent, we should be able to obtain a modification, by fair means or by force, of those odious treaties of Vienna, and to re-establish the equilibrium broken between us and the grand powers.

The immense blunder of the Congress of Vienna is that of having placed a military country like France in a state of forced hostility with the neighbouring nations.

England has retained almost all the conquests which she made in the colonies of the three parts of the world during the war of the revolution.

In Europe she has helped herself to Malta and the Ionian Islands, nay even her electorate of Hanover she has swelled into a kingdom and rounded with several lordships.

Austria has augmented her possessions by a third of Poland, by nibblings from Bavaria, by part of Dalmatia and Italy. The Netherlands, it is true, she no longer possesses; but that province has not devolved to France.

Prussia has aggrandized herself by the duchy or palatinate of Posen, a fragment of Saxony, and the principal circles of the Rhine; her advanced post is on our former territory.

Russia has recovered Finland, and established herself on the banks of the Vistula.

And we, what have we gained by these arrangements? We have been despoiled of our colonies; our old soil even has not been respected: Landau separated from France, Huningen demolished, open a wide breach on our frontiers. One battle disastrous to our arms would suffice to bring the enemy under the walls of Paris. Paris having fallen, experience proves that France must fall. It may, therefore, be said with truth, that our national independence hangs upon the chance of a single battle, and a war of a week. The jealous and imprudent distribution of the Congress of Vienna would oblige us, in a given time, to re-

move our capital to the other side of the Loire, or to extend our frontier to the Rhine. This is not an absurd mockery : Holland, successful at Mons, might come and sleep in the Louvre. Will our useless cries be heard by France any more than they were heard by the Restoration ? The other capitals of Europe, situated far back in their provinces, defended by the fortresses and the populations which cover them, are not of much importance, and even when they are taken, the state to which they belong is not destroyed. This is not the case with France, such as the allies have made her.

We know not if some apprehension of the dangers to which we are exposed might not have entered into the plan for surrounding Paris with detached forts. But the remedy would be worse than the disease ; some of the forts being taken, they would serve as a point of support for foreign invasion ; if no accident happened, these forts would become the intrenched camp of the Pretorians.

The idea of obtaining preservative frontiers by force, or by negociation, was not chimerical. We have shown, in a pamphlet published in 1831, that France then lost an occasion which she will never find again ; she excited such terror in the sovereigns, that she might have obtained every

thing without striking a blow. Do we not occupy Ancona, to the great annoyance of Austria? Did not Prussia respectfully carry arms to our bombs during the siege of Antwerp, and admire in the night, the luminous parabolas of our projectiles? Was she not interested in the effect of our monster-mortar? M. de Metternich has said that the apprehension of the archbishop of Cologne was an important event; he is right, admitting that France knew how to view and take advantage of it, that she would counsel and support the Pope in his legitimate resistance, that she was acquainted with the German spirit, and that she entered frankly into the religious interest of the offending provinces. Real statesmen would bring about the re-union of the Catholic circles of the Rhine with France, and pave the way to a compact the more durable, inasmuch as it would spring from the civilizing idea, religion. At the period of the war in Spain, in 1823, we should not have needed aid for an aggrandizement claimed in the interest of the new European balance of power: Alexander always thought that we had been too much despoiled; cooped up between him and us, Germanic Europe could not have withstood just claims. Once more become powerful by means of our successes in the Peninsula, it would have been easy to bring back the Czar to

his former notions of equity ; Prussia might have been prevailed upon by resuming the arrangement of Saxony, given up to the Congress of Vienna for a *douceur* of four millions.

The proofs of our aversion for the treaties of Vienna are numerous : traces of it may every where be found in our speeches, and in our works, before the war of 1823 ; after that war, the idea of a beneficial enlargement of our country never left us. The “ *Memoir on the Affairs of the East*,” for which the Count de la Ferronnays applied to us when we were ambassador at Rome, contains the same opinion. We there say : “ I have clearly shown, that the alliance of France with England and Austria, against Russia, is a deceptive alliance, in which we should find nothing but the loss of our blood and treasure. The alliance with Russia, on the contrary, would enable us to obtain establishments in the Archipelago, and to extend our frontiers to the banks of the Rhine. We might hold this language to Nicholas : ‘ Your enemies are soliciting us ; we prefer peace to war ; we wish to maintain neutrality ; but if you cannot adjust your differences with the Porte in any other way than by arms, if you are determined to go to Constantinople, enter into an equitable partition of European Turkey with the Christian powers. Such of those powers as are not so situ-

ated as to extend themselves toward the East, shall receive compensations. We will take for our share, the line of the Rhine from Strasburg to Cologne. Such are our just pretensions. It is for the interest of Russia, (so your brother Alexander said) that France should be strong. If you consent to this arrangement, and the other powers reject it, we will not suffer them to interfere in your quarrel with Turkey; if they attack you in spite of our remonstrances, we will fight them with you, on the same conditions that we have just stated.'

"This is what might be said to Nicholas. Never will Austria, never will England, give us the boundary of the Rhine as the price of our alliance with them; now, it is nevertheless there that France must sooner or later place her frontiers, as well for her honour as for her safety."

This after-thought, which we secretly cherished as flowing from our successes in Spain, we did not communicate to our colleagues, already unhappy enough to be engaged in hostilities, except in the form of plans, complaints, and vague hopes.

One day, having gone to carry a despatch to the King, we found him alone, seated before his small table, into the drawer of which he hastily put the letters or notes that he was writing with the help of a large magnifying glass. He was in

a good humour, and immediately began to talk to us on a literary subject.

“Would you believe,” said his Majesty, “that I have been for years an utter stranger to the cantata of Circe. M. d’Avary made me ashamed of myself, and I have learned it by heart.” And all at once the King began to declaim the cantata at full length.

He then passed to the song of Hezekiah. When he came to this line :—

Comme un tigre impitoyable, &c.

we took the liberty to ask him if he was acquainted with Rousseau’s correction :—

Comme un lion plein de rage, &c.

The King appeared surprised, and made us repeat Rousseau’s alteration. Lyric poetry led him to familiar poetry, to street ballads, and vaudevilles ; he began to sing the *Sabot perdu*. We ventured to relieve him by taking up some of the lines :—

On peut parler plus bas,

Mon aimable bergère.

The King was the Cardinal de Richelieu, while we were Conrad or Malville, helping Armand to cobble together this exquisite verse :

La cane s’humectait de la bourbe de l’eau.

Seeing his Majesty so gracious, we presented

to him the despatch upon our hat, and we slipped in at the same time a few words on the subject of our successes, and the frontier of the Rhine, under the protection of Babet. The King pouted out his lips, gave a slight puff, raised a finger of his right hand as high as his eye, looked at us, and by a friendly nod made a sign for us to retire, and as if to say: "We will see one another again." Every road leads to Rome.

Careful as we were to lock up within ourselves our ideas relative to the treaties of Vienna, a despatch of M. de Rayneval's proves that we were suspected in Prussia: that power was not pleased with England, which by her opposition was likely to force us to redouble our energy and to render us dangerous to the continent. On the other hand, M. de la Ferronays, in one of his letters, mentions the fears manifested by Austria of our successes: she said that *our heads would be turned*, that *every thing was to be dreaded from us*: she liked us better when there was room to doubt the fidelity of our army.

CHAP. LIII.

Two political machines to be created—Jealousies on every side—Pretensions of Naples—Russia—The ordinance of Andujar—The Duke d'Angoulême.

FOR the execution of these plans we required two machines, capable of raising immense weights; an army, to make us masters of the soil, and a Spanish Junta, to address Spain in the name of the Spaniards themselves, with the view of enforcing the obedience of the royalist guerillas scattered over the Peninsula.

The army, revived by the breath of war, arose as it were out of its own ashes. Soldiers will never be wanting in the land of Clovis, Charlemagne, St. Louis, Francis I., Louis XIV., and Napoleon: and as to money, the legislative vote and an able minister like M. de Villèle, will always secure it. It was necessary to create every thing; and every thing was created. The Duke of Belluno had been deceived as to the

amount of provisions and forage ; magazines were formed, it is true, at great expense ; but what of that ? receipts ought to exceed expenditure. Our troops rushed from the summit to the foot of the Pyrennees, like a torrent. All were inspired by success. Under the tent, French honour and valour left no opportunity for those projects begotten by the idleness of garrisons and camps.

A provisional Spanish Junta entered the Peninsula with our troops, and was at Madrid constituted a Junta of Regency. M. de Martignac accompanied the Junta as civil commissary, and Count de Caux, as chargé d'affaires. The Count filled the latter post until the arrival of the Marquess de Talaru, who on our recommendation was appointed ambassador.

The two machines, the army and the junta, being fairly constructed, all that remained to be done was to set them in motion, and to prevent any external obstacle from impeding their operation.

At Vienna we had to contend with jealousies, sometimes acting openly, and at other times disguised beneath the mask of interest. The Austrian cabinet, alarmed at our success, urged the poor cabinet of Naples to claim the regency of Spain ; a contemptible proceeding which was not

known at the time of its occurrence, but which threatened to ruin all by the uncertainty into which, for a moment, it threw our operations. The details will be seen in the correspondence. The result would have been that we should have been carrying on the war for the benefit of the King of Naples, the heir of the family of Ferdinand. The old king, not being able to join the army, he would have been represented by the Castel-Cicala, under whom the Duke d'Angoulême would have had the honour to serve. The Emperor of Russia put a stop to the intriguing of this groupe of puppets (whose wires were moved by M. Metternich) by prevailing on the sovereign of Naples to *return to his States in order to watch over the government of his kingdoms.*

On another occasion, Austria made a proposition which she imagined we should eagerly accept. M. de Caraman informed us that M. Metternich hoped to bring England to take part in our deliberations, in Paris, on the affairs of Spain ; so that by accepting this conciliatory offer, we should not have had any thing more to do in the business, but have consigned the whole to the blessed mediation of Austria. With similar views the Duke of Wellington had proposed to us the mediation of England. Prussia at first followed

the course of St. Petersburg ; but after the deliverance of Ferdinand, when she thought she could perceive some constitutional symptoms peeping out in the institutions of Spain, she became hostile. The Prussian envoy at Madrid did us great harm by participating in the sentiments of the absolutist party.

The very word charter was sufficient to shock the ears of the alliance ; we therefore, the author of the *Monarchie Selon la Charte*, naturally became an object of suspicion. It is true I was known to be an enemy to military insurrections, to liberal institutions framed in camps, and to emancipation effected by the bayonet ; but then, on the other hand, if we admitted the existence of rights of the people, were we any better than the soldiers of the Isle of Leon ? By this sort of reasoning the cabinet of Vienna attacked our influence at Berlin and St. Petersburg, and sought to neutralize our power over the mind of Alexander.

The latter cordially gave us the support which we had won at the Congress of Verona ;—he defended France at Vienna, and he assisted in defeating the grotesque and dangerous diplomatic plot concealed under the cloak of the King of Naples. The Emperor Alexander intimated to the cabinet of London, that if England should

attack France during our expedition, he should regard that attack as a declaration of war against the allies, and should treat it accordingly. This high tone operated as a check on Mr. Canning. The Emperor of Russia acted in good faith, but nevertheless his favourable dispositions proved the source of another embarrassment. He proposed to assemble in Poland an army of reserve, consisting of 60,000 men. This army was to be called the army of the alliance ; it was to be put in movement only in compliance with the wishes of the allied powers, and more especially with the demand of the cabinet of the Tuilleries. This proposition alarmed us. It was difficult to say to the Czar,—“ We accept your services as long as they are confined to words ; but whenever they are likely to be converted into acts, then we will dispense with them.”

The Austrian cabinet, to which the same communications respecting this army of reserve were made, enveloped itself in a maze of ambiguous words, and threw the whole difficulty back upon us.

On the Neva we were taking every precaution to make it understood that we might *perhaps be obliged* to leave a constitution in Madrid ; but in England, we were doing all in our power to prove that we loved liberty as well as any member of

the British parliament. Great Britain consented to interfere to obtain the deliverance of Ferdinand, if we would enter into her views ; but then Russia threatened. Our task was to extricate ourselves from this labyrinth, to break with no one, and to proceed direct to our object. It was complained that there was no possibility of comprehending what we wanted,—that we had two minds and two opinions,—that our language and our despatches were at variance one with another :—all this was true as respected *form*, but untrue as regarded *spirit*.

The grand difficulty consisted, in the first place, in obliging England to remain neutral. Except on the question of the war we approximated more nearly to the views of England, than to those of the other allies. The cabinet of St. James profited by this constitutional sympathy, to rouse the suspicion of the other powers of Europe, by representing that we wished to establish a representative government in the Peninsula.

In our despatches and letters, we deemed it expedient to drop a few ungracious words in reference to the alliance ; but they did not produce the intended effect. We were told that in speech we were as lavish of expressions of devotedness as we were chary of them in writing. The Emperor of Russia, the founder of the alliance, did

not wish that it should be even ostensibly slighted. He inclined to our views. He wished to disengage himself from his friends of the *Plaine des Vertus* ; but he did not choose that his wish should be perceived. There is no doubt that our unexpected triumph caused him some jealousy ; for he was secretly gratified at the thought of our being compelled to have recourse to him : even in the best of natures, some bad feeling will occasionally find access.

In England all was hostile, except the King, Mr. Peel, the Duke of Wellington, and the Castlereagh party. They did not like levelling principles, nor could they endure to see soldiers legislating after the manner of Cromwell's troops ; but they were perplexed by their national jealousies, and were dragged along by the current of public opinion. The radicals proposed at once to bombard St. Petersburg, and to march against us on the Ebro. They sent succour to the clubbists of Spain, and the cabinet of St. James closed its eyes to their proceedings. Sir Robert Wilson repaired in person to the Peninsula, with a corps of volunteers.

In a letter, astonishing by its style, at once imperious, fascinating, and sublime, Mr. Canning so far forgot himself as to express regret for the victory of Almanza in 1707, which gave the

crown of Spain to the Bourbons. In this letter it was easy to discern the fears felt by Mr. Canning for the future possible success of France. He could not forget the family compact. To threaten us the more effectually, he made himself the interpreter of the sentiments of Great Britain. He lamented our absence from the embassy in London ; and did us the honour to express fear of us in the department of foreign affairs. He observed that Lord Liverpool had known us to entertain other opinions. Lord Liverpool had mistaken our politeness for our real opinion. A proof that our sentiments, from the first, had always been the same, is, that even at that period we wrote on the subject of the Spanish war to the Viscount de Montmorency.

After the deliverance of Ferdinand the intrusion of the English administration became annoying. Checked by Russia and by the rapidity of our success, the English cabinet at first wanted courage, and Cobbett justly reproached it. Our position had its vulnerable point. When the army of Silveira entered the Spanish territory, we ought to have refused its support for fear of furnishing a pretext for the aggressions of England. Had Mr. Canning, as he did at a later period, landed some English regiments at Lisbon, our right flank being threatened, we could not

have followed the government from Madrid to Seville. If the Cortes had remained in the south of Spain ; if the king had not been restored to us at Cadiz ; if that city had been defended, or if Ferdinand had been obliged to embark ; then incalculable chances would have presented themselves. To those chances, a single decisive demonstration on the part of the British cabinet would have exposed us. But Providence favoured the temerity of the adventure.

We venture to affirm that we know nobody who at that period could have held the portfolio of the foreign department, or at least no one who would have carried on the war according to our views. M. de Montmorency and those who shared his sentiments were anxious to put down the Spanish revolution, but they would never have followed up that object, with the prospect of afterwards coming to a rupture with Europe. But, to destroy the work of the Cortes, without thereby securing the power and the emancipation of France, would have been to labour merely for the security of a moment. The act being once accomplished, and our safety and emancipation secured, troubles would speedily have been renewed in Spain.

In Madrid the conflict was kept up without intermission ; on the one hand with the junta of

regency, to which we had sent an ambassador ; and on the other hand, with the ministers who were accredited to the regency by the different foreign powers. Jealous of France, according to the humour of their respective cabinets, these ministers sometimes threatened to retire, sometimes insisted on measures which we could not accede to. They would enter into the party feelings of the different members of the junta, and the royalist chiefs ; or they would urge M. Talaru to establish general conferences, as if the allies had been there themselves with their money and their troops : but nevertheless the war was exclusively French ; we bore its burthens and braved its perils.

The envoy appointed by Austria to treat of the intervention of Naples, said that he had not received any orders from his court, and that he could not go to Madrid to recognize the junta : all this readily found its way to the Spanish factions, who were anxiously looking for the least symptoms of division.

We found it advisable to support this junta. It appealed to the Spaniards in the name of their King ; it induced the generals in the service of the Cortes to treat with a national authority, which authority in their eyes disguised all that was displeasing in a sudden change of party

and opinion. The junta also encouraged the royalists, who, seeing that it was attended by a diplomatic body, thought themselves supported by Europe. On the other side of the Pyrennees it was impossible to advance a league without popular support.

But the junta was infected with Spanish caprice; and animosities often rendered it quite intractable. The junta committed so many absurdities; it published a decree of so menacing a character against the Cortes party and the military who were returning to their homes, that the Duke d'Angoulême found himself obliged to quit Madrid, and he published at Andujar on the 8th of August, 1825, the following ordinance:

“ We, Louis-Antoine d'Artois, commander in chief of the army of the Pyrennees;

“ Considering that the occupation of Spain by the French army under my command, placed us under the indispensable necessity of providing for the tranquillity of this kingdom and the security of our troops, we have ordered and order as follows.

“ Art. 1. The Spanish authorities cannot make any arrest without the permission of the com-

mander of our troops in the district to which they may belong.

“ 2. The commanders in chief of the corps of our army are to liberate all persons who have been arrested arbitrarily and for political motives ; for example, the military returning to their homes. Those individuals are excepted who since their return to their homes may have given just ground of complaint.

“ 3. The commanders in chief of the corps of our army are authorized to arrest all who may neglect the observance of the present order.

“ 4. All journals and journalists are to be under the surveillance of the commanders of our troops.

“ 5. The present ordinance is to be printed and posted every where.

“ Given at our head-quarters at Andujar ;
Aug. 8th, 1825.

“ LOUIS ANTOINE.

“ By command of

“ His Royal Highness the General in Chief.

“ MAJOR GENERAL COUNT GUILLEMINOT.”

We stated in a letter to M. de Ferronays our opinion of this ordinance, which, though good in some respects, placed the Spanish press in a

state of siege. Our generals, accustomed to the Napoleonian wars, and to the decrees of the ruler of the world, could not easily dispense with these dramatic effects. The Prince Generalissimo here ventured upon an imitation, which as it did not elevate, tended to lower him. The ordinance, philosophically speaking, was a highly honourable measure ; politically speaking, it was a dangerous fault. The decree of Andujar was lauded to the skies : speculative dreamers found it congenial with their philanthropy and the progress of the age ; our enemies shrewdly perceived that it would cause our ruin. Such were the secret causes of the admiration it excited.

Our duty doubtless was to prevent re-action ; silently to unbar the prisons of men who were confined for their political opinions. But to convert this humane course of proceeding into an ostensible order, to declare to the *Reales* that the *Liberales* were favoured, was to arm against us the clergy, the monks, the whole population ; that population which facilitated our invasion and took from it all its terrors, which enabled us to march over a burning soil where Bonaparte could not penetrate, though aided by five hundred millions, and five hundred thousand men. The junta was roused ; and it appeared not improbable that

the people might rise, cut off our communications, and oblige us to fall back on the Ebro: this too, at the moment when our army was wavering under the white cockade, and when a single retrograde step would have doomed us to perdition.

Practical men, who when they have an object in view, look to the means by which it is to be gained, may judge whether or not we had reason to be alarmed. Among a people, who always regard an amnesty as a sort of denial of justice; who attach no value to indulgence,—who take life for life,—who give or receive death as they would perform a duty or pay a debt; it may easily be conceived what effect was produced by the ordinance of Andujar. It was not approved even by those whose lot it was calculated to ameliorate. We shall presently show the efforts we made to repair this magnanimous error.

In addition to all the other difficulties the Duke d'Angoulême was himself an obstacle. He was dissatisfied with every thing; he complained of every thing, and was continually threatening to return to France and bring matters to an arrangement there. He did not consult M. de Talaru; but merely consigned to him the charge of rectifying ill-timed measures. We had not his confidence; he gave it to M. de Villèle. The letters

of the Duke d'Angoulême, which the president of the council read to us, were characterized by sound sense, judgment, and military skill.

At the same time we maintained correspondence with our generals, relative to the commands of fortresses and the commands of the forces of the Cortes. If our ships did not punctually cast anchor at the stated hour ;—if our troops were impeded in their marches ;—if any operation had been delayed through the non-arrival of transports and the want of ammunition, we were in a state of agony. In the gardens of the Tuilleries we anxiously watched the telegraph, alternately wishing and fearing to know the intelligence that traversed the air above our head. Oh, mule laden with the gold of Philip ! How you would have helped us to enter the fortresses of Ferdinand ! If we had had fifty millions at our own disposal, we would have given all to remove any obstacle that stood in the way of our object. How paltry seemed the cavilling about the transactions of Ouvrard ! What signified the loss of a little money in an affair on which depended the future welfare of France ! The hours were numbered. A moment's delay would have driven us to the brink of the abyss. Alarm was rapidly spreading. We should lose Spain, and dissension would arise in Europe. Speedy success could

alone justify our enterprise. Should we be obliged to enter on a second campaign, what would be the consequence ? What a triumph for those who had foretold our disasters ? We should have been pronounced the most culpable and the most incapable of men. Where should we have found a retreat obscure enough to conceal us ? we should have been an object of universal reprobation ; cere-cloth and ashes would have been our only resource, and France would have been the prey of a revolution worse than the first. This idea alarmed us the more because, being minister for foreign affairs, we were not president of the council, and we could not, as under an absolute monarchy, dispose of the revenues of the state, and of the will of the monarch. A speech in the chamber, or a court intrigue, might at any moment have thrust us out of office before we could have had time to complete our work.

In fine, the embarrassments of our position in France were added to the difficulties we had to surmount abroad.

CHAP. LIV.

Conferences—Ministers under a representative government.

By the old stipulations it was settled that the five great allied powers should direct attention in common to affairs which concerned each one in particular. England was subjected to this clause at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, on the subject of the Spanish colonies ; the Emperor of Russia was obliged to conform to it at Verona, in reference to his dissensions with the Porte ; and we, in our turn, were compelled to submit to this dangerous obligation of the old agreements. The Russian, Prussian, and Austrian ambassadors came to the hotel of the minister for foreign affairs, to gossip about the affairs of Spain in pretended conferences, which we had no power to refuse holding. How could we honestly avow to Europe that we were merely incurring the risks of the war against the Cortes, in the hope of

releasing ourselves from the treaties of Vienna? France, who had been left in an orphan state by the death of Napoleon, required time to grow :

. Tant qu 'enfin
Le lionceau devient un lion.

Richelieu and Mazarin could act freely and without obstruction, the one in kindling the Thirty Years' War, and the other in extinguishing it. What could they have done, had they been forced to treat in conferences with foreign ministers, or to repel from the tribune the assaults of their adversaries, even when, in their own justification, they could not have developed their plans? Any oratorical deputy would have silenced them. Any measure demanding time, secrecy, and the direction of one single mind, is impracticable under a representative government, or at least under that form of government conceived in the French spirit. We cannot now follow the complicated and mysterious negotiations which enabled the master of Louis XIII. to humble the house of Austria, and to arm the protestants of Germany after having crushed those of France, by bringing Gustavus Adolphus from the rocks of Sweden. All that vast machinery was worked by the help of Father Joseph

with gold and promises under his cloak. But what could the Capuchin have done if he had had a journalist or a chamber orator at his heels. In France, a minister is never sure of holding office from one session to another: three-fourths of his time are lost in defending himself against miserable personal attacks. The length of an administration, in present times, is almost always a sign of its mediocrity; it can stand only by help of a sympathetic feebleness of the governing and the governed. The qualities which constitute great ministers excite jealousy; and men possessing those qualities are too high spirited to crouch to the humours of the great. If these superior men were deprived of oratorical power they would be for ever lost to the state: now this faculty is very frequently found to exist in men very deficient in mental capability. Richelieu, had he been dumb, would have been obliged to cede his place to some babbling lawyer.

Let us turn to England for example. If Lord Chatham and his son enjoyed high reputation for many years as statesmen and orators;—if they secured to themselves the means of accomplishing their designs, it is because our neighbours have not our impatience;—it is because the English aristocracy partakes of the firmness and the power of royalty, of which it has been the usurper

and the heir ;—it is because at the period when the two great Williams appeared, democracy had not gained the ascendancy in society. We much doubt whether in England, in 1838, Mr. Pitt would have attained the reputation and the success, which forty years ago placed him on the level of the greatest statesmen. Many a Ximenes, many an Alberoni, will henceforth die unknown.

In judging of men who are the depositaries of power, sufficient attention is not always bestowed on the difference between past and present time. Diplomatic obstacles, the intrigues of secret and absolute governments, remain the same as they were in former times ; and we have moreover to contend against the indiscretions and extravagancies of the liberty of the press. Nevertheless it was in the full light of that liberty, which we would not consent should be encroached upon, that the folly of the Spanish war was committed ; —it was by the light of that liberty, that the matches of our cannons were rekindled. The risk however was great ; for what would not the opposition have said and written, had we encountered the least reverse. We had no alternative but to leap into, or over, the abyss.

The ministers who negotiated the will of Charles II., and they who influenced affairs under Philip V., had only to contend against those cabi-

net intrigues, those private ambitions, and those difficulties of character, which must be encountered by all men who mingle in public life. The cabinet of Versailles was not under the necessity of treating in conference with the powers of Europe *styling themselves friendly*, and recovering its strength under jealous eyes.

Austria, foreseeing that our first object would be to insure ourselves of Spain, wished, as early as 1814, to garrison with her troops our frontier fortresses in Catalonia. At Vienna it was said, that we wished to separate from the alliance, and league ourselves with Russia; at St. Petersburg and Berlin, it was alleged, that we wished to give a charter to Spain;—and in France it was affirmed, that we wanted to re-establish the Inquisition and the *Rey neto*. Such was the weight of accusation under which we had to struggle. We had to deceive both friends and enemies, or rather to conceal from both the real state of things. It was requisite that France should accomplish her resurrection unperceived;—that the giant should re-appear sword in hand, when it was no longer possible to disarm him.

At the conferences held in Paris, we, however, obtained some advantage over the envoys of the alliance at Madrid; and at length we even succeeded in suppressing their official meetings.

According to the length and nature of these negotiations, the spirit of these envoys varied. M. Brunetti, who was very troublesome at the commencement of the war, became more manageable when the success of the war was insured ; and he showed himself to be less of an absolutist than his colleagues, in the question of the colonies. M.M. Bulgari and Royaz, who at first went along with us, became intractable when, Ferdinand being released, the establishment of the old Cortes, and the emancipation of the American provinces, became the subjects of discussion.

Dissension prevailed every where. In Spain General Bourmont did not agree with M. de Talaru ; at Vienna M. de Caraman demanded money or permission to retire ; and in Paris, the loyal and faithful Marshal Victor was obliged to surrender his portfolio in deference to the prejudices of the Duke d'Angoulême.

Amidst all these obstacles we were supported by the hope of obtaining great results, after which we trusted we might return to our solitary tastes. Those who know the indifference with which we regard worldly things, and the little importance we attach to them, will be convinced that it must have cost a great sacrifice to submit to so many constraints, and to manage to obtain the moral support of the continental cabinets, as long as we

needed that support against England. Another part of our task was to conciliate England, so as to make a portion of her projects serve our projects, by making her oppose, when her turn should come, the absolutist spirit of the rest of Europe. By excluding Great Britain from all influence in the Spanish war, we were supposed to be merely maintaining amicable relations with Russia, Austria, and Prussia ; and we wished, on the other hand, that England should be admitted to the general conferences on the Spanish colonies, in spite of the allied powers ; who wished to settle that affair without the concurrence of the cabinet of St. James.

CHAP. LV.

Spanish refugees.

THE Spanish royalists who took refuge in France furnished another subject of discussion. The Archbishop of Tarragona, the Bishop of Urgel, together with M. M. de Erro and Calderon, who had hitherto been found at the head of the insurgent provinces, maintained that no time was to be lost in installing the provisional Spanish government. But they demanded that General Eguia should be placed at the head of that government. They stated it to be the wish of Ferdinand, expressed in an order of the 10th of January, that General Eguia should preside over every species of government whatsoever, *that he might exert himself for the deliverance of his august person* : this phrase at least proved that the *constitutional* king considered himself a prisoner in the hands of his *constitutional* friends. M. de

Balmaceda and the Archbishop of Tarragona sent us declarations from the juntas and from the royalist commandants of Catalonia, asserting their fidelity to the regency of Urgel, and their determination not to acknowledge any other authority.

On the other hand, we received addresses disapproving of a proclamation, which General Eguia deemed it necessary to publish in his own name. These addresses affirmed that the proclamation would kindle among the royalists a war more sanguinary than that with which Spain had been afflicted for the space of three years.

At the same time, M. Berryer transmitted to me a note, which M. de Mataflorida had requested him to send me. It contained nothing eloquent or persuasive except the signature of M. Berryer.

“ M. Mataflorida’s party, (it was observed in the note), must prevail. It is now well known in Paris that General Eguia is an old man, worn out and incapable, and that the honourable Baron d’Eroles, after having defended M. Mataflorida to the last moment, consented to take part in the projected council without M. Mataflorida, only because France promised him assistance, which however he has not received.”

This was very well: but a letter addressed by

General Eguia to M.M. Erro and Calderon contained the following passage :—" I have received new communications by which I am directed to notify to the Marquess de Mataflorida, that he must henceforth renounce all idea of the power he has usurped, and no longer compromise His Majesty by addressing to him, as he has lately done, letters in which he names persons and things. Point out to the wise French government the necessity of restraining the Marquess de Mataflorida."

How then was it possible to appoint a provisional government composed of General Eguia, Baron d'Eroles, the Archbishop of Tarragona, the Bishop of Urgel, the Counsellor Calderon, and M. Erro ? How could the provisional government be thus composed, when General Eguia was rejected by one party who styled him *an old man, worn out and incapable*, and the Marquess de Mataflorida, rejected by Ferdinand, was condemned by another faction for his *ambitious spirit* and his *imprudence* ?

Different military leaders, then obscure, but who have since acquired celebrity, flitted before us like shadows. Among them were Cordova, Quesada, &c. The sight of these supplicants inspired us with melancholy reflections on human destiny. In like manner, during our own emi-

gration in London, we had seen emigrants soliciting aid, and contending one with another to obtain it. We loved Spain, her bright sky and her Moorish palaces ; we had cherished youthful illusions at that period of life when dreams are not *fantastic*, as they are *at the fall of the leaf*. We had traversed the Iberia of the ancient christians, at the moment when she was exhaling as it were her last sigh before the invasion of Bonaparte. We were attached to the brave Spanish nation, as well by our recollections, as by our singular prophecy of her resurrection, contained in the *Genie du Christianisme*. “ Spain, separated from other nations, still presents to history a character more original than any other country in Europe. The sort of moral stagnation into which she is thrown will perhaps one day turn to her advantage ; and when the other European nations will be worn out by corruption, Spain will appear gloriously on the scene of the world, because she has the principle of true morality within her.”

This prediction the noble Spanish nation has gloriously fulfilled.

CHAP. LVI.

Troubles at home.

THE last difficulties we have to mention are those which were created in Paris by our friends as well as by our enemies, and which we encountered in the discharge of our duties in the Council and in the Chamber. Though these difficulties did not operate *directly* on the affairs of Spain, yet their *indirect* influence was not the less felt, for they occupied our attention, excited distrust among the members of the government, and broke that unity which is so necessary in administrative action, and in a parliamentary majority.

The truth is that we had no power in the ministry. Every thing was managed between M. de Corbière and M. de Villèle. With marvellous dexterity M. de Villèle revised the accounts and corrected the blunders of his colleagues. As to foreign affairs he candidly confessed that he knew

nothing about them, but in this he was far too modest. When we mentioned to him the difficulties we encountered in London or in Vienna, his answer was : “ Well, my dear Sir, why should we trouble our heads about what they say ? Let us pursue our own course, and look after our finances. But you must arrange this matter, my dear Sir : that is your business.” This indifference amused us ; but the observations of M. Metternich and Mr. Canning sometimes made us pass restless nights.

The royalists accused us of doing nothing for them. How could we do any thing ? It was not in our power either to take or to ask.

The councils held with the King and the president increased the burthen of our labours. It was requisite to prepare budgets, and to devote attention to the framing of new laws, such as that of the Septenniality, which was our particular work.

The American debt, of which the minister from the Congress annually demanded payment, obliged us to look back to the work of our predecessors. Putting out of the question the non-executed treaty of the cession of Louisiana, it might be that we were indebted to America to the amount of five or six millions. But if, before the president’s speech, this sum was, strictly speaking,

claimable, after the speech we certainly owed nothing. We can never be convinced that we are bound to pay any thing to those who insult us, unless the persons so insulting us first discharge their debt of honour. A nation no more than an individual should submit to be insulted. France gave liberty to the United States; and she has not sunk so low but that she may oblige them to remember it.

In the course of events we had to send a mechanical throne to Pius VII., to direct attention to a conclave to look after our legations to little states, whose friendship we were anxious to preserve, and to keep a watchful eye on Portugal, whose movements were so dangerous to us.

We planned some new arrangements in reference to commercial consuls. We received from one of our clerks a large packet of notes relating to the persons employed in the department of foreign affairs: the packet still remains unopened; we have not read one of the notes, and never shall. M. d'Hauterive, under the supposition that we were hostile to the Septenality, sent us a memorial drawn up in a spirit quite opposite to our opinion. We returned for answer that we were for the Septenality, and in the course of the day M. d'Hauterive sent us another memorial favourable to that measure. This amused us.

For secret service money we required acquittances. All our accounts were submitted to the King and approved by him, as M. de Villèle's letter attests. Electors cards having been presented to persons in our offices, we forbade them to proceed to their colleges unless they paid their rates, under pain of dismissal. As to those who were furnished with the required qualifications, and who begged us to point out a candidate, we directed them to vote according to their consciences.

The Black Cabinet was not yet abolished : this miserable invention of the old monarchy had been successively adopted by the Directory and by Bonaparte. All that concerned our department was sent to us : we saw only some despatches of the *corps diplomatique*. We could have imagined their contents without reading them.

A letter from a coxcomb in Vienna by chance fell into our hands. It was addressed to an unfortunate woman in Paris. This was supposed to belong to the department of foreign affairs.

We had no fixed hours for granting audiences. Our office door was always open, and any one was free to enter.

Among the host of needy intriguers who advanced in procession towards the Rue des Capucines, there were several mysterious looking per-

sonages, closely buttoned up in brown coats, who looked like moving boxes filled with secret papers. Next came unpractised and inexperienced spies, who, forgetting that silence was indispensable to their calling, babbled the most extravagant tales imaginable. After these came dealers in dreams ; but we would buy none ; we had plenty to sell. Several visitors placed in our hands huge memorials, furnished with notes explicative and corroborative. Then appeared ladies, who made love with romances, as romances were formerly made with love. Some sued for places, and others begged for money. All denounced each other, and not unfrequently seemed on the point of coming to blows. In dress and appearance some were dirty and miserable, others eccentric. There was a venerable prelate very anxious to consult us. He was a man of rigid morals, and sincere piety ; but he struggled in vain against a parsimonious nature. At night in his chamber he would allow himself no other light than that of the moon ; and, if he had had the misfortune to lose his soul, I verily believe he would not have paid a sous to recover it.

Noble gallants, with their hair dressed in the style of the old knights of Malta, told us their tales of love, which, by-the-bye, were all strangely tinged with politics. Men who were recommended

to us, as persons animated by enthusiastic feelings and religious sentiments, honoured us with their advice. These men might possibly have been dangerous, if they had not been cowards.

We received requests for interviews from certain bravos, worthy of the reign of terror, who offered us their services in the way of assassination.

On one occasion we were visited by a stock-jobber. Without ceremony, and without any sort of oratorical preface, he informed us that he was connected with several *respectable houses*; that if it were possible to communicate to him telegraphic despatches, my Excellency might be a considerable gainer, without the slightest disadvantage to the public funds. We stared at this man with amazement, and then desired him to walk out at the door, if he did not prefer being thrown out at the window. He did not hesitate in making his choice; and he stared at us in his turn, as if he had beheld an *ozage*. We rang the bell, and the gentleman took his leave with his proffered million. No doubt he thought us strangely ignorant and stupid. Who could have known of our good fortune?

Had we taken advantage of it, should we now have been the less respected? The only difference is, that instead of being in straitened

circumstances, we should have been in affluence, we should have had a splendid house, and should have been giving dinners. We should still have been called *Monseigneur* by courtesy, and we should have passed for a statesman.

Fortune, though thus driven away, returned, but this time in the form of a young lady. Being under age, she could not travel without the consent of her relations, and she begged of us to furnish her with a passport from the department of foreign affairs for Geneva, so that she might dispense with an application to the minister of the police. She said she had something of a private nature to communicate to us which concerned *our interests*, if we would be pleased to hear her, though she confessed, with an air of modesty, that her conduct might seem extraordinary. We thanked her for the confidence with which she was willing to honour us ; but as we could not possibly have any *interest* in her proposed communication, we would spare her the trouble of gratifying our curiosity. We added, that she would experience no difficulty in obtaining her passport at the police department, and that her friends would never be so cruel as to prevent her from visiting the Alps. So saying, we politely ushered the lady to the door.

Next came a man whose countenance and

deportment betrayed embarrassment. He turned his hat round and round as he held it in his hands, and occasionally brushed it with his sleeve. But nothing could be more unembarrassed than this man's inventive faculties, which he had exercised in schemes for raising loans. He unfolded to us his plans somewhat at length : they were ingenious, though not remarkable for clearness. They betrayed here and there a little learned obscurity, from which no doubt the schemer could easily disengage himself.

To protect ourselves against the swarm of flies, who buz about wherever there is any thing to be picked up, we had not, like M. Choiseul-Gouffier's Turkish admiral, a tame lion to smell the hands of our visitors ; but we had a little negro boy who used to run about and annoy them, and sometimes by his noise interrupt their conversation. He was sent to us from Egypt by our friend, M. Drovetti. He was the son of a prince. We called him *Morgan* (the Pearl), a name of endearment given to him by his mother, who had been murdered by the Pacha's soldiers. The boy was about the age of the Duke de Bordeaux, who was sometimes the playmate of the young orphan prince, deposed from his ebony throne. Poor Morgan died prematurely at Rome, where we had placed him in the Propaganda, in the hope that

he would one day or other become an Archbishop of Ethiopia. Morgan, his mother's pearl, now adorns that mother in heaven. The little black prince, like the little white prince, his playfellow, was the sport of Fate. We would rather have been seated with him, beneath a spreading palm tree, at the source of the Nile, than have seen him running after us in the hotel of minister for foreign affairs.

In addition to our visitors we were annoyed by a multitude of letters. Some were of rather a menacing character, especially previously to and at the commencement of the war. They spoke the truth. They were calculated to impede us in freely carrying out our plans, and maintaining our diplomatic correspondence. The following is a specimen of one of these letters.

“ The army of the faith excites horror every where. No person of any note or distinction comes to us. The artillery is not to be depended on. It is wholly composed of Bonapartists or Republicans. Next to the *sournois* (the artillery) the *taguans* (the chasseurs) are in the first line of operation.

“ *It is very evident that you wish to regain the boundary of the Rhine, for you will not listen to any report.*

“ Why do you make yourself angry because

M. de Villèle* has converted the Bourse into a gambling-house?

“ If you should accomplish all you wish in Spain, are we to be rewarded here by having at the head of affairs the Abbé de La Meunais, Branchet,† and the rest of the priests. The *Drapeau Blanc* attacks you every morning, and takes no pains to disguise its hopes.

“ Do you know that all points of difference are likely to be brought to an adjustment; that the republicans, as well as the pure Bonapartists, agree as to the necessity of a political sacrifice, and that all consent to M . . . ? It is a great error thus to bring about a concurrence of opinion; but there is no remedy; it is done.

“ Colonel M . . . has just finished an excellent caricature. It represents our army marching

* I allow the name of M. de Villèle to stand here, because, after having had so many millions at his command, he quitted office without augmenting his patrimony. Generally speaking, the men of the restoration, at least those who entered upon their public career with the restoration, retired with pure hands. Having alluded to M. de Villèle, I may mention the warmth with which I defended him when certain persons hoped to pay their court to me by attacking him.

† My illustrious compatriot will be very much astonished to find himself ranked here among the absolutists who were to govern France.

into the defiles of the mountains. The Spaniards are perched upon the heights, exclaiming to our troops — “ Enter, gentlemen, pray enter ; *you do not pay till you depart.*”

“ The English will be in Portugal before we have taken up our position on the Ebro. A strong opinion prevails against the war ; and irresolution augments the prevailing evils.

“ May not that vast cobweb called the French army be torn to pieces by the Spaniards, after the manner of Baylen ; and may not that idiot Ferdinand allow himself to be embarked at Cadiz like a bale of goods ?

“ Who would have said that the entrance into Madrid would cause a depression of the funds to the extent of two francs ? yet this was foreseen by those who affirm that that will be the commencement of the war, of your difficulties, and of the impossibility of treating.”

We received other letters which tended to impede our political labours. They gave us occupation, less fatiguing, it is true, but they nevertheless encroached on our time and attention. People addressed themselves to us to obtain favours, which we felt pleasure in rendering or soliciting. We experienced no little gratification in proving to those whose political hostility to us

was well known, that the supporters of legitimacy, when free from the influence of passion and prejudice, could be kind, sincere and polite.

For example, M. Saint-Elme addressed to us a very generous letter in behalf of M. Barginet ; and M. Caste took an opportunity of proving to us his belief in our sincere attachment to the liberty of opinion. Two poets, M. Lebrun and M. Arnault, expressed a hope that we interested ourselves in the fate of their elegant poetic labours. We have convinced them that they were not mistaken. Finally, we received several letters from M. Benjamin Constant. There is one circumstance which affords us great consolation, viz. : that the men whom we at first thought most hostile to us, have become our friends : for example M. M. Benjamin Constant, Beranger and Carrel. In proof of this assertion, we annex to the end of this work some letters from those celebrated men. They are a present which we offer to their country.

Thus, amidst councils, speeches, debates in the chambers, plans of law, petitions, complaints, audiences, visits, dinners and balls (for we were obliged to give even balls)—thus occupied and perplexed in a hundred different ways, we pursued our operations in Spain : we spent the chief part of our nights in writing, and we occasionally found time

to scribble a few pages of our *Memoires*, seeking in the recollection of our wandering life some image of this present life: *Nebulæ per inane volantes*. In fine, as we were anxious to direct a little of our attention to every thing, we opened a correspondence with the inhabitants of St. Malo, requesting that they would grant us leave to be interred on the beach, which was the scene of our boyish pastimes. This negociation lasted longer than the Spanish war. Few ministers, and still fewer triumphant ministers direct their attention to their graves: every one seeks amusement in his own way.

It is now time to lay before the reader the correspondence relating to Spain. This correspondence refers to the events of which we have already given an analysis, and it extends to the period of Ferdinand's deliverance. A ministerial cabinet will thus be thrown open to the public in the lifetime of those who conducted affairs, and in the presence of some of the witnesses of those affairs. The secrets of men are so futile, men themselves are so insignificant, kings and kingdoms are so trivial, that it is not worth while to envelope them in mystery. When, by dint of inquiry, we discover that some particular event was brought about by chance, by a *femme de chambre*, by a clerk, by a conversation between

two persons previously unknown, what is gained by the *manifestation* of this great truth? Whether events are brought about this way or that, it matters little: men are fleeting beings; the transitory occurrences of their lives are lost sight of in the long life of human nature. Nothing appears to us more ludicrous than the important taciturnity of state secrets.

CHAP. LVII.

Diplomatic letters.

THE subjoined letters are almost all our own. We have introduced among them some letters from kings, ministers, generals, and ambassadors, merely for the purpose of connecting the links of the chain, showing the reader the opinions which were entertained in different countries and in different courts, and explaining some passages in our own correspondence. It will be matter of curiosity to those who love the study of history to see what was written, during a memorable period, by the men who conducted the affairs of Europe. In the few letters addressed to ourselves we have suppressed a few passages which appeared too personal in reference to some individuals. Thus in the series of letters from M. de la Ferronays we have cancelled some observations which unjust prejudice suggested to the

Emperor Alexander respecting the administration of M. de Villèle.

This correspondence almost commences with the letters from Mr. Canning. I have already expressed my admiration of these elegant effusions of talent and imagination, which bear traces of a rivalry highly complimentary to ourselves. The British minister sought to draw us upon ground on which we refused to combat. He feigned ignorance of the *French question*; and he threw himself on the war of succession, of which we had not said a word. He spoke ill of Ferdinand, of whom we thought still worse than he did, as the reader may have perceived from some of our reflections on the diplomatic documents of Verona. He directed our attention, for the purpose of alarming us, to the artificial device of the cabinet of Vienna, which was reminding Spain of her greatness, at the moment of her dependence on Austria; a piece of trickery on the part of M. Gentz, which had not escaped our notice. Mr. Canning alluded to the revolution of 1688, hoping, like a good Englishman, that Spain would follow the example of that revolution. He supposed that if the Spanish government, which we accused of excesses, had recriminated upon us, we should have been not a little embarrassed.

It was not possible for us to enter into a controversy on these different points, because on the one hand, they were distinct from the main question, and on the other, we could not reveal to Mr. Canning our real opinions respecting the Spanish war, nor the necessity that we should seize the opportunity of attaching the Peninsula to France, from which she ought never to be separated. Thus in our correspondence, Mr. Canning is the poet and we are the man of business. The letters of Mr. Canning are long, elegant, and fascinating; mine are brief, dry, and direct to their object. The eloquence of our illustrious friend wanted nothing but success.

Since Mr. Canning, though opposed to us, honoured us with his friendship and consideration; since Cobbett, at the other extremity of the ladder, declared that we were doing our duty as a Frenchman; since sovereigns, important by their influence over the fate of mankind, were forced to concede some value to our labours; since M. M. Benjamin Constant, Carrel and Beranger admit that our ideas were applicable to circumstances,—we are encouraged to believe that we have not been entirely useless to our fellow creatures. But these feelings of vanity gain no hold upon us; and we blush for them, the moment after we have given them utterance.

M. CHATEAUBRIAND TO M. GENTZ.

Paris, December 30th, 1822.

I am here installed in the post of minister. Prince Metternich will, perhaps, communicate to you the letter in which I did myself the honour to inform him of all the details. Do not forsake me; I am on the breach. I have to contend against men and things: support me, I entreat you. If I am seconded by the favourable sentiments of the cabinets of Europe, I shall feel myself stronger. You are aware, Sir, that I have reproached the foreign powers with long injustice towards the royalists. Sometimes you have regarded us as old barons of the thirteenth century; at other times, you have pronounced us to be innovators of the eighteenth century: all this has operated to our injury. Allow me to be a constitutional royalist: be not alarmed either at my conduct or my language. I know France, and I know the only course that will lead us to an order of things calculated to secure the honour of my country and the repose of Europe. You, Sir, have promised me your friendship; I solicit it, and proofs of it will be very useful to me at the present moment. You know the sentiments of esteem and consideration with which I remain, &c.

CHATEAUBRIAND.

MR. CANNING TO M. CHATEAUBRIAND.

Permit me, my dear Vicomte, to return to you the congratulatory compliments which you recently presented to me. You, like myself, are now Secretary for Foreign Affairs. You know how much I was gratified by the prospect of having to treat with you here as French ambassador: judge then if I am now happy under present circumstances, which place us, in reference to each other, in a situation to co-operate still more effectively for the welfare, the mutual unity, and interest of our respective countries.

I beg, my dear Vicomte, that you will remember me to M. de Villèle. Present my compliments to him, and assure him how sincerely I sympathise in his success, and how much I rejoice at his decision; a decision which, in my opinion, has saved not only France, but perhaps Europe, from a crisis such as they are not in a condition to sustain.

The work of peace, which M. de Villèle has so well begun, remains to be consolidated. For that object count upon me in any way in which I can be useful, and believe me always, my dear Vicomte,

Your Excellency's most obedient,

GEORGE CANNING.

P. S. This, my dear Vicomte, is *not* the last time I shall write to you, (for I intend, with your permission, to do so as often as the course of affairs may require,) but perhaps this is the last time I shall write to you in any other language than English.

M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND TO MR. CANNING.

Paris, January 2nd, 1823.

I flatter myself with the belief, Sir, that there is some similarity in our destinies, which must contribute to strengthen the bonds which unite us both as friends and statesmen. I am convinced that we shall come to an understanding on practical politics. You detest the radicals as much as I detest the Jacobins; and if France and England would resolve to discourage these parties in all countries, we should speedily put an end to the alarms of the Continent.

There is only one circumstance which I regret, Sir, and that is, that the eminent post to which the King has raised me obliges me to abandon the no less honourable one in which I had the pleasure to see you frequently. May the friendship which unites us serve to maintain a reciprocal feeling of amity between our two countries! Until the nomination of my successor in London shall afford me an opportunity of officially thanking the King your master for the kindness he deigned to show me, I beg of you to lay at his feet the homage of my profound respect and gratitude. You know, Sir, the sentiments of esteem, attachment, and admiration which I shall cherish for you as long as I live.

In this letter I have suppressed those titles and compliments with which friendship is always anxious to dispense. I beg you will treat me in the same way, and in this manner we may discuss great affairs of state in the language of familiar friendship.

CHATEAUBRIAND.

M. DE MARCELLUS TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

London, January 10th, 1823.

Monsieur Vicomte,

I lost no time in presenting to Mr. Canning the assurances contained in your last letter. I mentioned that you, like himself, wished to enter upon a private correspondence, the result of which might be advantageous to the cause and the principles which you both mutually defend. I added that he could write to you in English. He readily acceded to this plan of private correspondence. He drew a comparison between his political existence and yours; and ingeniously pointed out the striking resemblance between them. He concluded by observing that everything tended to create a close union between you. "And did M. Chateaubriand," pursued he, "*also* enter office against the wish of the King?" I replied, that having long lived out of France, I could not know anything of the feelings prevailing in the interior of the Tuileries; but that there existed another point of resemblance between you and him, viz. that since your mutual entrance into office, the Kings of France and England had evinced towards each other a marked degree of cordiality.

"We must derive great advantage from our union in present circumstances," said Mr. Canning. "We may act in accordance at Madrid, without appearing to have any understanding with each other; and we may each keep within the line of our respective interests. By this means I hope we shall succeed in maintaining peace,

and the happiness of the world will be our work. If M. de Chateaubriand approve this plan, let him tell me in his private letters what he expects of me, specifying also what he wishes on the part of the Spaniards. I will reply by candidly expressing my thoughts. We will then combine our ideas and plans. We will prepare our plan of operations at Madrid. To succeed, we must act simultaneously, but separately."

I had previously, Monsieur le Vicomte, expressed your desire to commence this intimate correspondence. If I may be permitted to communicate to you my opinion, I should say that you might turn to good account this direct intercourse and the high esteem which I observe Mr. Canning cherishes for you. I am persuaded that by making allowance for his position—by acknowledging what his new situation demands in reference to the parliament and trade,—by regretting officially (since it must be so) *the exclusively French* principle of the Spanish question, but at the same time admitting confidentially something of that principle, which, at bottom, is honourable to us, you would obtain the sincere and effective concurrence of Mr. Canning at Madrid.

I speak to you, Monsieur de Vicomte, with great freedom, submitting without reserve my ideas to your approval or disapproval. In writing to you, I put no restraint on the expression of my thoughts. With every assurance of boundless fidelity in the performance of the new duties you may prescribe to me, and with expressions of respectful attachment,

I remain, &c.

LE VICOMTE DE MARCELLUS.

MR. CANNING TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

London, January 11th, 1823.

Our letters having crossed each other, I will not stop to consider whose turn it is to write next; but will show you at once, my dear M. de Chateaubriand, that I accept your challenge, delivered to me by M. Marcellus, and avail myself of the condition which you are good enough to annex to our correspondence, by writing in the language in which alone I am sure of expressing myself correctly, and which you understand as well as I, and your King better than either of us.

If you ask me my opinion, I give it you in the words of our Lord Falkland in the time of our Charles I.: "Peace!—peace!—peace!" The war between France and Spain would not, to be sure, be a civil war, but it would be as nearly so as a war between two nations can be; and it would perhaps be the parent of war *plus quam civilia*; which might again divide these two nations against themselves, even if others did not follow their example. Am I for peace, because I hate revolutions less than you do? You give me full credit for showing your invincible hostility to them. But it is because the lovers of revolutions of all countries pray for war, that I am most anxious for the prevention of it. That class of politicians has a marvellous sagacity in discovering what could best promote their objects; and I confess, that in addition to my faith in their instinct, I arrive, by reasoning, at the same conclusion, that a war in Europe at this moment, against the revolutionary principle, would shake the monarchy of France, and its

yet unconfirmed institutions, to their foundations. What shook so fearfully your institutions would no doubt try ours; but ours have root enough to stand the trial. And wrapping ourselves up, as we should be wise enough to do, in a strict and imperturbable neutrality, depend upon it, we might, if we were so disposed, turn your distractions to our own account: but depend upon it we have no such disposition. Rather, much rather, will we exhaust our efforts to preserve the peace on which we think your prosperity depends.

The reply to the Duc de Montmorency's answer to our offer of mediation, which you will receive from M. de Marcellus by this messenger, is adapted to what we conceived to be M. de Villèle's policy. M. de Montmorency was for making the question of peace or war a question "*toute Européenne*." M. de Villèle had made it a question for France herself, and he, as it appears to us, was right, as he thus placed the whole management into your own hands.

Our note adopts this view: I trust there is nothing presents a perspective in it that can embarrass you. You know we must keep our own case clear. You will have heard of Lord Fitzroy Somerset's journey to Madrid. His mission is one of counsel and exhortation: I trust it will be well received. If he passed through Paris, as I enjoined him to do, without seeing your Excellency or M. de Villèle, it was because I *was sure* that his reception at Madrid would be cordial, in proportion as he was known to be *our* missionary and *yours*. Sir C. Stuart can tell you that, even since Lord. F. Somerset was despatched, I have had fresh reason to be satisfied that such is the temper at Madrid; and that all our

endeavours would be spoiled by the notion of our acting *in concert* with France.

There is enough for the present. And for the present then, mon cher Vicomte, adieu !

G. CANNING.

M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND TO M. DE LA GARDE.

Paris, Sunday, January 12th, 1823.

Lord Fitzroy set out yesterday without the despatch. To-day (the 12th) a courier has brought us your despatches of the 5th January, Nos. 2 and 3, with three packets and two private letters to M. de Villèle, the one dated the 5th, the other the 6th. I have consulted the Cabinet, and by its advice I recommend you, Monsieur le Comte, no longer to defer speaking to M. de San Miguel touching the violation of territory. You will inform him of the new infraction of which we have to complain; you will tell him that we will be satisfied with no partial reparation; that there must be no more exchanging of despatches, no more promises that end in nothing. You will inform him that this violation of the right of nations is a further proof that it is impossible for us to remain in our present position; that a complete change of the order of things in Spain will alone satisfy us on what we owe at once to our honour and safety. In short, you will declare, M. le Comte, that if the change is not prompt and decisive, the King's Government will be compelled to recal you, and that you may momentarily expect such an order.

It is said here at Paris, that news is arrived from

Madrid of the 7th, that is, of a date posterior to that which we have received from you.

It would seem by this news that the letters of the four courts have been referred to a committee of the Cortes, charged to examine and reply to them. Suffer not yourself, M. le Comte, to be imposed on by evasive measures, which have no other end but to gain time and conclude nothing. If this commission exists, will it make its report quickly?—will it consent to changes which will insure the repose of France and Europe? If it contents itself with saying that the defects of the Spanish constitution shall *one day* be inquired into, are we to be satisfied with this answer? undoubtedly not. We must have something explicit and clear, for it is impossible to open the Chambers without telling them our situation, and whether we are to have peace or war. Put no trust in England in this matter. She will not really second you until she is convinced that France fears no one. Be firm with Sir W. A'Court, and show him that we are at length tired of useless sacrifices.

Your colleagues of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have orders to retire, whatever may be the determination of the Cortes, short of a real change. It belongs not to us to weaken their resolutions. Leave them to act according to their orders. You will receive herewith a packet of despatches from the three courts for your colleagues. If you should have departed ere you receive this despatch, commit the packet to the flames. Make all your preparations for departure so as to quit Madrid without delay, on the first order that the King shall charge me to transmit to you.

CHATEAUBRIAND.

M. DE LA GARDE TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

Madrid, January 13th, 1823.

Monsieur le Vicomte,

Mr. Jackson has just informed me, that after a note at midnight from M. de San Miguel to Sir W. A'Court, to solicit the good offices of England between France and Spain, he immediately set out as envoy.

Sir W. A'Court had already informed me that he had laboured indirectly to bring the Spanish government to this step, and it is probable that the above note was the result of the secret sitting of the Cortes held yesterday.

I have no time to obtain more circumstantial evidence, and having scarcely sufficient to write what I know, I must content myself with hastily tracing these few lines, in order not to suffer the occasion to pass.

Yesterday, before resolving into a secret committee, the Cortes received from M. de San Miguel the declaration, that the government is occupied in drawing up a manifesto, declaring to Europe its sentiments and principles. Supposing that such a circumstance involves me in the necessity of demanding my passports, I entreat your Excellency to prescribe the line of conduct I am to follow with our consuls.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

LA GARDE.

M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND TO MR. CANNING.

Paris, January 14th, 1823.

It is with real satisfaction, my dear Sir, that I have received the first letters of a correspondence which

makes me acquainted with such a man as yourself, and who has the power to be of such service to your country. To follow your example, I will enter at once upon the question of peace or war, considered abstractedly. No doubt of the incalculable advantages of peace, and no doubt, again, that we should make every sacrifice to obtain it.

I am, then, in theory, perfectly of your opinion; but with me this is not, or at least is no longer, the question. Can we, in the circumstances in which we are placed, avoid a rupture with Spain, if no thorough change takes place in that country? Can we longer remain in that unsettled political condition in which I found men's minds when the King confided to me the portfolio of foreign affairs? Can we, in the turbulent state of opinion in France, open the session without having decided what course to take? Let us first examine this. You know better than I do, that absolute principles have little application in politics; in human affairs there are necessities, and whatever the efforts of statesmen, they cannot pass the bounds of possibility.

War, say you, will overturn institutions yet in their infancy. Perhaps so; but a government may perish in two ways: the one by open violence, the other by dishonour. If revolutionary Spain is suffered to boast of having made monarchical France tremble; if the white cockade is to retire before the descamisados, people will remember the power of the empire and the triumphs of the tri-colored cockade; now, calculate the effect of this remembrance on the cause of the Bourbons.

But war, if it is to take place, (which God forbid!) will it be as dangerous as you seem to think? The spirit

of the people here is martial; our increasing population will supply us, if we need it, with more than a million of the finest soldiers on the Continent; our finances are in so flourishing a state that the budget of this year proves that we have, in the excess of our receipts, the means of commencing the campaign without levying a single fresh impost. We may be at least allowed to hope for a preliminary success in Spain. Success will attach the army to the King for ever, and cause all France to fly to arms. It is incredible what may be effected amongst us by the word *honour*!—the hour that compels us to fall back on this great national resource, gives us the power to move the world. No one can longer profit by our cabals and misfortunes.

But peace will be best for all this, and peace is in your hands. If, in following in the steps of the continental powers, you had conceived it necessary to hold strong language to the Spanish government; if you had said confidentially, “We are not against you, neither are we for you. Your political system is monstrous: it justly alarms Europe, and above all, France; change it, or reckon on no support, on no assistance in arms or money from England;” I do not doubt that all would at once have been well, and England would have had the glory of preserving the peace of Europe. Does this means of safety still remain to us? I fear that the crisis is too near at hand, and that we are now confined within limits too narrow.

I must now tell you, my dear Sir, that I have received with pain your note in reply to the answer of M. de Montmorency. The idea that first occurred to me was, not to answer this note myself, in order to avoid new

subjects of dispute ; but the cabinet is of a different opinion. As mention is made in this letter of the allies and the congress at Verona, and as my predecessor communicated to the ambassadors of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, the first proposition of the Duke of Wellington, I find myself compelled to make them acquainted with the sequel. These papers may come before parliament ; this may increase the acerbity which at present prevails in diplomatic relations ; private recriminations between the courts of St. James and the Tuileries appear to me to be of little use ; all which, however, would quickly be laid aside in the course of events. I should have been very glad to see Lord Fitzroy Somerset in his way to Paris. We would have consulted on the common safety. If there is a feeling against us at Madrid, be assured there is a no less powerful one against you. The rough manner in which you have just done yourself justice has wounded the Spanish pride. What we had best do is to endeavour to insure rational liberty to Spain, by snatching her from the dominion of clubs and revolutionary anarchy.

CHATEAUBRIAND.

M. GENTZ TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

Monsieur le Vicomte,

The event which forms the subject of the letter with which your Grace has honoured me, and which I have received with the most lively gratitude, is in my eyes one of the happiest that the vicissitudes of good and bad for-

tune, through which we are condemned to seek the road to safety, have brought upon Europe.

I should regard it as such, Mons. le Vicomte, if, in order to judge of it, I had only those notions which I share with all the world, those principles and sentiments which you have engraven in letters worthy of immortality, and certain to enjoy as large a share of it as the works of men can pretend to. But besides having had the inappreciable advantage of hearing you discuss practical questions of the highest importance, I am acquainted with the application you make of those noble principles to the problems we have to resolve, and which are not always regarded in the same point of view by statesmen agreed among themselves on the fundamental principles.

I may therefore flatter myself in possessing all the requisites necessary to form a correct opinion on the system that the French government will follow in an epoch the most decisive to its future existence.

The affair of Spain, of whatever importance it may be, is, after all, but an isolated point in the mighty career which opens before you; but a presentiment which possesses me, and to which I yield as if it were an inspiration, tells me, that under your auspices and those of M. de Villèle, we shall arrive (for France is us) at results which in the midst of our painful struggle we had regarded as far above our hopes.

My personal opinion would here be of little value, but since it is entirely shared by Prince Metternich, it would seem to acquire great weight. Never yet has this enlightened minister felt the high confidence in the supreme direction of the affairs of France with which I now see him penetrated, and *certes* your first despatch to M. de

Caraman was of a nature fully to justify this confidence.

I have observed with much satisfaction, Mons. le Vicomte, that in this document you have often made use of the term *continental alliance*. Nothing appears to me more just than to substitute the words (at least in the confidential language of cabinets) for so many vague terms, which at best serve but to typify the nothingness of the engagements to which they relate. If peace and good order can yet be solidly re-established in Europe, it is only the sincere and active union of the great continental powers that can conduct us thereto. All is true, all is real in this association; in spite of the diversity of forms, interests are common, wants are reciprocal. With talents even of the first order at the head of its government, France cannot consolidate itself by an isolated march, and God will ever preserve it from choosing that in which it would be joined with England; and with regard to us, although tranquil under the ægis of our old institutions, how can we long reckon on this blessing, if France renders us not, by the wisdom of its councils and the success of its measures, that moral support that it has a right to expect on our part? The whole science of politics seems to me to be included in these simple truths; further inquiry is not worth the trouble bestowed on it. Your sojourn at Verona, M. le Vicomte, should have convinced you that Austria, as well as Prussia and Russia, has ceased to aim at subordinate objects, to occupy herself in views of private interest or vulgar ambition; that amongst us all is elevated to pursuits of a far different character; and I regard as one of the happiest results of the last congress, that a man of your authority should

have discovered there what will enable him to do us this justice among his own countrymen.

Revolutionary writers celebrate with transport the dissolution of the great alliance, and talk as if we were on the point of a complete broil with the powers that composed it. They should be made to understand (and who can better do this than the respectable journals of France?) that they deceive themselves, or they deceive the public; that the opposition manifested by England on questions, without doubt, of great importance, is not an attitude hostile to the allies; and that if the reunion of the powers against the progress of disorganisation has sustained a real loss in the refusal of England to take part in certain general measures, this loss is more than counterbalanced by the strengthening of the tie among the continental. This observation will suffice to destroy two-thirds of the sophisms and menaces of M. Bignon.

I will trespass no longer on your Excellency's valuable time, and I will never forget the rule I ought to observe in this respect. If, however, questions should arise particularly interesting, upon which I should feel it my duty to address to you any observations, I flatter myself they will be received with courtesy. It is superfluous to add, that if, on any occasion whatever, your Excellency should be inclined to avail yourself of my zeal and goodwill, I shall be most happy to offer them.

I have the honour to be, with every sentiment of admiration and respect, &c.

GENTZ.

Vienna, January 16th, 1823.

M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND TO M. DE LA GARDE.

Paris, January 18th, 1823.

I have received, M. le Vicomte, under the date of 10th January the despatch (No. 5) that you have done me the honour to address to me. In doing justice to the measured terms in which the note of M. de San Miguel to the Duke of San Lorenzo is written, the council of ministers has not been able to conceal that the Spanish government rejects every conciliatory measure. Not only does the government give no hope of an amelioration, which might have been expected from the feelings which have so long united the French and Spaniards in love to their monarchs and rational liberty, but France must withdraw its army of observation, and repulse foreigners who should ask an asylum in it.

France is little accustomed to listen to such language; she pardons its haughtiness, however, in consideration of the actual state of fermentation of Spain.

We will never renounce the glorious privilege we inherit from our ancestors: whoever touches French soil is free, and enjoys the rights of an inviolable hospitality. The victims of the troubles which agitate Spain have taken refuge amongst us; they have been welcomed with the regard that misfortune claims; but they have not been permitted to continue to bear arms, and the right of nations has been scrupulously respected.

Has Spain acted thus with France? We could name individuals among the subjects of his most Christian Majesty, to whom the Spanish government has promised

employment in corps destined to fight against their country. We might have recriminated. We have been silent for the sake of peace.

On the other hand, is it well to demand the dissolution of the army of observation, just as the Spanish constitutional troops have twice violated the French territory? I transmitted to you, M. le Vicomte, in my last despatch, the official proofs of this deplorable event.

The state of confusion in which Spain is, compromises our essential interests; she declares she will afford no remedy to this; she even requires us to renounce the precautions which her resolution has obliged us to take. It is painful to be compelled to dwell upon such inconsistencies.

In his solicitude for the prosperity of the Spanish nation, and the happiness of a country governed by a prince of his family, his most Christian Majesty had wished that his minister should remain at Madrid after the departure of the *chargés d'affaires* of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. His last wishes have not been listened to; his final hope has been disappointed. The demon of revolution, which so long desolated France, has swayed the councils of Spain. Well! we call all Europe to witness: let it say if we have not done all it was possible to do to preserve those relations with Spain that we are forced to sever only with the most poignant regret. But now that all hope is gone, that the expression of sentiments the most moderate has only drawn upon us fresh provocations, it is no longer consistent, M. le Vicomte, either with the dignity of the King, or the honour of France, that you remain at

Madrid; consequently the King orders you to demand passports for yourself and the whole of your legation, and to depart without losing a moment as soon as they shall be delivered to you.

You would do well to instruct our commercial agents in the ports and cities of Spain, of your departure, by a circular. I will put them in possession of the King's will when your recal shall be officially known here. As soon as you shall touch the French soil, you had better send forward an express to instruct me of your arrival.

You are authorised, M. le Comte, on demanding your passports, to give a copy of this letter to M. de San Miguel.

I have the honour to be, M. le Comte, &c.

CHATEAUBRIAND.

M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND TO M. DE LA GARDE.

Paris, January 20th, 1823.

I received yesterday evening, M. le Comte, by Mr. Jackson, your letter of the 13th, in which you tell me that M. de San Miguel has transmitted a note to Sir Wm. A'Court, for the purpose of *soliciting the good offices of England between France and Spain*.

I hasten to despatch another courier, (who, however, I trust will not find you at Madrid,) to tell you that this new incident must not prevent you from executing your orders in demanding your passports and departing forthwith.

Your presence is an evil which must cease; all that is proposed to you at Madrid, is only what the Duke

of Wellington has submitted to us at Paris. It is only wished to protract the business, to involve us in vague negociation without results. The cabinet of St. James wants to play the part of mediator, and increase its influence in Spain at our expense. The envoys of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, are treated with indignity, and we ourselves are addressed in language scarcely less rough, because it is wished to separate us from the continental alliance, and render us the suppliants of England with the Cortes ; nothing of this sort will accord either with our policy or our dignity.

Depart then without hesitation, M. le Comte. If Spain is of good faith, and will really treat, M. de San Miguel will address himself directly to the French government, without mediation. M. de San Miguel can write to me by a courier, and I shall have the honour of replying to him after having received the King's orders.

I have desired you, M. le Comte, to write a circular to our consuls to announce your departure. I shall myself prepare instructions to be sent to them in the event of war breaking out.

This letter is for you alone, and must be communicated to no one ; if it finds you still at Madrid, and you are asked why you depart while a negociation is pending, you will answer that France, which cannot listen to a mediator, rejects not, however, the good offices of England, but that it is directly and with me that M. de San Miguel must treat, and that, in short, your orders will not permit you to remain at Madrid.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CHATEAUBRIAND.

MR. CANNING TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

London, January 21st, 1823.

A thousand thanks, M. Vicomte, for your long, frank, and friendly answer to my letters. I lose not a day in replying to it; because, though I have (as you may well believe) enough of official business upon my hands at this moment, I know nothing in the whole range of the correspondence in Europe, that compares in importance with a just understanding between our two governments; and I know no foundation so sure that can be built for such an understanding, as on a constant and unreserved communication with you.

To begin with that part of your letter which relates to *our* language to Spain, and to the importance which you attach to our holding a common language with France; a language I mean (for I perceive that I have expressed myself ambiguously) common with that which France holds to Spain;—I will tell you at once quite fairly, that I agree with you on the former point, but presume to differ on the latter.

The language which you put into our mouths as that which you say you wish we had employed in speaking to Spain, what is it but the language which we *have* actually employed? But through the Spanish *chargé d'affaires* here, and through Sir W. A'Court at Madrid, Spain knows distinctly what we think on the impracticability of the constitution of 1812, and of the expediency of promising a revision of it: and these opinions are de-

clared with less reserve, in phrase, through Lord Somerset, who carries with him, as his whole instruction, a memorandum from the Duke of Wellington, in which, if your very words are not set down, there is nothing of your sentiments that is not expressed.—Do you believe that Spain “*compte sur nous pour des secours d’armes et d’argent?*” Not she, I promise you. Do you imagine that, knowing we shall not be “*contre,*” she has reason to flatter herself that we shall be “*pour elle*” in a war with France? Be assured she is under no such misapprehension. If you harbour such, after having seen us, in a manner which you characterise (and I do mean to say characterise unjustly) as “*si rude,*” do ourselves right against Spain by force, at a moment when we risked, by so doing, the chance and the consequent misinterpretation of a coincidence between our maritime aggression on the Spanish colonies and a French irruption on the Pyrenees, what would not your apprehensions, your suspicions have been, if we had sacrificed our commercial rights and interests to a desire of propitiating Spain; and to the purpose (it might have been said) of leaving her hands more free to cope with the combination of the continental powers?

You are right, I dare say, in your belief that this proceeding of ours has “*blessé l’orgueil Espagnol.*” But at least it must have destroyed (in fact it *did* destroy) the illusion, that we had any thoughts of making common cause with Spain.

Nay, it did create, at the first moment, an impression that we were leagued with you, not in counsel only, but in action, against Spain; and it is against the remnant, or the possible revival, of that impression we are obliged

to guard, when, though speaking (as I have assured you) the language which you would dictate, we never decline speaking it in concert with you.

In truth, how *could* we speak in concert with you, not being prepared to adopt your conclusions ;—not having (to state the matter fairly) the same right as you to adopt them ? *You* say to Spain, “ Your present system is not only distasteful to us, it is practically injurious. It subjects us to incessant alarm ; it imposes upon us burdensome precautions. A period will arrive, and that shortly, when, if that system is not changed, we must revise our precautions, and change them for other means more direct and more efficacious.” I do not mistake your argument, I think ; I do not here intend to question, much less to combat it ; I am only showing you that *your* argument is not *ours* ; that we have neither the right to use it, nor the interest, which you believe yourselves to have—the *immediate* interest—in its successful application. A *general* interest we have, that Spain and every other country in Europe should be well governed ; a general interest we have, that the peace of Europe, and particularly the peace between France and Spain, which is the most imminently and obviously in danger, should be preserved.

But if your interest in the amendment of the Spanish constitution is such, that you feel yourselves justified in saying, “ Amend it, or we make war upon you ;” if ours, on the other hand, is only such as may authorise us to say, “ Amend it *for your own* sakes, we conjure you, or you hazard a war with France ;” is not the difference between these two addresses such as makes it impossible that they should be uttered in concert ? Would not the

uttering them in concert change essentially the character of one or other of the speakers? would it not dilute your menace into a remonstrance, or exasperate our representation into a declaration of hostility? and, not intending hostility, is not our best chance of a favourable hearing with Spain to be derived from a tone corresponding with our intentions? If “l’orgueil Espagnol” is the obstacle to enforce concession, is it not advisable to keep *one* channel open, through which concession might appear to be made to reason, and not to force? I do not warrant to you the chances of success through that channel. I am become less sanguine than I was in the hope of it. Things have fallen out untowardly, and contrary, I confess, to my calculation. I did expect that the French despatch would not be delivered till after those of Russia, &c. It has preceded them. I reckoned much upon the interval that would follow the departure of the three chargés d’affaires—the minister of France still remaining at Madrid; and, as I understood M. de Villèle’s despatch to M. la Garde, (but I presume incorrectly,) waiting for some *new* fact to justify his departure. It now seems as if M. la Garde were to follow his three colleagues more closely, and on nearly the same grounds. I think these changes unfortunate. But still I do not despair; I do not despair if you continue to be for peace, and if your just estimate of the dangers of war to France does not yield to your belief of its facilities, and your anticipation of its glories. But I own some of your topics alarm me, more than your reasonings tranquillise me upon that point.

When I speak of the dangers of war to France, do not suppose that I undervalue her resources or power. She

is as brave and as strong as she ever was before; she is now the richest, the most abounding in disposable means, of all the states in Europe. Here are all the sinews of war, if there be the disposition to employ them. You have a million of soldiers, you say, at your call. I doubt it not:—and it is double the number, or thereabouts, that Bonaparte buried in Spain. You consider a “*premier succès au moins*” as certain; I dispute it not. I grant you a French army at Madrid. But I venture to ask, “what then—if the King of Spain and the Cortes are by that time, where they infallibly will be, in the Isle of Leon?” I see plenty of war, if you once get into it: but I do not see a legitimate beginning to it, nor an intelligible object. You would disdain to get into such a war through the side-door of an accidental military incursion. You would enter in front, with the cause of war blazoned on your banner. And what is that cause? Is it to be learned from the notes or despatches of the four continental powers—or from M. de Villèle’s only? It is vengeance for the past, or security for the future. You disclaim the former, no doubt:—but how is the latter to be obtained by war? I understand a war of conquest; I understand a war of succession—a war for the change (on the one hand) or the conservation (on the other) of a peculiar dynasty. But a war for the modification of a political constitution; a war for the two Chambers; and for the extension of the legal prerogative—a war for such objects as these, I really do not understand, nor can I conceive how the operations of it are to be directed to such an end. You would not propagate *la Charte*, as Mahomed did *al Koran*; or as, in the earlier part of your revolution, France did the rights of man. Consider: is

there not some forbearance on the part of Spain, in not throwing these things in your teeth? Might she not, when informed that the change of her constitution has not been bloodless, desire that it should be compared with 1789 and 1792-3? Might she not, when accused by Russia of a *forcible* change of government, remind the Emperor Alexander of the events which preceded his own accession and the treaty of Tilsit, which made over Spain to Bonaparte? Might she not speak to Prussia of promises of free institutions made by a King, and violated? Might she not accept Prince Metternich's appeal to the former union of Spain and Austria, and, turning to us, (if we took part in the lecture,) say that she was ready, like England in 1688, to preserve her laws and liberties by a slight change in the reigning dynasty, and to place an Austrian prince, with enlarged powers, upon her throne? Surely the discussions with which the war has been prefaced, are as hazardous as the war itself. Consider before what an audience you plead: how many of their passions are against you, how few of their sympathies with you. In the beginning of the French revolution, the character of your Louis XVI. ranged all that was good in Europe on his side. Of Ferdinand is it not enough to say, that in the British Parliament, and not in the popular branch of it, but in the House of Lords, and not by a factious orator, but by the first minister of the King, (a man whose temperance and sobriety of judgment even his adversaries extol,) it has been admitted that the conduct of Ferdinand had "provoked a revolution." And do you make war to free such a monarch from all restraint? and do you hope to have mankind with you?

Judge of the confidence with which I mean to open

myself to you, when I hesitate not to submit such arguments as these to your consideration.

I have, however, detained you too long: only one word more. The arguments which I thus venture to address to you, do not imagine that I suggest to Spain. Far otherwise. With regard to the personal safety of the King, we have spoken at Madrid as plainly as you could wish us, or as you could speak. And I verily believe there is no danger. With regard to his prerogatives, we have not disguised our opinion that they ought to be enlarged; and I am not without hopes that a revisal of the constitution *is* intended. I am *sure* its imperfections are acknowledged. But *can* they *promise* a revisal of it under pain of invasion? Make the case your own. Would France yield anything to such a menace? Did she?

But so far is our language to Spain from being the language of encouragement to defiance, that I venture to affirm it is merely attributable to Sir W. A'Court's advice that the communications of the three powers were not met by an *instant* transmission of their passports: and while I am writing, I receive despatches of the 10th from Madrid, which inform me that it is under discussion in the Spanish cabinet, whether they shall not ask *our good offices* with *you*? I do not answer for the result of that discussion. But will you prevent the chance of such an opening for explanation and for peace? I trust not.

And so, for the present, farewell.

G. CANNING.

MR. CANNING TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

Foreign Office, January 24th, 1823.

I am enabled to perform the promise which I held out to you in my last letter, and to transmit to Sir Charles Stuart, by this day's messenger, a note from the Spanish government to Sir W. A'Court, requesting our good offices to avert a war. The assurances which that note contains, I confess, tranquillise *me* as to the point on which apprehension was felt, — especially in relation to the royal family of Spain. In any case the note invites discussion; and I trust you will feel it wholly impossible to decline the overture.

Mr. Jackson, who brought Sir W. A'Court's despatches, and is returning to Madrid with mine, has orders to wait your pleasure at Paris, and to be the bearer of anything that you may wish to say to Sir W. A'Court. Use A'Court as your own: there is no longer any danger of misapprehension at Madrid. I write to him, on the contrary, to communicate unreservedly upon everything with M. la Garde, if he is still there (as I hope he is); if not, to consider himself as M. la Garde's successor in everything in which he can be serviceable to the French government.

Peace, peace, peace.

It is still within your reach, with honour as well as with safety. But, turn political events as they may, I am, mon cher Vicomte, ever your friend and servant,

G. CANNING.

M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND TO MR. CANNING.

Paris, January. 27th, 1823.

If anything, my honourable friend, could make me change my opinion on the policy which France should follow, it would certainly be your letter of the 21st. I can conceive nothing more impressive and eloquent, but it leaves the difficulty untouched.

We are both agreed that the constitution of Spain should undergo modifications, but you think that these modifications should be effected by the Spanish government. What time do you assign for this desirable change? How many months, or years, must elapse ere we can without danger abandon those conservative measures that the Duke of Wellington has himself approved? Can we prolong to an uncertain future day the state of misery and violence into which the Spanish revolution has thrown us? Sir Charles Stuart has transmitted to me your short letter of the 24th, and the copy of the note to M. de San Miguel. What do I find in this note? That the Spanish government will retain its sentiments unchanged; that if there are defects in the constitution of the Cortes, it will be for the nation to correct these defects when and how it shall please, and that, in short, the government of Spain relies on the good offices of England. Wherefore? Because it has determined that we shall dissolve our army of observation! Is not this a proposition most contemptuously insulting? and is it possible to commence a negociation upon such a basis? You see, my honourable friend, they will drive us to extremities. It is not by throwing

ourselves at the feet of the revolutionists that we can secure our safety. We wish for peace: we invoke it with our most fervent prayers, but we will not have it with revolution. We will not daily see our soldiers corrupted, and our people inflamed. And do you think that England is less menaced than France by the clubs of Madrid? Have you not your Radicals, as we have our Jacobins? Is your powerful aristocracy less an object of hatred to modern levellers than the high royal prerogative of our monarchy? We have here a common enemy; legislative soldiers may declare, some morning, at London as well as Paris, that it is necessary to regenerate our institutions, destroy our two Chambers, and establish the sovereignty of the people *by the independence of the bayonet!*

The King has recalled his ministers from Madrid. Sir William A'Court therefore remains sole representative of the five great Powers; we willingly abandon ourselves to his good intentions to effect what he can for preserving to France peace with honour. Meanwhile we shall continue our preparations for war. The time that will elapse from the day on which I write to you, to that on which we shall commence hostilities, (if such hostilities are inevitable,) will suffice to obtain intelligence and settle everything. Now, my honourable friend, employ the resources of your genius in persuading the Spaniards to leave their King the privilege of consulting them on modifying their institutions. The day on which you shall announce such an effect of your efforts will be the happiest of my life. Happen what may, however, nothing can alter my high esteem for your country, and my affectionate sentiments for yourself.

CHATEAUBRIAND.

MR. CANNING TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

•Foreign Office, January 27th, 1823.

M. de Marcellus has tantalised me for the last four days, *mon cher* Vicomte, with the promise of a courier who was to bring him most important communications. But the courier does not arrive. I can hold out no longer; and therefore I send off a messenger, before the regular day, to Sir Charles Stuart, to beg that he, on his part, will also disregard the established order of our correspondence; and let me know, without delay, what has been done and is doing at Paris. To-morrow is a day with you of tremendous importance. God grant that it may have passed without a declaration of war, and all may yet be well.

Is it possible, meantime, that all that I hear, from other sources, of the excessive unpopularity of the apprehended war in France, can be true, and yet that you can be bent upon it? By “you,” I of course do not mean *you* individually, because I am sure that you are for peace, if not compelled to war, as a choice between evils. But what evil can be greater than the carrying on a war, with an unwilling people, against a people struggling for their national existence?—How long—I conjure you to consider—will the point of *honour*, on which you rely, and which I admit to be the main spring of French exertion—how long will that sustain you through the harassing difficulties and *inglorious* details of a war of posts and guerillas?

We have seen, in our time, many moments of crisis and alarm; many on the turn of which hung the fate of

nations. But I protest I do not recollect any instance in which I have thought so much at stake on a single decision. That decision is *to-day* in your hands. When you receive this letter, it will be (in one case) past your recal. May it have been such as to satisfy your own enlightened judgment; safe as well as honourable for France, and by consequence salutary for the world.

I hope you will be satisfied with our course now. Public report tells me that you (again meaning not *you*, M. de Chateaubriand, but France) cannot bear that *we* should negociate between a Bourbon and a Bourbon. In God's name, why not? Have we not negociated between a Bourbon and his people? and had you reason to suspect us of failing in that trust?

Even M. de Marcellus was surprised at this declaration, and perhaps did not more than half believe it; but what he has heard on Tuesday, and what he now hears every day, has, I dare say, satisfied him of the correctness of my opinion. "And what then?" you will perhaps say, "is France to truckle to the public voice of England? Is she not to assert her honour, and to maintain her security, if England objects to her mode of accomplishing those purposes?" Far be it from me to hazard any such doctrine! But I venture to suggest that in either of two views, the judgment of England cannot be quite *indifferent* to France. As a moral and enlightened people, it cannot be indifferent that the English nation, weighing the cause of France against Spain in the balance, should pronounce her pretexts for war frivolous, and her intended aggression unjust;—that it should be thus made plain to France beforehand, that in the course of this war (if unfortunately it should

begin) her success will be matter of regret, her failures matter of rejoicing to a whole friendly people. But, further, it cannot be indifferent to France to see that the Spanish war is considered by the instinctive sense of the people of England, untaught in this respect by their government, (and led indeed to believe that their government was of a different opinion,) as touching very nearly *English* interests.

In truth, why revive, *mon cher ami*, the recollection of times when Spain was the theatre of our contest and rivalry? Why revert to the succession war, and the family compact? M. de Montmorency avoided these topics, when he asked the English plenipotentiary at Verona what *appui*, moral or material, we would give to France, if unavoidably involved in a war with Spain?—a war, by the way, in all the questions at Verona, represented as purely *defensive* on the part of France.

Was it worth while to change those questions from “European” to “French,” for the purpose of pointing them against England? or did it escape your observation, that such *was* the effect of the new light in which the speech of the King of France has placed them?

Now, do not mount your war-horse, and say—what signifies after all the ill-will, or even the hostility of England? There *is no* ill-will—and God forbid that there should be hostility!—we are as peaceable as lambs. We want peace for ourselves, and for all the world; for you, our neighbours, especially; because we know, by woeful experience, to what danger we are exposed *paries cum proximus ardet*. But, in that pacific disposition, we do most peacefully complain that you have set us a task

almost as difficult as you have set the Spaniards. You have spoken aloud, before all the world, upon topics, which, in order to keep a strict and unalterable neutrality, we ought to have been enabled to treat as obsolete and forgotten.

You have approximated two epochs which had been long distinct in our minds; the war for Spain against Bonaparte, of which undoubtedly we had not forgotten either the origin or the termination;—with that of a century ago, the origin of which was perhaps the last thing of which we should like to be reminded—except its termination. And we think it rather hard, after having exhausted our blood and treasure in a war of six years *against France* to restore the *Bourbon* to the throne of Spain, to have it recalled to our recollection that there was a time when France placed them there in spite of us.

I really think it would have been better to keep the war *toute Européenne* as M. de Montmorency left it, than to change its nature to *toute Française*, in the sense in which that term is now applied.

The distinction between “European” and “French” we were perfectly ready to allow;—inasmuch as vicinity, and consequent liability to danger from contact or contagion, distinguished *your* claim to meddle in the concerns of Spain from that of the remoter continent. But when consanguinity of dynasties is pleaded as the ground of interference, we cannot help recollecting that that *last* French war in Spain (in which we triumphed) was undertaken by France to expel that dynasty;—and we do not take it kindly to be reminded that the last French war but *one* (in which we were foiled) was carried on to introduce it. We might have been allowed to forget the

battle of Almanza, when we had restored Ferdinand of Bourbon by the battle of the Pyrenees.

Besides—to revert to a suggestion in one of my former letters; if this *consanguinité* be alone or in great part the cause of the French invasion of Spain, (an invasion which all Europe, except the powers that were assembled at Verona, concur in deeming a great calamity,) do you not, in announcing the cause, indicate the remedy? Austria has already, whether awkwardly or maliciously, reminded the Spaniards of happy times, antecedent to the transfer of Spain, to the house of Bourbon; and we have our own cure for the misgovernment in 1688, too freshly and too constantly before our eyes, to have any objection to offer a similar expedient, if adopted by Spain. Indeed, indeed, my valued friend, you have stirred most inconvenient reflections!

And what is the result to which these reflections lead me? Why—as before, to the one only practicable and wholesome result—peace, peace. I thought this object desirable for France, (as for all the world,) *before* the speech of the King of France; I think it doubly so *since*. “Peace with honour!” To be sure, you place your honour in obtaining security—security from the dangers to which you say your vicinity exposes you. Be it so; we will labour with you, and for you, to obtain for you that security; we advise you to take it *small*; because, in good truth, the Spaniards have not much to give, be they ever so willing. But we advise you, taking it, to make the most of it—to cry it up as sufficient to justify you in discountenancing your preparations for invasion, “in laying down your arms,” if by that expres-

sion M. de Villèle means withdrawing the army of observation.

Leave the Spanish revolution to burn itself out within its own crater. You have nothing to apprehend from the eruption, if you do not open a channel for the lava through the Pyrenees.

Such are my opinions, honestly and sincerely given. Such, Lord Liverpool tells me, he believed to be *yours*, before you left this country in the summer. He regrets as much as he is surprised at the change.

It is not yet too late to save the world from a series of calamities. The key to the floodgate is yet in your hands. Unlock it, and who shall answer for the extent of devastation? "The beginning of strife is as the letting out of waters." So says inspired wisdom. Genius is akin to inspiration; and I pray that it may on this occasion profit by the warning of the parable—and pause!

Ever, my dear friend, your friend and admirer,

G. CANNING.

MR. CANNING TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

London, February 7th, 1823.

I scarcely know how to write to you to-day, my dear M. de Chateaubriand. I hesitate between the duty of sincerity and the fear of offence, till I have almost a mind not to write at all. But there is no end of such difficulties; or rather, if such difficulties are suffered to prevail, there is an end of our correspondence. And

that, I may say without flattery to you, or vanity on my own part, would, in the present crisis of affairs, be a national if not a *European* misfortune. I write therefore, and will write the truth; subject, I am afraid, to some possible misconstruction, and to the risk of what may be distasteful, but with no other intention (*ita Deus adjuvet!*) than that of consulting your ease and honour as well as my own, and the interests of both our governments; and in the confidence that, even if you distrust my judgment, you cannot doubt my friendship.

Well then, to begin at once with what is most unpleasant to utter; you have united the opinions of the whole nation, *as those of one man*, against France. You have excited against the present sovereign of that kingdom, the feelings which were directed against the *usurper* of France and Spain in 1808: nay, the consent, I am grieved to say, is *more* perfect than on that occasion: for then the Jacobins were loath to inculcate their idol; now they, and the Whigs and Tories, from one end of the country to the other, are all one way. Surely such a spontaneous and universal burst of national sentiment must lead any man, or any set of men, who are acting in opposition to it, to *doubt* whether they are acting quite right. The government has not on this occasion *led* the public; quite otherwise. The language of the government has been peculiarly measured and temperate, and its discretion far more guarded than usual; so much so, that the mass of the nation were in suspense as to the opinions of the government, and that portion of the daily press usually devoted to them was (for some reasons better known perhaps on your side of the water than on ours) turned in a directly opposite course. I was not

without expectation of such an ebullition. M. de Marcellus will probably have told you that I did express such an expectation to him, and that I assured him of my perfect conviction that if the word "neutrality" had found its way into the speech, we should have had to combat the combined efforts of all parties in the House of Commons to get rid of it. Even if you distrust us, what hinders you from negotiating for yourselves? Only negotiate, at least, before you invade.

Ever, my dear M. de Chateaubriand, with the sincerest regard and admiration, yours,

G. CANNING.

COMMUNICATION OF THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR.

Extract from the Russian Despatch to General Pozzo di Borgo of the 3d and 15th, and from the Document annexed to it.

The Emperor still flatters himself that moderation will pervade the councils of the English government, which will not, by a rupture with France, run the chance of cutting asunder the ties which unite it with the Continent. But if, contrary to all expectation, England should declare war against France to prevent his Most Christian Majesty from rendering the most essential of services to Spain, his Imperial Majesty authorises his ambassador at once to assure the cabinet of the Tuileries that his intentions are not changed, and that, for his part, he shall regard the attack directed against France as a general attack upon the whole of the allies, and that he shall meet, without hesitation, the consequences of this principle. Certain of this support, the Emperor exhorts

the King to consummate his measures, and march with confidence against the authors of trouble and misery.

Acting in this spirit, the Emperor calls to mind the question agitated at the congress, relative to marching an army on the western frontier of the empire as a measure necessary to European safety.

The cabinet then separated without coming to any decision on this point; but the matter has been agitated anew. His Imperial Majesty is ready to establish an army of observation in his dominions.

Extract from the Despatch of Count Nesselrode to M. Tatischeff, dated 3rd and 15th March.

In this despatch to M. de Tatischeff, the Emperor replies to the overture of the King of Naples. His Imperial Majesty prays that this sovereign may return to his kingdom, and watch over the government of his possessions.

Extract from the Despatch addressed to Count Lieven.

The Emperor orders his ambassador to express to the British Cabinet the same sentiments; to remind it that in similar circumstances the opposition had encountered eloquent adversaries among the members of the ministry; that Lord Liverpool had often been of this number; that he applied himself more than once to strengthening the bonds of the alliance; that the cabinet seems to have forgotten this circumstance.

Count Lieven has orders to express himself in these terms to Mr. Canning, and to inform him that his Imperial Majesty has been surprised to find that England should think that principle alarming in the mouth of the

King of France, which it had implicitly admitted in all those transactions which had France for their object; and that it should declare that cause just and equitable in Spain which it had supported neither at Naples nor in Piedmont.

M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND TO MR. CANNING.

Paris, March 10th, 1823.

I have long, my honourable friend, owed you an answer: my excuse must be the multitude of affairs by which I am oppressed. I cannot resume the subject where your letter left it, for affairs have since moved considerably onward.

You perceive that we have not ceased to temporise, in order to give occasion to the wise men of Madrid to put an end, without the effusion of blood, to the misery of their country; but every thing must have a termination, and you know that it would be impossible to prolong the condition in which we are, without the most serious inconvenience to ourselves. If, indeed, we are forced to enter Spain, be assured that we shall only do so with intentions the most pacific, and a sincere desire to leave it quietly, and to listen to any proposition that may put an end to the calamities of war. Our affair with Spain, if nothing is done to complicate it, will alter nothing in Europe. We ask nothing, we want nothing, we complain of nobody; but, my honourable friend, we might complain amiably of the permission given by your government for the exportation of arms. In prohibiting this from our own coasts, the neutrality would have remained the same, and we should have been less disadvantageously situated;

but if this should cost us the lives of a few more soldiers, they are accustomed to sell their lives dearly, and we have a million to replace them. Thus we do not complain.

I might also complain a little of your friendship. However, if it could not defend me from the ignoble and calumnious attacks of Mr. Brougham, it is for particular reasons. For myself, my honourable friend, if ever you are attacked from our tribune, be assured that no political reasons shall prevent me saying all I know of your talents and character.

Continue, my honourable friend, in your benevolent principles; I shall expect that the mob will not break your windows for my sending you an ambassador. When the Radicals have done with the Duke of San Lorenzo, and he shall be forgotten, we may perhaps hope for some favour.

You are aware, my honourable friend, of my entire and perfect devotion.

Yours with my whole heart,

CHATEAUBRIAND.

M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND TO GENERAL GUILLEMINOT.

Paris, March 23rd, 1823.

I have the honour to send you, General, the proclamation of Monseigneur the Duke d'Angoulême, in French and Spanish. We conceive that it will be impossible for us to have it printed here, without the printers being robbed of some copies. You will receive it as it has been ratified by the council and approved by the King, and

you will cause it to be printed at Bayonne in the two languages. You will put the date to it. We think it would be better dated the 2nd or 3rd April. You will immediately transmit a number of copies to Perpignan for the army of Catalonia, and cause it to be dispersed profusely throughout Spain. The Minister at War thinks that the invasion should take place on the 7th April. Thus the proclamation will precede you five days.

M. de Caux, our diplomatic agent, is arrived from Berlin. He will set out to join you on Tuesday. You will be very well satisfied with him. He has passed a great part of his life in Spain, understands Spanish as well as French, and unites great moderation of character with the habit of exertion. M. de Martignac, the civil commissary, sets out to-morrow.

Your grand object will be the formation of the Spanish council. The Archbishop of Tarragona, who is named president, will neither separate himself from M. Marta Florida, nor join M. Eguia. The latter has powers from Ferdinand, and it will be next to impossible not to admit him into the council; but, on the other hand, his name is a terror to those who side with the Cortes. I should hope that the presence of Monseigneur the Duke d'Angoulême would settle all this. We must get to Madrid as we can: arrived there, we shall establish the provisional government, and then it will be more easy to conciliate interests and self-love. Messrs. Erro and Calderon, intended members of the council, who are still here, will set out to-morrow for Bayonne.

I am constantly conferring with the Minister at War on the subject of provisions. He invariably answers me

that you want nothing. Meanwhile I invite, at all events, men of business to despatch vessels loaded with oats, forage, and other provisions, to Bayonne, so as to open a market there in case of necessity. If, as I hope, the ports of the Spanish coast will be opened to you as you advance into Spain, you will receive much assistance from them.

Above all, General, spare no pains to get possession of places; they will not only give security to your march, but if they fall before you as you are entering Spain, the moral effect of these successes will be immense throughout the Peninsula. I am not without some inquietude with regard to Catalonia: Mina has drawn to a head there, and certainly the French and Piedmontese refugees, united to the English who have arrived as volunteers, will stand firm, and, may be, panic-strike at first some of our raw troops. Do you not think that a thousand or twelve hundred men of the guard might be useful in this quarter? England has just declared its neutrality, but we cannot await its good offices: without appearing to do so, it will work us all the mischief it can. It will be essential to raise and arm the Gallicias, which will cut off all communication with Corunna. Here will be the rendezvous of all the malcontents and succours from the Radicals of England. If we could seize on this port, or place it in the hands of the royalists, it would be a great point gained. Perhaps an enterprise by sea would succeed.

You have here, M. le Comte, a very long letter. Write to me, I beseech you, whenever you have time, and depend wholly upon me.

Believe entirely in my devotion, and receive the renewed assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

CHATEAUBRIAND.

M. GENTZ TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

Vienna, March 8th, 1823.

M. le Vicomte,

I have just read, for the second time, one of the finest orations that has ever been delivered in a public assembly. It scarcely becomes me to speak my admiration of it to your Excellency, as if I had been unaware that you had never lifted up your voice on this great question but to treat it with a decided superiority. Neither is it to the eloquence of this speech that I pay the tribute of my homage; it is inherent in all your compositions, M. le Vicomte, but here it is of a kind at once so characteristic and elevated, that the speech is not like one that can be pronounced upon dogmatically. But the force of the reasoning and logic, the choice of arguments, the appropriate introduction of the most profound reflections, the victorious manner in which the most pointed objections are examined and answered—this, in my eyes, is that which constitutes the distinguishing merit of this *chef-d'œuvre*.

Your Excellency has not time to read long letters, nor is in any need of my eulogies. I am entering on no problematical question. It is an irresistible feeling which prompts these lines, and I have a strong internal conviction that if the Spanish expedition is executed as it has been advocated, it will infallibly lead to the glory of France and the safety of Europe.

Believe, M. le Vicomte, in the assurance of every respectful sentiment with which I am

Your Excellency's


Most obedient and devoted Servant,


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
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